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' `"CG Times 12ptXR& 8BibliogrphyBibliography0....fp2Doc InitInitialize Document StyleS !    I. 1. A. a.(1)(a) i) a)S ($0 ($0 0 (($0 0 0   A_ekqwDocumentDocument StyleI.1.A.a.(1)(a)i)a)jo4Tech InitInitialize Technical StyleS #  1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 S CuyTechnicalTechnical Document Style11.11.1.11.1.1.11.1.1.1.11.1.1.1.1.11.1.1.1.1.1.11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1x?t2PleadingHeader for numbered pleading paper % z &(  XXXXX6/''*d66/''*d6\\ 1\\ 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28  .+(2/$ 0!   )*(2$0 0 0 0 (<$0 0 0 0 0 $35;AGMU]c1I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)  CRight ParRight-Aligned Paragraph NumbersI.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)#|G' `"CG Times 12ptXXp Prk;XP d($# e37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)Demers - Co.Ed.'96  4 ' HELPDESK0HELPDESK .   䀞!0 U 0!  C + $#1C  @6FLORIDACONFERENCEOFCOUNTYCOURT `     `     h JUDGES@ >WINTEROF1995/1996 0   @ :PARTIALCRIMINALLAWUPDATE x @<<;By:JudgeDavidA.Demers      0-() Ї@FF8Copyright1996DavidA.Demers@>AllRightsReserved@::=INTRODUCTORYCOMMENTS   @G@22< I.PurposeofOutline. P     Thematerialcontainedinthisoutlinewaspreparedfortwopurposes:(1)toprovidea 0  structureforasegmentofajudicialcoursedealingwithrecentcriminalcasesandotherdevelopmentsand(2)toprovideareadyandrelativelyusefulsourceforjudgestoregularlyuseindealingwithcriminalmatters.@JJ< II.Courseobjectives.     Theobjectivesofthiscourseareasfollows:    1.Theparticipantswillbeabletomoreeffectivelyanticipateandruleonmattersthatcomebeforethemincriminalcases.  2.Theparticipantswillhaveabetterunderstandingofrecentdevelopmentsincriminallaw.  3.Theparticipantswillbeabletoquicklylocateauthoritiesintheareasofcriminallawthatarecoveredthroughtheuseofthisoutline.@; III.Commentsonoutline. @   Thisoutlinecovers:(1)someU.S.SupremeCourtdecisions;(2)ManyFloridaSupreme   CourtopinionsandDistrictCourtopinionspublishedintheSouthernReporterfrom650So.2dto658So.2d.Thiscoversmanyofthecasesfor1995uptoaboutAugustof1995.Pleasenotethattherearemanydecisionsthathavenotbeenincludedinthisoutlinefromthecoveredperiod,buttheymayappearinfutureoutlines.Sometopicshavebeenleftvacateforfutureuse.  Therearecertainareasthatarenotcoveredduetotheneedtoplacesomelimitationsonthescopeofthematerial.Thoseareasinclude:mattersrelatingexclusivelytocapitalcases,sentencingguidelines,forfeitures,postconvictionrelief,andavarietyofspecificoffenses.  Thelawchangesrapidlysoitiswisetoshepardizethesecasesbeforeyourelyonthem.Severaldecisionsfromprioroutlinesareincludedforvariousreasons,buttheoutlineisnotcumulative.  Anycommentsthatmightimprovethismaterialorcoursearewelcome.Suchcommentsmaybeprovidedbyletterorbytelephone. -@), Ї   `     h      p JudgeDavidA.Demers     `     h      p St.Petersburg,Florida   `     h      p (813)5827836 x   @? TABLEOFCONTENTS   (  8   DISCOVERY#L"L"{(#.\ \   #1   8  0`     Applicationofdiscoveryrules#L"L"{(#.7` ` #1 p 8  0`     Whatmustbedisclosed?#L"L"{(#.0` ` #1 `  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Impeachmentandrebuttalmaterial#L"L"{(#.ppB #1 P  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Criminalrecordsandacts#L"L"{(#.: #1 @  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Statements#L"L"{(#. + #1 0  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Confidentialinformants#L"L"{(#.8 #1  p  8  0`     Statementofparticulars#L"L"{(#.1` ` #2 `  8  0`     Richardsoninquiry#L"L"{(#. +` ` #2 P  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Whenisitrequired?#L"L"{(#.5 #2 @  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Sufficiency#L"L"{(#. , #3 0  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Discoveryviolations#L"L"{(#.5 #4   8  0`   0 ` `  ` Harmlesserror#L"L"{(#.((/ #4  8  0`     BradyViolations&RelatedMatters#L"L"{(#.;` ` #5  8  0`     Sanctions#L"L"{(#. "` ` #5  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Dismissal#L"L"{(#.t t * #5  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Witnessexclusion#L"L"{(#.2 #5  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Continuances#L"L"{(#. - #6 p 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Speedytrialdischarge#L"L"{(#.hh7 #6 ` 8  0`     Depositions#L"L"{(#. $` ` #6 P  8   SPEEDYTRIAL#L"L"{(#.p p   #6 0  8  0`     Whentimebeginstorun#L"L"{(#.0` ` #7  p 8  0`     Application#L"L"{(#. $` ` #7 ` 8  0`     Demands#L"L"{(#. ` ` #7 P 8  0`     Waiver,extensions,&tolling#L"L"{(#.6` ` #7 @ 8  0`     Availability#L"L"{(#. %` ` #8 0 8  0`     MotionsforDischarge#L"L"{(#.<<.` ` #8   8  0`   0 ` `  ` Generally#L"L"{(#.x x * #8 ! 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Prose#L"L"{(#.` ` ' #9 "  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Discoveryviolation#L"L"{(#.4 #9 #! 8  0`     Constitutionalrighttospeedytrial#L"L"{(#.=` ` #9 $"  8   SEARCHANDSEIZURE#$"$"{(#. "  #10 p&!$  8  0`     Generalprinciples#$"$"{(#. +` ` #10 `'"% 8  0`     Thresholdissuesandproceduralconsiderations#$"$"{(#.G` ` #10 P(#& 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Sufficiencyanduseofthemotionandprocedure#$"$"{(#.P #10 @)$' 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Credibility#$"$"{(#. , #10 0*%( 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Remedy#$"$"{(#. ' #11  +p&) 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Subjectsofsuppression#$"$"{(#.8 #11 ,`'* 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Governmentagents#$"$"{(#.2 #11 -P(+ 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Expectationofprivacy,propertyinterest&standing#$"$"{(#.  U #11 -@), 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Detention,Search&Seizure#$"$"{(#.= #12  8  0`     Warrants#$"$"{(#. !` ` #15  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Sufficiencyoftheaffidavit#$"$"{(#.= #15  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Sufficiencyofwarrant#$"$"{(#.7 #16  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Executionofwarrant#$"$"{(#.5 #16 p 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  KnockandAnnounce#$"$"{(#.<  #16 `  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Areaandpersonstobesearched#$"$"{(#.I  #16 P  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Roleofofficers#$"$"{(#.:  #16 @  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Searchofahome#$"$"{(#.1 #16 0  8  0`     Exceptionstowarrantrequirement#$"$"{(#.  :` ` #16  p  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Consensualencounters#$"$"{(#.6 #16 `  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Schoolsandstudents#$"$"{(#.5 #18 P  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Investigatorystops#$"$"{(#.XX4 #18 @  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Generalprinciples#$"$"{(#.<  #18 0  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Specifickindsofinformationandobservations#$"$"{(#.X  #18   8  0`   0 ` ` 0 0h    Highcrimeareaorcontactwithcriminal#$"$"{(#.Zh h #18  8  0`   0 ` ` 0 0h    Tips,informants,andBOLOS#$"$"{(#.Mh h #21  8  0`   0 ` ` 0 0h    Othercircumstances#$"$"{(#.Eh h #25  8  0`   0 ` ` 0 0h    Specificoffenses#$"$"{(#.ppCh h #25  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Righttosearch,seize,°reeofrestraint#$"$"{(#.W  #25  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Consent#$"$"{(#. ( #25 p 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Burdenandstandards#$"$"{(#.>  #26 ` 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Authoritytoconsent#$"$"{(#.<<>  #26 P 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Voluntariness#$"$"{(#.7  #26 @ 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Scope#$"$"{(#. /  #26 0 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Incidentaltoarrestorprobablecause#$"$"{(#.00G #27  p 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Lawfulnessofarrest#$"$"{(#.44>  #27 ` 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Probablecause#$"$"{(#.||8  #27 P 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Proximitytotimeandplaceofarrest#$"$"{(#.||O  #28 @ 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Plainvieworopenview#$"$"{(#.((8 #28 0 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Abandonment#$"$"{(#. , #29   8  0`   0 ` `  ` Exigentcircumstances#$"$"{(#.xx6 #30 ! 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Motorvehiclesandboats#$"$"{(#.``9 #31 "  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Generalrules#$"$"{(#.7  #31 #! 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Stopsfortrafficoffensesordrivingbehavior#$"$"{(#.X  #31 $" 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Investigatorystop#$"$"{(#.dd<  #31 % # 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Probablecause#$"$"{(#.||8  #33 p&!$ 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Incidentaltoarrest#$"$"{(#.>  #33 `'"% 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Durationofstopandscopeofsearch#$"$"{(#.ppN  #33 P(#& 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  PretextualStop#$"$"{(#.9  #34 @)$' 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Subjectofsearch#$"$"{(#.,,;  #39 0*%( 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Roadblocks#$"$"{(#.dd4  #40  +p&) 8  0`     Exceptionstoconstitutionalrequirements#$"$"{(#.,,B` ` #40 ,`'* 8  0`   0 ` `  ` "GoodFaith"exception#$"$"{(#.7 #40 -P(+ 8  0`   0 ` `  ` InevitableDiscovery#$"$"{(#.5 #41 -@), 8  0`     Electronicsurveillance#$"$"{(#.HH0` ` #43   8   ADMISSIBILITYOFSTATEMENTSANDCONFESSIONS#$"$"{(#.<<;  #44   8  0`     Privilegeagainstselfincrimination#$"$"{(#.00=` ` #44  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Application#$"$"{(#.  , #44 p 8  0`   0 ` `  ` CustodialinterrogationbypoliceagentsforpurposesofMiranda#$"$"{(#.a #44 `  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Invocationofrights#$"$"{(#.5 #46 P  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Voluntarinessofstatement#$"$"{(#.; #47 @  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Unlawfularrestorentryintohome#$"$"{(#.C #48 0  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Impeachment#$"$"{(#. , #48  p  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Commentonexerciseofrighttoremainsilent#$"$"{(#.N #48 `  8  0`     RighttoCounsel#$"$"{(#.h h )` ` #49 P  8  0`     AccidentReportPrivilege#$"$"{(#.PP2` ` #49 @  8  0`     CorpusDelicti#$"$"{(#. '` ` #49 0  8  0`     Otherprivilegedcommunications#$"$"{(#.8` ` #49   8  0`     Electronicsurveillanceofconversations.#$"$"{(#.44C` ` #49   8   PRETRIALMATTERS#$"$"{(#.   #50   8  0`     Righttoeffectiveassistanceofcounsel#$"$"{(#.hhA` ` #50  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Righttocounsel#$"$"{(#.1 #50  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Natureofright#$"$"{(#.9  #50 p 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Waiver#$"$"{(#.0  #50 ` 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Righttoappointedcounsel#$"$"{(#.; #50 P 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Selfrepresentation#$"$"{(#.XX4 #51 @ 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Interferencewithright#$"$"{(#.8 #55 0 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Dealingwithproblemswithcounsel#$"$"{(#.C #55  p 8  0`     Preliminaryhearings#$"$"{(#. -` ` #61 ` 8  0`     Pretrialrelease#$"$"{(#. )` ` #61 P 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Delayinfilingcharges#$"$"{(#.8 #61 @ 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Righttobail#$"$"{(#.\ \ . #61 0 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Settingofbail#$"$"{(#. 0 #61   8  0`   0 ` `  ` Estreature&forfeitureofbond#$"$"{(#.XX@ #61 ! 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Modification&revocation#$"$"{(#.: #62 "  8  0`     Disqualificationofthejudgeorprosecutor#$"$"{(#.D` ` #63 #! 8  0`     Severanceandconsolidation#$"$"{(#.4` ` #65 $" 8  0`     MotionsToDismiss#$"$"{(#. +` ` #65 % # 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Deficiencyinchargingdocumentorprocedure#$"$"{(#.@@M #65 p&!$ 8  0`   0 ` `  ` PretrialIntervention#$"$"{(#.6 #66 `'"% 8  0`   0 ` `  ` (C)(4)Motion#$"$"{(#. . #67 P(#& 8  0`   0 ` `  ` DoubleJeopardy#$"$"{(#.0 #68 @)$' 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Generalprinciples#$"$"{(#.<  #68 0*%( 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Waiver#$"$"{(#.0  #69  +p&) 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  MultipleProsecutions#$"$"{(#.?  #69 ,`'* 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Multiplechargesinthesameprosecution#$"$"{(#.R  #72 -P(+ 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Mistrialbasedonmanifestnecessity#$"$"{(#.<<N  #73 -@), 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  CollateralEstoppel#$"$"{(#.=  #73  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Sentencing#$"$"{(#.,,4  #74  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Constitutionality#$"$"{(#.2 #74  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Limitations#$"$"{(#. , #76  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Mattersrelatingtothevalidityoftheapprehensionofthedefendant#$"$"{(#.f #77 p 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Conductofinformantsandlawenforcementofficers.#$"$"{(#.U #77 `  8  0`     0` ` ` Competency#$"$"{(#.T T +` ` #77 P  8  0`     Venue#$"$"{(#.  ` ` #79 @  8  0`     Continuances#$"$"{(#.H H %` ` #79 0  8  0`     Changesofplea#$"$"{(#.$ $ (` ` #79  p  8  0`     Absenceofdefendant#$"$"{(#. -` ` #81 `   8   COMMONEVIDENTIARYPROBLEMSARISINGDURINGTRIAL#$"$"{(#.||@  #82 @   8  0`     Relevanceandprejudice#$"$"{(#.0` ` #82 0  8  0`     Hearsay#$"$"{(#. ` ` #83   8  0`   0 ` `  ` Whatconstituteshearsay?#$"$"{(#.: #83  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Spontaneousstatementsandexcitedutterances#$"$"{(#.N #83  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Testimonyastowhatwitnesswastoldtoprovidelogicalsequence#$"$"{(#.b #84  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Priorconsistentstatements#$"$"{(#.< #84  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Priorinconsistentstatements#$"$"{(#.xx> #84  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Statementsformedicaldiagnosisandtreatment#$"$"{(#.ddO #84 p 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Priortestimony#$"$"{(#.PP0 #84 ` 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Businessrecords#$"$"{(#.1 #85 P 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Childabusecases#$"$"{(#.2 #85 @ 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Statementsagainstinterest#$"$"{(#.< #86 0 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Activitiesofapublicoffice#$"$"{(#.  > #86  p 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Conspiracy#$"$"{(#. + #86 ` 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Invitedresponse#$"$"{(#.1 #87 P 8  0`     Impeachment#$"$"{(#.H H $` ` #87 @ 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Subjectofimpeachment#$"$"{(#.7 #87 0 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Criminalhistoryandpriorbadacts#$"$"{(#.D #90   8  0`   0 ` `  ` Circumstancesshowingbias#$"$"{(#.XX; #91 ! 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Statements#$"$"{(#. + #91 "  8  0`     Othercrimesorbadactsassubstantiveevidence#$"$"{(#.xxI` ` #91 #! 8  0`     Otherbadactsandothergoodacts#$"$"{(#.;` ` #93 $" 8  0`     Taperecordings#$"$"{(#.( ( (` ` #94 % # 8  0`     Character#$"$"{(#.  "` ` #94 p&!$ 8  0`     Privilegedcommunications#$"$"{(#.2` ` #94 `'"% 8  0`     EyewitnessIdentification#$"$"{(#.2` ` #95 P(#& 8  0`     Credibility#$"$"{(#.t t $` ` #95 @)$' 8  0`     Evidenceofevasionofprosecution#$"$"{(#.88;` ` #95 0*%(  8   SCIENTIFICEVIDENCEANDOPINIONTESTIMONY.#$"$"{(#.XX:  #96 ,`'*  8  0`     Predicateandstandardsforexpertopinion.#$"$"{(#.D` ` #96 -P(+ 8  0`     Typesofscientificevidence#$"$"{(#.5` ` #98 -@), 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Polygraph#$"$"{(#. * #98  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Batteredwoman'ssyndrome#$"$"{(#.ll: #98  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Sexoffenderprofiles#$"$"{(#.6 #98  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Psychologicaltestimonyastovictim#$"$"{(#.E #98  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Childabusecases#$"$"{(#.2 #98 p 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Hypnoticallyrefreshedtestimony#$"$"{(#.A #99 `  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Differenttheories#$"$"{(#.3 #99 P  8  0`     LayOpinion#!!{(#. $` ` #100 @  8  0`     Appointmentofexpert#!!{(#.@@.` ` #100 0   8   OTHERISSUESARISINGDURINGTHETRIALORSUBSEQUENTTOTRIAL `  #!!{(#.  #101 8  0`     Jurymatters#!!{(#. %` ` #101 @  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Waiver#!!{(#. ' #101 0  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Discriminationinchallenges#!!{(#.tt= #101   8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Meetinginitialburden#!!{(#.@  #101  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Properprocedure#!!{(#.@@:  #103  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Sufficiencyofreasonsforchallenge#!!{(#.,,N  #103  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Remedy#!!{(#.PP0  #104  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Voirdire#!!{(#.L L * #104  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Juryselectionandmultiplejuries#!!{(#.C #104 p 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Challengesforcause#!!{(#.5 #104 ` 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Timeforandmatterofchallenges#!!{(#.88B #109 P 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Juryinstructions&contact#!!{(#.< #109 @ 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Standardinstructions#!!{(#.dd?  #109 0 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Instructionsonelementsanddefenses#!!{(#.O  #109  p 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Lesserincludedinstructions#!!{(#.F  #110 ` 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Waiver#!!{(#.0  #110 P 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Unusualinstructionsormodifications#!!{(#.O  #110 @ 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Specialinstructions#!!{(#.>  #111 0 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Curativeandlimitinginstructions#!!{(#.hhL  #111   8  0`   0 ` `  ` Jurymisconductorproblems#!!{(#.< #111 ! 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Jurydeliberations#!!{(#.3 #112 "  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Juryverdict#!!{(#.( ( - #112 #! 8  0`     Presenceofdefendantandthejudge#!!{(#.<` ` #112 $" 8  0`     Presentationofevidence#!!{(#.1` ` #114 % # 8  0`     Competencyofwitnesses#!!{(#.0` ` #115 p&!$ 8  0`     ConfrontationandCrossexamination#!!{(#.<` ` #116 `'"% 8  0`     RedirectandRebuttal#!!{(#. .` ` #116 P(#& 8  0`     Impropercomments#!!{(#.l l *` ` #117 @)$' 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Bythejudge#!!{(#.h h - #117 0*%( 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Bytheprosecutorordefensecounsel#!!{(#.  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(` ` #146 p 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Theftrelatedoffenses#!!{(#.HH7 #147 `  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Badcheckcharges#!!{(#.DD2 #147 P  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Trespass&burglarycharges#!!{(#.< #147 @  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Criminalmischief#!!{(#.2 #147 0  8  0`     Telephonecalls#!!{(#. (` ` #147  p  8  0`     Violentcrimes#!!{(#. '` ` #148 `  8  0`     Weapons#!!{(#. ` ` #148 P  8  0`     Sexuallyrelatedoffenses#!!{(#.2` ` #149 @  8  0`     Witnesstampering#!!{(#. *` ` #149 0   8   DEFENSES#!!{(#.  #150   8  0`     Entrapment#!!{(#. #` ` #150  8  0`     Alibi#!!{(#.` ` #150  8  0`     Selfdefense#!!{(#. %` ` #150  8  0`     Mentalcondition#!!{(#.p p )` ` #150  8  0`     Voluntaryintoxication#!!{(#.00/` ` #151 p  8   PENALTY#!!{(#.dd  #152 P  8  0`     Procedure#!!{(#.@ @ "` ` #152 @ 8  0`     Factorsthatthecourtmayconsider#!!{(#.HH<` ` #152 0 8  0`     Licensesuspension#!!{(#.  +` ` #152  p 8  0`     Concurrentvs.Consecutivesentences#!!{(#.=` ` #152 ` 8  0`     Creditfortimeserved#!!{(#./` ` #154 P 8  0`     HabitualOffenders#!!{(#.  +` ` #154 @ 8  0`     Modificationorenhancement#!!{(#.``4` ` #154 0 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Termsofpleaagreement#!!{(#.PP8 #154   8  0`   0 ` `  ` Misdemeanortofelony#!!{(#.6 #154 ! 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Vindictiveness#!!{(#./ #155 "  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Time#!!{(#.  % #155 #! 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Conditionsofprobation#!!{(#.8 #156 $" 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Priorconvictions#!!{(#.2 #156 % # 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Mandatoryminimumsentences#!!{(#.PP< #156 p&!$ 8  0`     Splitsentences#!!{(#. (` ` #156 `'"% 8  0`     Illegalsentence#!!{(#. )` ` #157 P(#& 8  0`     Probationandcommunitycontrol#!!{(#.8` ` #157 @)$' 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Nature&Application#!!{(#.LL5 #157 0*%( 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Term#!!{(#.  % #157  +p&) 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Conditions#!!{(#. + #158 ,`'* 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Announcementontherecord#!!{(#.D  #158 -P(+ 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Validityofproperlyannouncedconditions#!!{(#.00S  #162 -@), 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Meaningofconditions#!!{(#.?  #166  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Violationsofprobation#!!{(#.8 #166  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Waiver&ValidityofCondition#!!{(#.H  #166  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Jurisdiction#!!{(#.``6  #168  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Sufficiencyofaffidavit#!!{(#.B  #168 p 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  RightsofDefendant#!!{(#.$$=  #169 `  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Procedureathearing#!!{(#.TT>  #173 P  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  RulesofEvidence#!!{(#.;  #173 @  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Willful&substantialviolation#!!{(#.hhI  #174 0  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Sufficiencyofevidence#!!{(#.44A  #174  p  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Judgment,OrderofRevocation,&Sentence#!!{(#.S  #174 `  8  0`   0 ` ` 0 0h    Form#!!{(#.6h h #174 P  8  0`   0 ` ` 0 0h    Nonwillfulviolations#!!{(#.Hh h #175 @  8  0`   0 ` ` 0 0h    Additionalprobation#!!{(#.Fh h #175 0  8  0`   0 ` ` 0 0h    Creditfortimeserved#!!{(#.  Hh h #183   8  0`   0 ` ` 0 0h    Otheroptions#!!{(#.dd?h h #185  8  0`     Costsandfees#!!{(#. '` ` #185  8  0`     Restitution#!!{(#.t t $` ` #188  8  0`   0 ` `  ` Procedure#!!{(#. * #188  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Timeforsetting#!!{(#.:  #188  8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Noticeandopportunitytobeheard#!!{(#.L  #188 p 8  0`   0 ` ` 0  Righttocounsel#!!{(#.:  #189 ` 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Delegation#!!{(#. + #189 P 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Waiver#!!{(#. ' #189 @ 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Victims,TypesofCases,andCausation#!!{(#.,,G #189 0 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Abilitytopay#!!{(#. / #190  p 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Amount#!!{(#. ' #190 ` 8  0`   0 ` `  ` Collection#!!{(#. + #191 P  8   POSTCONVICTIONRELIEF#!!{(#.%  #193 0  8  0`     MotionforPostConvictionRelief#!!{(#.:` ` #193   8  0`     Sealingofrecords#!!{(#. +` ` #193 ! 8  0`     MotionsforNewTrial#!!{(#.PP.` ` #193 "  8  0`     ReturnofProperty#!!{(#. +` ` #193 #! 8  0`     Appeals#!!{(#. ` ` #193 $"  C   p&!$  7XXdXXd7 2  I  .3  0   DISCOVERY .(#(#   2  A  .3  0 `  Applicationofdiscoveryrules . ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 Theserulesfordiscoveryonpostconvictionmattershavebeenissued:(1) p  "'Onamotionwhichsetsforthgoodreason...thecourtmayallow `  limiteddiscoveryintomatterswhicharerelevantandmaterial,andwherethediscoveryispermittedthecourtmayplacelimitationsonthesourcesandthescope.'" (2)Thetrialjudgeshallconsiderthesefactorsin 0  decidingwhethertoallowlimiteddiscovery:(a)theissuespresented;(b)theelapsedtimebetweentheconvictionandthepostconvictionhearing;(c)anyburdensplacedontheopposingpartyandwitnesses;(d)alternativemeansofsecuringtheevidence;and(e)anyotherrelevantfacts.(3)Thetrialjudgehastheinherentauthoritytopermitsuchdiscovery upona 0  showingofgoodcause andthisisnotanexpansionofeitherRule3.850   orRule3.220.(4) "[A]partymaybeallowedtotakepostconviction  depositionsofthejudgewhopresidedoverthetrialonlywhenthetestimonyofthepresidingjudgeisabsolutelynecessarytoestablishfactualcircumstancesnotintherecord,providedtherequirementssetforthabovearefulfilledandthejudge'sthoughtprocessisnotviolated." Statev.Lewis ,656So.2d1248(Fla.1995).p (# (#    2  B  .3  0 `  Whatmustbedisclosed? $P` (#` (#     ` 2  1  .3  0  Impeachmentandrebuttalmaterial .0 (# (#     ` 2  2  .3  0  Criminalrecordsandacts . P (# (#    `     ` 2  3  .3  0  Statements .   (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Anoralstatementmadebythestate'sexpertwitnessisnot "  discoverable."Whenweread[rules]3.220(a)(1)(ii)(1988)and3.220(a)(1)(x)(1988),intandem,weareleadtotheconclusionthatthereferenceto'statements'islimitedtowrittenstatementsorcontemporaneouslyrecordedoralstatements."Watsonv. p&!$ State ,651So.2d1159(Fla.1994). `'"%(#(#    `    ` 2  4  .3  0  Confidentialinformants |. @)$' (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Beforethestatewillbecompelledtodiscloseaconfidential  +p&) informantthedefense "mustnotonlyallegethespecificdefense ,`'* soughttobeproved,butmustalsosupportthatdefensewithswornproof. Thebestprocedureisforthecourttoconductan in  camerahearing. Statev.Burns ,651So.2d717(Fla.2dDCA  1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Thedefensefiledamotiontocompeldisclosureofaconfidential `  informant.Itwasgrantedbasedonastipulationthattheinformantwaspresentduringtheinvolveddrugtransaction.Whenthestatefailedtocomply,thetrialjudgedismissedtheinformation.Onappealthecourtreversedbasedontheseprinciples:(1) presence  p  duringthetransactiondoesnotautomaticallyrequiredisclosure; (2) failureofthestatetocomplywithsuchanorder P  doesnotautomaticallyentitlethedefendanttodismissal; (3) @   "[t]heremustbeadeterminationastothenecessityfor 0  disclosure,governmentmisconduct,andprejudicetotheaccused;" (4) "inordertocompeldisclosure,adefendantmust  allegethespecificdefensesoughttobeproved,andmustsupportthedefensewithswornproof." Statev.Banks ,656So.  2d590(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    `         2  C  .3  0 `  Statementofparticulars 2. p` (#` (#    2  D  .3  0 `  Richardsoninquiry . P` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3    0  Whenisitrequired? 0 (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0  Thetrialjudgerefusedtoallowthestatetoaskthedefendantwhy ` shehadacocainepipeinherpursebecausethepipehadnotbeenlistedindiscovery.However,whenshetestifiedthatshewasnotfamilarwithcocaine,thecourtthenallowedthestatetoaskthatquestion.ThiswasdonewithoutaRichardsoninquiry.Onappeal   thecourtfoundthatthiswaserror.Becausethepipehadnotbeenlisted,itcouldnothavebeenintroducedintoevidence. "Permitting "  counseltocrossexamineappellantaboutthecocainepipehavingbeenfoundinherpurseallowedtheprosecutortoaccomplishindirectlywhattheprosecutorcouldnotaccomplishdirectly.ThereisnoexceptiontotheRichardsonrulefor p&!$ impeachment. Guerriev.State ,649So.2d928(Fla.4thDCA `'"% 1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Duringthetrialthevictimofanaggravatedassaulttestifiedthat 0*%( afterthedefendanthadbeenarrestedandchargedheaskedthevictimtodropthechargesandtoldhim"'thattheywasn'tgoingto ,`'* findthegun;andhewasgoingtobeatthisrapanyway,likehedoinallothercases.'"Thedefenseattorneymadeageneralobjectiontothetestimony.Itwasagreedthatthiswouldbearguedoutofthepresenceofthejuryafterthevictimhadfinishedtestifying.Thedefenseattorneythenpointedouttothecourtthatthistestimonywasinviolationofthediscoveryruleinthatthedefendanthadnonoticethatthedefendanthadmadethesestatementstothevictim.Codefensecounselthenarguedtheimpactofthestatementasanimpermissiblecommentonthedefendant'spriorrecord.Thecourtdeniedamotionformistrial.Therewasnofurtherargumentorrulingontheallegeddiscoveryviolation.OnappealtheStatearguedthatthedefensehadwaivedanyRichardsonobjection.The P  courtdisagreed. "'Althoughadefendantmusttimelyobjectto @  theuseoftheundiscoveredevidencesothatitisbroughttotheattentionofthetrialcourt,nomagicwordsexisttotriggertherequirementthatthetrialcourtconductaRichardsonhearing.'"    Thecourtneedonlybeputonnoticeofaviolationandthere  neednotbeaspecificrequestforsuchahearing. Inthiscasethe  noticewassufficient. Searsv.State ,656So.2d595(Fla.1stDCA  1995). (#(#    `  2  c  .3    Seecasesondiscoverablematerial. `    `  2  d  .3  0  Seecasesbelowunder"Sanctions."@(#(#    ` 2  2  .3  0  Sufficiency .  p (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Thedefendantwasconvictedofmurderingacabdriver.Duringthe P trialthestatepresentedawitnesswhotestifiedthatthedefendanthadmadeastatementthathewasgoingtorobacab.Thedefenseobjectedtothistestimonyonthegroundsthatthestatementhadnotbeendisclosed.Thetrialjudgeconductedaprocedureandallowedthestatementintoevidence.ThedefendantarguedthattheRichardsonprocedureconductedbythetrialjudgewasinsufficient #! apparentlybecausethetrialjudgemadenofindingastoprejudice.OnappealtheCourtreviewedthepartsofaproperRichardson % # inquiry: "[T]hetrialjudgemustfirstdeterminewhethera p&!$ discoveryviolationoccurred.Ifaviolationisfound,thecourtmustassesswhethertheState'sdiscoveryviolationwasinadvertentorwillful,whethertheviolationwastrivialorsubstantial,andmostimportantly,whataffectithadonthedefendant'sabilitytopreparefortrial." Inthiscasethetrial  +p&) judgeconductedadetailedinquiryoftheprosecutor,thedefense ,`'* attorney,andthewitness,butthenconcluded "thattherewasno  basistoconcludethattherehadbeenawillfuldiscoveryviolation." Theinquirysupportedtheconclusionthatthewitness  hadnotrevealedtheinvolvedinformationtothestatepriortotestifying. "[W]efindtherecordhereshows,whenviewedasa p whole,thatthetrialcourtmadeanadequateinquiryandconcludedthattherewasnobasistofindawillfuldiscoveryviolationbytheState.WeagreewiththetrialcourtthatnoneoftherulesofcriminalprocedurerelatingtodiscoveryrequiretheStatetodiscloseinformationwhichisnotwithintheState'sactualorconstructivepossession.Fla.R.Crim.P.3.220(1)"  `   Sinclairv.State ,657So.2d1138(Fla.1995).P (#(#    ` 2  3  .3  0  Discoveryviolations .0  (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0  Duringthedirectexaminationofawitness,theprosecutorasked  whatconversationshehadwiththedefendant.Thedefensecounselobjected "becausethestatehadnotdisclosedtothedefenseany  statementthat[thedefendant]mayhavemadetothewitness."   ThetrialjudgerefusedtoconductaRichardsonhearing.Thestate  wasrequiredtodisclosethedefendant'sstatements. "Thefactthat p thewitnesswasonthestate'switnesslistand[thedefendant]failedtodeposehimdoesnotvitiatethestate'sdiscoveryviolation." Thecourtdidnotfindharmlesserrorinthiscase. @  Masonv.State ,654So.2d1225(Fla.2dDCA1995).0(#(#    ` 2  4  .3  0  Harmlesserror N. ` (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Despitesolidandlongstandingcommitmenttoaperseruleof @ reversalforfailuretoconductaRichardsoninquirywhereoneis 0 required,theFloridaSupremeCourthasnowruledthatharmlesserroranalysisappliestosucherrors. "Indeterminingwhethera ! Richardsonviolationisharmless,theappellatecourtmust "  considerwhetherthereisareasonablepossibilitythatthediscoveryviolationprocedurallyprejudicedthedefense.Asusedinthiscontext,thedefenseisprocedurallyprejudicedifthereisareasonablepossibilitythatthedefendant'strialpreparationorstrategywouldhavebeenmateriallydifferenthadtheviolationnotoccurred.Trialpreparationorstrategyshouldbeconsideredmateriallydifferentifitreasonablycouldhavebenefittedthedefendant.Inmakingthisdeterminationeveryconceivablecourseofactionmustbeconsidered.Ifthereviewingcourtfindsthatthereisareasonablepossibilitythat ,`'* thediscoveryviolationprejudicedthedefenseoriftherecordisinsufficienttodeterminethatthedefensewasnotmateriallyaffected,theerrormustbeconsideredharmful.Inotherwords,onlyiftheappellatecourtcansaybeyondareasonabledoubtthatthedefensewasnotprocedurallyprejudicedbythediscoveryviolationcantheerrorbeconsideredharmless." The `  courtstressed,however,theneedtofollowRichardsonprinciples. P  Inthisparticularcasethecourtagreedthattheerrorwasharmless.Considerthefactsofthecaseforguidance. Statev.Schopp ,653 0  So.2d1016(Fla.1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Wherethestatefailedtoprovidethedefensewithnoticeof P  incriminatingstatementsthecourtcouldnotconclude "beyonda @  reasonabledoubtthatnoproceduralprejudiceresultedfromtheallegedfailureofthestatetodivulge"thestatements. The   opinionreiteratesthestandardssetforthinStatev.Schopp,653So.  2d1016(Fla.1995). Searsv.State ,656So.2d595(Fla.1stDCA  1995). (#(#    `    2  E  .3  0 `  BradyViolations&RelatedMatters . ` (#` (#      ` 2  1  .3  0 ForanexampleoftheapplicationofBradyprinciplestothesentencing ` phaseinacapitalcasesee Scottv.State ,657So.2d1129(Fla.1995).P (# (#   2  F  .3  0 `  Sanctions . 0` (#` (#     ` 2  1  .3  0  Dismissal . ` (# (#    ` 2  2  .3  0  Witnessexclusion d . @ (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Thedefensefailedtoprovidethenameoftwowitnessestothestate.   Thiswasasexualbatteryonachildcase.Attrialanexperttestifiedthatanexaminationindicatedthatapenishadbeenforcedintothevictim'svagina.Thevictimtestifiedthatshehadneverhadsexwithanyone.Thedefendantattemptedtocallapersonotherthedefendantandanotherperson,whowasfriendofthevictim,totestifythatthevictimhadengagedinsexualrelationswiththisotherperson.Thedefensehadnotadvisedthestateofeitherwitness.Thetrialjudgeexcludedbothwitnessesbecauseopeningstatementsanddirectexaminationhadbeencompletedandthetestimonywasextremelyimportant.Onappealthecourtreversedbecausereciprocalrulesofdiscoverycannotbeappliedinawaythatdeniesadefendantofhisfundamentalrighttodefendhimself.. "Sincethe ,`'* testimonysoughttobeintroducedbythewitnessesintheinstantcasewasexculpatoryinnature,exclusionofthetestimonywoulddenyappellanthisfundamentalrighttodefendanthimselfinviolationoftheSixthAmendment.""Whenexculpatoryevidenceissoughttobeintroducedinviolationofthediscoveryrules,andremedieswhichwouldallowthetrialtoproceedareinsufficient,thepropercourseofactionistodeclareamistrial.Amistrialisanappropriatediscoverysanctionunderrule3.220(n)(1)..." Mattearv.State ,657So.2d 0  46(Fla.4thDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Thedefendantwaschargedwithsaleofcocaine.Thedefendant P  attemptedtoputawitnessonthestandwhowouldtestifythatheoverheardaCItelltwopeoplethathisattempttocarryoutacontrolledbuyofcocainefromthedefendantfailedandthedefendantwasinnocent.Theprosecutionobjectedthattherehadbeenadiscoveryviolationinthatthestatewastoldofthewitnessonlyonedaybeforethetrial.Thedefensecounselstatedthathehadonlyrecentlybeeninformedofthewitness.Theprosecutoraskedthatthewitnessbeexcluded. "Thetrialjudge,expressingtheview  thatthestatewouldsufferundueprejudiceasaresultofthelatenoticeofthiswitnessandtheresultinglackofopportunitytoinvestigatetheveracityofhistestimony,orderedthetrialtoproceedwithoutthedefensewitnessbeingpermittedtotestify."  @ Onappealthecourtreversed. "Theseveresanctionofwitness 0 exclusionshouldbealastresortreservedonlyforthemostextremeorcompellingcircumstances,butparticularlywhentheexcludedtestimonyrelatestocriticalissuesorfactsandthetestimonyisnotcumulative." Thisextremesanctionshouldbe @ used "onlyafterthetrialcourthasconductedanadequate 0 inquirytodeterminewhetheranyotherreasonablealternativesmightbeusedtoovercomeormitigatepossibleprejudice." Even ! assumingthattherewasprejudicetothestate,thecourtstillerredbyexcludingthewitnessbyfailingtoconsiderotheralternativeslike arecessorcontinuancetogivethestateachanceto $" investigatethewitness. Donaldsonv.State ,656So.2d580(Fla. % # 1stDCA1995). (#(#     ` 2  3  .3  0  Continuances A. P(#& (# (#     ` 2  4  .3  0  Speedytrialdischarge .0*%( (# (#     `   ,`'*   2  G  .3  0 `  Depositions  .` (#` (#    `    2  II  .3  0   SPEEDYTRIAL .(#(#   2  A  .3  0 `  Whentimebeginstorun P. ` ` (#` (#    2  B  .3  0 `  Application . 0 ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 Thedefendantwasgiventhefollowingtickets:twoforDUIwithserious `  injury,twoforDUIwithpropertydamageandonefordrivingwithasuspendedlicense.Thematterwassetfortrialincountycourt.Thecourtclerktransferredtheticketstocircuitcourt.SubsequentlythestatefiledaninformationincircuitcourtchargingthedefendantwithfelonyDUI,twocountsofDUIpropertydamageandonecounteachofDUIpersonaldamage,DUIimpairmentandDUIdrivingwithasuspendedlicense.Thespeedytrialperiodontheticketsexpired.Thedefendantfiledanoticeofexpirationofspeedytrialincountycourt.Thestatetooknoactionduringthewindowperiod.Twomonthslaterthestatenolleprossedthetickets. "Asamatteroflaw,defendantisforeverdischargedfromthecounty p courtcharges.Afterthespeedytrialperiodranonthemisdemeanorticketoffenses,defendantfiledappropriatemotionsfordischarge.Thestate'snolleprosequiwasanullitybecausethestatetooknoactionpursuanttoRule3.191(p)(3)afterthenoticeofexpirationofspeedytrialwasfiled." Thestatearguedthatthechargeswereconsolidatedwith  p thefelonycharges.Thecourtheldthatthiscouldonlybedonebycourtorder. Statev.Woodruff ,654So.2d585(Fla.3dDCA1995).P (# (#    2  C  .3  0 `  Demands ". 0` (#` (#     2  D  .3  0 `  Waiver,extensions,&tolling A#. " ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 Inthiscasetrialwassetaftertherunningofspeedytrial.Onthedayof $" trialthedefendantfiledamotiontodismissondoublejeopardygroundsandamotiontodischarge.Thetrialjudgeheldaninformalconferencewithcounselandindicatedthatheviewedthefilingofthedoublejeopardymotionasawaiverofspeedytrial.Thestatemaintainedthatthepartiesagreedtoawaiverofspeedytrialatthisconference.Thejudgechosetosetthatmotionalongwithsimilarmotions.Thejudgethenresignedduetoillnesswithoutrulingonthedefendant'spendingmotions,includingthespeedytrialmotion.Speedytrialhadexpiredwhenanotherdefenseattorney ,`'* signedawrittenwaiveroftherighttospeedytrial.Subsequently,anotherjudgedeniedthemotiontodischarge.Thecircuitcourtdeniedapetitionforwritofprohibition.Onappealthecourtreversedbasedontheseprinciples:(1)underRule3.191(d)(2)awaivermustbe "inwriting,signedby  properpersonorcounsel,or'uponstipulationannouncedtothecourt;'" (2) "speedytrialtimeistolledduetohearingsonpretrial `  motionsonlybywrittenorrecordedorderofthecourt;"(3)"[m]eresilenceofthedefendantordefensecounselataproceedingwhereinthedefendant'strialdateissetbeyondthespeedytrialperiodisnotaneffectivewaiver;"(4)"[e]venanofftherecordagreementbydefensecounseltoatrialdatebeyondthespeedytrialperiodisnotavalidwaiver." Inthiscasetherewasnothingindicatingawaiver.Defense P  counselhadremainedsilentwhenthecasewassetfortrialbeyondthespeedytrialperiod.Furthermore,therewasnoreasonthatthedoublejeopardymotioncouldnothavebeenheardduring15daywindow.Thetrialjudgeindicatedadesiretoconsiderthedoublejeopardymotionalongwithsimilarmotions,but "delaysduetoreasonspersonaltothecourt  andcrowdeddocketsdonotexcusecompliancewiththespeedytrialrule." Underwoodv.Johnson ,651So.2d760(Fla.1stDCA1995). (# (#    ` 2  2  .3  0 Intheabovestyledcausetherewasaclaimthatspeedytrialwasextended p becausetheoriginaljudgewasill,butthisoccurredafterthespeedytrialperiodhadexpired. Anextensionisonlyeffectiveifitisenteredby P writtenorrecordedorderpriortotheexpirationoftheperiod. Inthis @ casetherewasnowrittenorrecordedorderbeforethespeedytrialperiodexpired. Theorderreflectingextenuatingcircumstancesoccurredafter  p theexpirationoftheperiod. Underwoodv.Johnson ,651So.2d760 ` (Fla.1stDCA1995).  (# (#    2  E  .3  0 `  Availability /. 0` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 Onthedayoftrialthestateobjectedthatthedefendanthadnorighttoa ! jurytrial.Thetrialjudgeresetthetrialonthelastdayofthespeedytrialwindowsohecouldconsiderthestate'sobjection.Thetrialjudgewasawareofthefactthattheassistantpublicdefenderhadanothertrialinwhichspeedytrialwasabouttoexpireandwhichhadbeengivenprioritybyorderofthechiefjudge.Thedefendanthadbeencontinuouslyavailable.Thedefenseattorneyhaddoneeverythingreasonabletogetthecasetotrial.Speedytrialconsiderationsbarredtrial. "Thiscourt'sdecisionin P(#& Obanionv.State,496So.2d977(Fla.3dDCA1986),reviewdenied, @)$' 504So.2d768(Fla.1987)prohibitsanindigent'sspeedytrialrightfrombeingcircumventedbyschedulingthetrialofaseriesofindigentdefendantsforthesamedate." Statev.Alvarez ,651So.2d1231(Fla. ,`'* 3dDCA1995).  (# (#   2  F  .3  0 `  MotionsforDischarge 5.  ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0  Generally 5. p (# (#     ` 2  2  .3  0  Prose 6. P  (# (#     ` 2  3  .3  0  Discoveryviolation 37. 0  (# (#    2  G  .3  0 `  Constitutionalrighttospeedytrial 7. ` ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 InAugust1991thedefendantwaschargedwiththecommissionoffelonies @  occurringinMay1989.InJanuary1992,thedefendantfiledamotiontodismissforpreaccusationdelay.Hearguedthatbecausetheinvestigationwascompletein1989,thedelayinfilingthechargesagainsthimviolatedhisdueprocessrights,providedatacticaladvantagetothestate,andcausedprejudicebecausehecouldnotexamineasemensampletakenfromthevictimtorebutpositiveDNAevidencebecauseithaddegraded.Thestateexplainedthatthedelayresultedfromadministrativeproblemsinvolvingahopetodisposeofthecasethroughanegotiatedplea,achangeofprosecutorsandotherproblems.Thetrialjudgegrantedthemotiontodismiss.Onappealthecourtreversed. "'[I]nevaluatinganasserteddue P processviolationbasedonpreindictmentdelay,[thecourtmust]...considerboththereasonsforthedelayandtheprejudicetotheaccused.Further,theaccusedbearstheburdenofprovingtheprejudiceand,ifthethresholdrequirementofproofofactualprejudiceisnotmet,theinquiryendsthere.Onceactualprejudiceisshown,itisnecessarytoengageinasensitivebalancingofthegovernment'sneedforaninvestigativedelay...againsttheprejudiceassertedbythedefendant.'" Inthiscasethedefendantfailedtoidentifywhatbenefithe   hopedtosecurefromfurthertesting.Hefailedtoallegethatthetestingwouldhaveproducedfavorableresults.Healsofailedtoshowthatthesemensamplewouldhavebeenavailablehadhebeenchargedanyearlier. #!  Evenwherethedelayresultsfromadministrativeoversight,the $" defendantmustshowthatthedelaycausedactualprejudicebeforethestateisrequiredtoexplainorjustifythedelay.Heretherewasnoevidencethatthedelaywasintentionallycausedbythestatetogetatacticaladvantage.Thestatehasnodutytochargethedefendantonceprobablecausehasbeenestablished. Statev.Grady ,657So.2d1254 @)$' (Fla.2dDCA1995).  (# (#   ,`'*  2  III  .3  0   SEARCHANDSEIZURE A.(#(#   2  A  .3  0 `  Generalprinciples :B.` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 "Allsearchesmustbeauthorizedbyavalidsearchwarrant...orfall p withincertainlimitedexceptions....Thoseexceptionsareconsent,lawfularrest,hotpursuit,stopandfriskandprobablecausewithexigentcircumstances." "The'plainview'doctrine hasfrequentlybeen @  consideredanexceptiontothewarrantrequirement.Inreality,materialsthatareseizedbecausetheyareinplainviewofanofficerwhoobservesfromalocationwherehehasalegalrighttobearenotsubjectto[a]FourthAmendment[analysis]...." Pottsv.Johnson ,654 P  So.2d596(Fla.3dDCA1995).  (# (#    `   2  B  .3  0 `  Thresholdissuesandproceduralconsiderations F. ` (#` (#     ` 2  1  .3  0  Sufficiencyanduseofthemotionandprocedure F. (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0  Wherethejuryisswornandthecourtthenhearsamotionto  suppressanderroneouslygrantsit,trialonremandisbarred.    Statev.Kennon ,652So.2d396(Fla.2dDCA1995).p(#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Amotiontosuppressfiled fivedaysbeforetrial wastimelyunder P rule3.190(h)(4)anditwaserrortodenyitwithoutanevidentiaryhearing. Martinv.State ,654So.2d978(Fla.1stDCA1995).0(#(#    `  2  c  .3  0  UndertheFloridaConstitution,FloridaCourtsareobligatedto ` followdecisionsoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtinresolvingsearchandseizureissues. "PolicystatementsfromtheUnited @ StatesSupremeCourtwillserveasapolestarinchoosingamongcompetingandunreconciledviewsofFourthAmendmentissues." Statev.Daniel ,20Fla.L.WeeklyS497(Fla.Opinion ! filedSept.28,1995). (#(#    ` 2  2  .3  0  Credibility  M. $" (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  "Asageneralrule,anyconflict...isforthefinderoffactto p&!$ resolvewheretherecordcontainscompetentsubstantialevidenceastoboththeState'sandthedefense'stheories. Ontheotherhand, P(#& arecordcontaininguncontrovertedandbelievableevidencesupportingonlyasingletheorymeansthetrialcourtmustacceptthattheoryasfact,evenifthetheoryisbasedentirelyonthearrestingofficer'stestimony.Statev.Carter,563So.2d728, ,`'* 728(Fla.3dDCA1990). Anyotherrulingisplainerror. Statev.  Daniel ,20Fla.L.WeeklyS497(Fla.OpinionfiledSept.28,  1995). (#(#    `      ` 2  3  .3  0  Remedy HQ. p (# (#     ` 2  4  .3  0  Subjectsofsuppression Q. P  (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Theactualidentityofadefendantisnotsubjecttosuppression 0  evenifitismadeasaresultofanunlawfulpolicestop. These  p  casesinvolvesuspendeddriver'slicensechargesarisingfromvehiclestops.Thecourtreliesonimmigrationdecisionssetforthintheopinion.Thecourtalsospecificallyrejectsthesuggestionthatthisissueiscontrolledbythebodyoflawdealingwithimpermissiblelysuggestiveidentificationprocedures. O'Nealv.   State ,649So.2d311(Fla.3dDCA1995).(#(#    `     ` 2  5  .3  0  Governmentagents U. (# (#     ` 2  6  .3  0  Expectationofprivacy,propertyinterest&standing ]V.  (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  "'UnderFloridalawitisclearthatonedoesnotharboran ` expectationofprivacyonafrontporchwhereasalesmanorvisitormayappearatanytime.'...Therighttoapproachafrontdoorthough,istemperedbythegeneralrulethatthecurtilagesurroundingahomeisentitledtothesameprotectionsasthehome." Pottsv.Johnson ,654So.2d596(Fla.3dDCA ` 1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  "Aperson'sbackyard...fallswithina'zoneclothedbya 0 reasonableexpectationofprivacyintowhichthegovernmentcouldnotreasonablyintrudetoconductasearch.'... 'Typically,theyard ! adjacenttoaresidentialdwelling,particularlythepartofthebackyardblockedfromviewfromthestreetbythedwelling,isclothedwithareasonableexpectationofprivacyfromunreasonablegovernmentalintrusion.'"  Pottsv.Johnson ,654 % # So.2d596(Fla.3dDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  c  .3  0  Thereisareasonableexpectationofprivacyin apublicrestroom P(#& stallatafarmer'smarket. Ramirezv.State ,654So.2d1222 @)$' (Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  d  .3  0  Astallinapublicrestroomatafarmer'smarketisnotlikeonein ,`'* aprobationandrestitutioncenter.Inthelatterfacilityaninmatedoes "nothavethesameexpectationofprivacyinsidealocked  toiletstallasanonincarceratedpersonbecauseconfinementataprobationcentercarrieswithitthecircumscriptionofcertainprivacyrightsforinstitutionalsafetyandsecurityreasons."  p  Ramirezv.State ,654So.2d1222(Fla.2dDCA1995).` (#(#    `  2  e  .3  0  TheFourthAmendmentextendstothecontentsofpackagesthatare @  beingshipped,includingpackagesinthepossessionof Federal 0  Express. "'Lettersandsealedpackagesofthiskindinthemail  p  arefullyguardedfromexaminationandinspection,exceptastotheiroutwardformandweight,asiftheywereretainedbythepartiesforwardingthemintheirowndomiciles.Theconstitutionalguarantyoftherightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpapersagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizuresextendstotheirpapers,thusclosedagainstinspection,wherevertheymaybe.Whilstinthemail,theycanonlybeopenedandexaminedunderlikewarrant,issueduponsimilaroathoraffirmation,particularlydescribingthethingtobeseized,asisrequiredwhenpapersaresubjectedtosearchinone'sownhousehold.'"[quotingfromExParteJackson,96U.S.727,6 p Otto727,24L.Ed.877(1877).] Anofficermayseizeapackage `  ifheorshehasprobablecausetobelievethatitcontains P contrabandandexigentcircumstancesorsomeotherexceptiontothewarrantrequirementispresent. Theofficermayholdthe 0 packageandsecureasearchwarrant.Inthiscaseatrainedcaninealertedonapackage.Thecourtheldthatthisdidnoteliminatetherequirementthatawarrantbesecuredintheabsenceofexigentcircumstancesbeforesearchofthecontainer.Thisisdifferentfromasearchofanautomobile.The automobileexceptiontothe 0 warrantrequirementestablishedinCarrollv.UnitedStates,267   U.S.132,45S.Ct.280,69L.Ed.543(1925),permitssearchandseizureofamotorvehicleanditscontentswithoutawarrantifthereisprobablecausetobelievethatitcontainscontraband.  #! Analertbyatrainedcanineprovidesthisprobablecause.Thesamerulesdonotapplytoapackageunlessthepackageisinsideofamotorvehiclewhichisbeinglawfullysearched.Thenittoomaybesearched. Danielsv.Cochran ,654So.2d609(Fla.4thDCA `'"% 1995). (#(#    `     ` 2  7  .3  0  Detention,Search&Seizure i.  0*%( (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0  Seecasesbelowonconsensualencounter.,`'*(#(#    `     `  2  b  .3  0  Openingthecruiserdoorsothatthedefendant'sbicyclewould  hititcausingthedefendanttofall,constitutedaseizureoftheperson. Itwasnotnecessaryfortheofficertotouchthedefendant  withhishands. Clarkv.State ,648So.2d848(Fla.4thDCA p 1995). (#(#     `  2  c  .3  0  Thedefendant'svehiclewaslawfullystopped.Therewasreasonto @  believethattheremightbeaguninthecar.Oneofficerbegantalkingtothedefendantandsawthatthedefendantwaswearingahipbag.Itwasbulgingandappearedtobeveryheavy.Underthecircumstancestheofficerthoughtthatthedefendantmighthaveanotherweaponinthisbag,whichwasclosetothedefendant'shand. Theofficerthenaskedthedefendantifhehadany 0  weaponsinthebag.Thedefendantinquiredwhethertheofficerswerejustlookingforweapons.Theofficerresponded:"Why,doyougotdrugsinthere?"Thedefendantsaidyesandopenedthebagtorevealthemarijuana. Theofficerthenseized  thebagcontainingdrugsandparaphernalia. Theinquiry  concerningthecontentsofthebagwasnotasearch. Statev.  Bernard ,650So.2d100(Fla.2dDCA1995).p(#(#    `  2  d  .3  0  Officersrentedvideotapesandcopiedthemandreturnedthetapes P tothebusiness.Therewasnoindependentexaminationofthetapesbyajudge.Thedefendantwaschargedwithdistributionofobscenematerialsbasedonthetapes.Amotiontosuppressthetapeswasgranted.Acircuitcourtreversedthecountycourtonthegroundsthattherehadnotbeenanillegalsearchorseizurebecausetheownerhadvoluntarilyturnedthetapesoverwhenherentedthemandtheofficersreturnedtheminatimelyfashion.OnappealtheDistrictCourtreversedtheCircuitCourt. "Weholdthatthe   officer'sactofcopyingtherentedvideotapesconstitutesaseizureof[theowner's]property.Whileitistruethatlawenforcementofficersareallowedtokeepasinglecopyofavideotapeormovieforpurposesofpreservingtheevidence;seeState $" v.Johnson,605So.2d545,548(Fla.2dDCA1992),thelawful % # retentionisdependentupontheissuanceofawarrantfortheseizureoftheitempriortotheofficersobtainingit.Onlywhenawarranthasbeenissuedistheretentionnotapriorrestraint....Thecopyingofthemovieontoablankcassetteforthepurposeofpursuingaprosecutionfordistributionofobscenematerialswithoutthedeterminationthatthemovieisobsceneisanillegalseizureevenwhentheoriginalcassetteis ,`'* returnedtothestoreownerduringtherentalperiod." Miragaya  v.State ,654So.2d262(Fla.2dDCA1995).(#(#    `  2  e  .3  0  Therewasaseizureofthedefendantwhere"apoliceofficerpulled  upbehind[thedefendant],approachedhisvehicle,andorderedhimtoturnoffhismotorandgivehimhisdriver'slicense." Taylorv. `  State ,658So.2d173(Fla.5thDCA1995).P (#(#    `  2  f  .3  0  Thedefendantwaswalkinginahighdrugresidentialareaatabout 0  2:00p.m.Adeputysawhimandreportedthatthedefendantlookednervouslyatthepolicecar,crossedthestreet,andcontinuedtowalkwhilelookingbackatthecar.Forthesereasonsthedeputydecidedtoapproachthedefendant.Hethenadvisedanotherdeputythatthedefendantshouldbeapproached.Eachdeputyapproachedthedefendantatthesametimeandstoppedwithinaboutthreefeetofthedefendant.Onedeputyaskedthedefendanthisnameandthedefendantresponded.Theotherdeputynoticedthatthedefendantwashidinghisrighthandbehindhisbackandhadablackobjectinhishand.Hesaidthathebelievedthedefendantmightbeholdingagun.Atthatpointoneofthedeputiesaskedthedefendantwhatwasinhisrighthand.Thedefendantsaid"[N]o"andpulledhishandback.Thedeputythengrabbedthedefendant'shandtoseewhatwasinit.Hesawashirtinthedefendant'shand.Atuggingmatchbetweenthedeputyandthedefendantthentookplace,resultingincrackcocainefallingfromtheshirt.Thetrialjudgeheldthattheinitialcontactwasaconsensualencounterwhichturnedintoavalidstopwhentheofficersbegantofearfortheirsafety.Onappealthecourtruledthat oncetheofficersgrabbedthe P defendant'shandtheencounterbecameastop. Evenifitthe @ officerhadareasonablebelief thatthedefendantwasarmed,any 0 alarmwasdispelledoncethedeputysawthatthedefendantwasholdingashirtratherthanaweapon.Thus,thedeputywasnotauthorizedtopullthedefendant'sshirtfromhishand. Thiswas "  particularlytruesincetherewasnoevidencethatweaponsareusuallyhiddeninthismanner. Stephensv.State ,656So.2d531 $" (Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  g  .3  0  Asaresultofaradiodispatchadeputymadecontactwiththe `'"% defendant.Drugswereultimatelydiscovered.Amotiontosuppresswasdenied.Theofficeridentifiedhimselfasapoliceofficerinaloudvoicewhileheilluminatedthedefendant'sfacewithaflashlight.Thedefendantstoppedandthedeputythenmotionedforhimtocomeforward.Severalotherthingshappenedthatarenot ,`'* keytothedecision.Thecontactwiththedefendantultimatelyresultedinthediscoveryofdrugs.Thestatearguedthattheinitialcontactwasaconsensualencounter.Onappealthecourtrejectedthiscontention. "Atthethresholdoftheresidence,[thedeputy]  shinedhisflashlightin[thedefendant's]face,statedinaloudvoice,"CollierCountySheriff'sOffice,"andmotionedfor[thedefendant]tocometowardhim.Webelievethoseactionswere'ashowofofficialauthoritysuchthat"areasonablepersonwouldhavebelievedhewasnotfreetoleave."'" Statev. 0  Hughes,562So.2d795,797(Fla.1stDCA1990),quoting  p  Jacobsonv.State,476So.2d1282,1285(Fla.1985).InUnited `  Statesv.Mendenhall,446U.S.544,100S.Ct.1870,64L.Ed.2d P  497(1980),theSupremeCourtlisted 'useoflanguageortoneof @  voiceindicatingthatcompliancewiththeofficer'srequestmightbecompelled'asanexampleofacircumstancethatmightindicateaseizure. Id.446U.S.at554,100S.Ct.at1877. Chase  v.State ,656So.2d588(Fla.2dDCA1995).(#(#    2  C  .3  0 `  Warrants .` (#` (#     ` 2  1  .3  0  Sufficiencyoftheaffidavit .p (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0  Thecourtfoundtheaffidavitsufficienteventhoughitwasbasedon P hearsay.Thecircumstancessupportedtheconclusionthattheinformationwasreliable.Theinformantwasnamedintheaffidavitandthedefendantwhowasthesubjectoftheprosecutionwasactuallybabysittingforherchildwhenmuchoftheinformationintheaffidavitwasdeveloped. "Thisisnotacaseinvolvinga P confidentialgovernmentinformantorananonymoustip." See @ theopinionfordetails. Statev.Guertin ,650So.2d1041(Fla.4th 0 DCA1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Thedefensearguedthattheaffidavitwasinsufficientbecause:(1) "  itdidnotallegefactsshowingthereliabilityoftheconfidentialinformantand(2)theaffiantdidnotobservetheCIfromthetimetheCIlefttheaffiantandwentintothehouseandfromthetimetheCIleftthehouseandcamebacktotheaffiant.Thetrialjudgedeniedamotiontosuppress.Onappealthecourtstatedthat the `'"% reliabilityoftheconfidentialinformantcanbeestablishedbyacontrolbuy. Thatwasthecasehere,wheretheCImadetwo @)$' controlledbuys.Theaffiant/officersearchedtheCIbeforethecontrolledbuytomakesuretheCIhadnodrugsandsearchedtheCIagainwhentheCIreturnedtomakesurethattheCIdidnothave ,`'* themoneythatwastosupposedtobeusedtopurchasedrugs.TheCIwaspersonallysupervisedandconstantlymonitoredbytheaffiant/officer.TheaffiantdidnothavetheCIinsightallthetimewhentheCIwasoutsideofthehouse,butwhentheaffiantdidn'thavetheCIinsight,anotherofficerdid.While,itwouldhavebeenbetteriftheaffianthadputhispartner'sobservationsintotheaffidavit,itwasnotfatal. Malonev.State ,651So.2d733(Fla. P  5thDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  c  .3  0  Theaffidavitestablishedprobablecausethatthere"willbecocaine"  p  intheinvolvedpremisesatadateinthefuture.933.18(5) "requiresasearchwarrantofaprivatedwellingforviolationof P  thelawrelatingtonarcoticsordrugabusenotbeissuedunlessuponaffidavitshowingprobablecausethatthelawisbeingviolatedtherein." Inthiscase "[i]fthewords'ispresently'had   beenusedinsteadofthewords'willbe',theaffidavitlikelywouldhavepassedmuster." Pazosv.State ,654So.2d1000  (Fla.4thDCA1995). (#(#     ` 2  2  .3  0  Sufficiencyofwarrant 3. (# (#     ` 2  3  .3  0  Executionofwarrant .` (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0   KnockandAnnounce . @(#(#    `    2(  1  )3  0 h Seecasesbelowunderarrest"KnockandAnnounce." ph(#h(#    `  2  b  .3  0   Areaandpersonstobesearched G. P(#(#     `  2  c  .3  0   Roleofofficers .0(#(#     ` 2  4  .3  0  Searchofahome Ӛ.! (# (#    2  D  .3  0 `  Exceptionstowarrantrequirement  .#!` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 Theburdenisonthestatetoshowthevalidityofthewarrantlessseizure. % #  Powellv.State ,649So.2d888(Fla.2dDCA1995).p&!$ (# (#    ` 2  2  .3  0  Consensualencounters k.P(#& (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0  Seecasesaboveondetention.0*%((#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Aconsensualencounterwastransformedintoadetentionwhen ,`'* theofficerdecidedtoconductapatdown.Sholtzv.State ,649  So.2d283(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  c  .3  0  Thiscaseinvolvedtheissueofwhetherevidencewassecuredasa  resultofaconsensualpolicecitizenencounter.Therewasadisputeinthetestimonyandthetrialjudgeacceptedthedeputy'stestimonyoverthedefendant.Thecourtmustacceptthatonappeal.Thedeputywasonpatrolwhenheencounteredthedefendant,whowasonabicycle.Thedeputycalledouttothedefendantandaskediftheycouldtalk.Thedefendantstoppedhisbicycleandagreedtotalk.Thedeputyaskedthedefendantifhehadanyweapons.Thedefendantsaidthathedidnot.Thedeputythenaskedwhetherhecouldsearchthedefendantandthedefendantreplied:"Yeah.Iain'tgotnothing."Thedeputyhadnoprobablecausetobelievethedefendanthadcommittedacrime.Thedeputysaidthatifthedefendanthadnotconsentedtothesearch,hewouldhavelethimgo.Thedeputydidnottellthedefendantthathecouldleave.Afterconsentthedeputypatteddownthedefendant'sclothing,buthedidnotreachintohispocket.Accordingtothedeputy,thedefendantinterruptedthesearchbyplacinghislefthandintohisleftpant'spocket,whilesayingallhehadwasmoney.Whenthedefendanttookhishandoutofhisleftpocket,heremovedmoneyandarockofcocaine.Accordingtothedeputy,hedidnottellthedefendanttoemptyhispocket.Thedefendantsaidhestoppedonlybecausethedeputytoldhimto,butheadmittedthatthedeputydidnotshowanyforce,pullagunorabadge,orderhimtostop,orhandcuffhim.Acceptingthetrialjudge'sviewofthefacts,onappealthecourtaffirmed. Jonesv.State ,658So.2d178(Fla.1stDCA P 1995). (#(#    `  2  d  .3  0  "Apoliceofficer'srequestthatapersonstopisnot,byitself,   deemedtocarrywithitsuchcoercionaswouldrenderanotherwisevoluntaryencounterwiththepoliceinvoluntary.Theappropriateinquiryiswhethertheencountercarrieswithitspecificcircumstanceswhichwouldindicatetoareasonablepersonthathewasunderrestraintforbiddinghimtoleave.Statev.Davis,543So.2d375,37677(Fla.3dDCA1989).Even p&!$ thoughappellantmightnothavefeltfreetoleave,thatisnottheappropriatetestthecorrecttestiswhetherareasonablepersonwouldhavebelievedhewasnotfreetoleave.Statev. @)$' Daniels,576So.2d819,822(Fla.4thDCA1991).[Thedeputy] 0*%( wasnotrequiredtotell[thedefendant]thathehadarighttorefusetherequesttosearch.Statev.Diaz,549So.2d759,760 ,`'* 61(Fla.3dDCA1989),rev.denied,560So.2d232(Fla.1990).  Inthiscase,competentandsubstantialevidencesupportsthetrialcourt'sfindingthatnoindiciaofcoercionarepresent.[Thedeputy]didnotdisplayabadge,pullagun,order[thedefendant]tostop,orhandcuffhim.Thereisnoindicationthatheuselanguageoratoneofvoiceindicatingthatcompliancewouldbecompelled,noristhereanyindicationthattheencounterbecamethreateninginanymanner." Thecourt @  distinguishedthedecisioninSholtzv.State,649So.2d283(Fla. 0  2dDCA1995),wherethecourtfoundthatthesearchwasnotconsensual.Inthatcasethedeputy "informed" thedefendantthat `  hewantedtodoapatdown,whereas,inthiscasethedeputy requestedandgotpermissiontosearch. Furthermore,inSholtz @  theofficerretrievedthecontrabandfromthedefendant'spocket;whereas,inthiscase thedefendantretrievedthecontraband   fromhisownpocket. Jonesv.State ,658So.2d178(Fla.1st  DCA1995). (#(#     ` 2  3  .3  0  Schoolsandstudents .. (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0  Throughananonymoustip,aschoolsecurityemployeelearnedthat p astudentinphysedclasshadabulgeinhispantsandwasbelievedtohaveagun.Thetipgaveadescriptionoftheclothingthestudentwaswearing.Theemployeewenttothegymandtoldthestudenttostepoutside.Atthispointthestudentwasnotfreetogo.Theemployeedidnotnoticeabulge.Theemployeeaskedthestudentifhecouldsearchhim,butthestudentdidnotrespond.Astheyenteredthelockerroomagundroppedoutofthestudent'spants.Theemployeewasnotactingonarequestfromlawenforcementofficers.Thetrialjudgedeniedamotiontosuppressthegun.Onappealthecourtaffirmed. "Whenlawenforcementisnotinvolved   'thelegalityofasearchofastudentshoulddependsimplyonthereasonableness,underallthecircumstances,ofthesearch.'"  "  Giventheinformationtheemployeehadand "[w]hentakinginto #! considerationthattherewereapproximately150studentsinthegymandthatitwaspossiblethat[thestudent]wascarryingafirearm" heactedreasonablyinstoppingthestudentforabrief p&!$ investigation. S.D.v.State ,650So.2d198(Fla.3dDCA1995).`'"%(#(#    ` 2  4  .3  0  Investigatorystops .@)$' (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0   Generalprinciples O.  +p&)(#(#  ,`'*     `  2  b  .3  0   Specifickindsofinformationandobservations *.(#(#     `    2(  1  )3  0 h  Highcrimeareaorcontactwithcriminal . h(#h(#    `     h 2(  a  )3  0  Defendant stoppedvehicleneartrailerwhere p drugsweresold +passengerenteredtrailer+ `  passengerreturnedtovehicleinafewminutes. No P  reasonablesuspicion. Powellv.State ,649So.2d @  888(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#     `     h 2(  b  )3  0  Officersobservedthedefendantapproachaman `  andhandhimmoneyinexchangeforasubstancethattheofficersbelievedmightbedrugs.Giventhetotalityofthecircumstancestheofficershadafoundedsuspiciontomakeaninvestigatorystop.Ramirezv.State ,654So.2d1222(Fla.2d  DCA1995). (#(#    `     h 2(  c  )3  0  Officerswerewatchingahouseatalocationwhere  thepolice hadmadethirtyorfortyarrests.A  dealer  ,whoworkedthatlocation,waspersonally p knowntooneoftheofficers. Atabout10:45p.m. ` anofficersawthedefendantpullupinacar.Theknowndealercameoutofthehouse,andtheofficerwhoknewthedealer,sawthedefendantandthedealerengageina"handtohand"transaction. The  p officerdidnotseeanymoneyordrugsexchangehands. Theobservingofficerradioedtootherswho P stoppedthecarinwhichthedefendantwaslocatedandfoundcocaine.Thetrialjudgedeniedamotiontosuppress.Onappealthecourtfoundthattheofficershadreasonablesuspiciontostopthedefendanteventhoughnoofficersawanymoneyordrugsbeforethestop. Althoughthecourtis #! reluctanttopermitastopwherethereisnotobservationofmoneyordrugs,otherfactorsjustifyingthestopinthiscase."Ofsignificancearetheofficer'snarcoticsexperience;thereputationofthelocationfordriveuptransaction;theextendedperiodofsurveillance;andthehistoryofpreviousmultiplearrestsfromthatsite.Inthiscase,allofthesefactors,togetherwiththenatureoftheexchangebetweenBurnette ,`'* andaknowndealergaverisetoareasonablesuspicioninOfficerGriffisthat[thedefendant]hadengagedinillegalactivity." Nevertheless,the  causewasremandedforfurtherproceedingsbecausetherewasnoevidenceastoanyadditionalfactorswhichwouldhavebeensufficienttocreateprobablecauseforthesearchofthecar. Burnettev.State , P  658So.2d1170(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    `     h 2(  d  )3  0  Onappealthecourtfoundthattheofficerhada  p  foundedsuspicionofcriminalactivityjustifyinganinvestigatorystopbasedonthefollowingfacts:(1)officerswereconductingsurveillanceofacertainhouse;(2)itwasinanareaknownfordrugactivity;(3)oneoftheofficershadtheplaceundersurveillancethreetimesaweekforamonth;(4)duringthistimecarswouldcomeuptothehouse,eitheralongthestreetorinthedriveway;(5)blackmaleswouldcomeoutandapproachthedriversorthedriverswouldgetoutofthevehicle;(6)itemswouldbehandedbackandforthandthenthevehiclewouldleave;(7)threeorfourarrestsweremadeafterseeingthesethingsandthearresteeswerefoundwithcocaineintheirpossession;(8)onthenightinquestiononeoftheofficerssawaredFordescortpullintothedriveway;(9)severalblackmalescameoutofthehouseandapproachedthecar;(10)thedefendantgotoutofthefrontpassengersideofthecarandwalkedtowardthefrontofthecar;(11)thedefendantandoneoftheblackmaleswereengagedinconversation;(12)theblackmalecuppedhishandandhelditouttothedefendant;(13)thedefendantlookeddownintothehandandthenbeganreachingintohisfrontrightpocket;(14)boththedefendantandtheotherpersonwalkedclosertothehouseandbehindanothercarparkedinthedriveway;(15)afterbeingbehindthecarforafewseconds,thedefendantturnedaroundandquicklywalkedbacktohiscar;(16)thecarthenbackedoutanddroveaway.Theofficerssawnomoneyordrugsexchanged. Saadiv.State ,658So.2d112(Fla.2d 0*%( DCA1995). (#(#  ,`'*    `     h 2(  e  )3  0  Anofficerfirstsawthedefendant,ayoungblack  male,at8:30p.m.inavehicleintheareaofamotelthatofficershadundersurveillanceforsuspecteddrugactivity.Anofficerdeterminedthattheownerofthevehiclewasawhitefemaleinher40's.Theofficersawthedefendantabout30minuteslaterandattemptedtomakeatrafficstop.Beforethestopwasmadetheofficersawthedefendantmakeanabruptleftturnintothemotelwithoutgivingapropersignal.Whenthestopwasmade,theofficerfoundthatthedefendantwasdrivingwithasuspendedlicenseandarrestedhim.Asearchofthevehicleincidenttothearrestrevealedcocaine.Thetrialcourtdeniedamotiontosuppress.Whentheofficerwasaskedifhestoppedthedefendantbecauseofthetrafficinfractionorhadhealreadymadeuphismindtostopthedefendantbeforetheinfraction,theofficerrespondedthathestoppedthedefendantbecauseof"'[a]combinationofevents.The,um,suspectedconfirmeddrugactivity;thefactthat,um,hecameoutofthatarea;hewasdrivingacarthatwasnotregisteredtohim.'"Onappealthecourtreversed. "Merepresenceinahighcrimeareais P notsufficienttoprovidethefoundedsuspicionofprior,present,orimminentcriminalactivitynecessarytosupportastop.Mosleyv.State,519  p So.2d58(Fla.2dDCA1988).Particularlyinsufficientandabhorrentasapurportedbasisforfoundedsuspicionisthebarefactofayoungblackmaledrivingavehicleregisteredtoawhitefemaleolderthanhe." McCrayv.State ,657So.   2d1(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    `    2(  2  )3  0 h  Tips,informants,andBOLOS R. #!h(#h(#    `     h 2(  a  )3  0  Ajuveniletoldanofficerthatawomanpassengerin % # acarparkednearbyhadaskedhimforcrackcocaine.Theofficerhadnopriordealingswiththejuvenile.Whentheofficerapproachedthecarhefounditexactlyasthejuvenilehaddescribedit.Thereweretwofemalesinthecar.Whentheofficeraskedthedriverforherlicense.Henoticedthatthedefendant,whowasoneofthewomen,closedher ,`'* legstogetherasiftohidesomething.Theofficerdidnotbelievethatthedefendanthadaweapon,butheaskedhertoexitthevehicle.Asubsequentsearchrevealedacrackcocainepipe.Theofficerdidnothavereasonablesuspicionforthedetention. Cronin p v.State ,656So.2d213(Fla.1stDCA1995).` (#(#    `     h 2(  b  )3  0  Thefactthattipstercontactedthepolicethreetimes @  didn'tmakethetipsufficienttoestablishreasonablesuspicion. "Ananonymoustipmayfurnish  p  reasonablesuspiciontojustifyaninvestigativestopifindependentpoliceinvestigationcorroboratestheanonymousinformation." Inthis @  casethetipwasinsufficientandthecourtreversedthedenialofthemotiontosuppress.Thetipdescribedablackmaleincludingheight,weight,andclothing.ThetipstersaidthatthemanwaspackagingcocaineinanapartmentatacertainlocationandthathewoldbedrivingagreenToyotavehicle.Inthenexttwocontactsthetipsterjustsaidthatthecarwasstillthereandthatthecarwasleaving.Theofficers p  nevercorroboratedtheinformation butstopped ` thecarwhichthedefendantwasdriving.Theydidnotseethedefendantleavetheapartmentorgetintothecar.Nordidtheyseeifhewascarryinganything.Infactoncetheystoppedthedefendant, therewere"innocentdetailsofthetipthatthey ` couldnotcorroborate." Thedefendant'sheight, P weightandclothingdidnotmatchthedescription.ThecarthedefendantwasdrivingwasaMazadanotaToyota.Theonlyinformationthepolicewereabletocorroboratewasthatthedefendantwasablackmandrivingagreencar. Fullerv.State ,658So.2d "  1202(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    `     h 2(  c  )3  0  Adeputyreceivedatipthatanindividualinapickup % # truckwaswatchingchildrenplayinanemptylot.Adescriptionwasgiven.Adeputywenttotheareaandsawthedefendantparkedonthesideoftheroadinavehiclematchingthedescription.Thedefendantpulledthetruckawayasthedeputyapproached.Thedeputystoppedthetruckbasedonaconcernforthesafetyofthechildren.Drugswerefoundinthe ,`'* truck.Thetrialjudgedeniedamotiontosuppressionbasedonherconclusionthatthedeputyhadareasonablesuspiciontobelievethedefendanthadcommittedorwasabouttocommitloiteringandprowling.Onappealthecourtreversed. "Neither p thetipnorthedeputy'sobservationsweresufficienttocreateafoundedsuspicionofcriminalactivity....Becausetherearesituationsinwhichlawabidingcitizenswouldbeparkedinavehiclewatchingchildrenplay,thetrialcourt'sfindingthat[thedefendant]wasloiteringorprowlingiswithoutsupport." Drivingawayfrom P  thedeputywasinsufficienttoelevatethedeputy'sbaresuspiciontoafoundedsuspicion. Martinv. 0  State ,658So.2d1153(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    `     h 2(  d  )3  0  Adeputyreceivedaradiodispatchdirectinghimto  a"possible"drugtransaction.ItallegedlyinvolvedfourpeopleatanapartmentorhomewithtwowhitevehiclesinfrontofitsdoorandacrossthestreetfromaCubanmarketonaspecifiedavenue.Thedeputywenttothelocationandfoundtwowhitecarsparkedinfront.Thedefendantwasoneofthepeoplewhocamefromtheresidence.Theofficerbecameconcernedforhissafetyanddetainedthedefendant.Asearchofhispersonresultedinthediscoveryofdrugs.Amotiontosuppresswasdenied.Onappealthecourtreversed.Theinformationreceivedbytheofficerwasinadequatetoestablishreasonablesuspicion. "Inadditiontothefactthatthe 0 dispatchonlyrelayedthatapossibledrug   transactionwasoccurringinvolvingpossiblyfour ! individuals,nodescriptionswereprovidedoftheindividualsortheresidenceinvolved,nolicensetagnumbersweregivenandtherewasnoindicationthatthesourceoftheinformationhadseenadrugtransaction,drugs,ormoney.Theminimalgeneralfactsgiven'couldhavebeenprovidedbyanypilgrimontheroadway.'" There P(#& was nocorroboration. Chasev.State ,656So.2d @)$' 588(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    `     h 2(  e  )3  0  Anofficerknewtheareawherehewasassignedwas ,`'* ahighcrimeareafordrugs.Henewthatthetypicaldrugtransactioninvolvedaperson,usuallywhite,drivingacardownthestreetuntilablackmaleoragroupofblackmalesapproachedthecar.Thedriverwouldstopthecar,andtheblackmaleswouldrunovertothecarwindow.Thedrugsellershowedhisproduct,thebuyershowedhismoney,andtheymadetheexchange.Theofficerreceivedadispatchthatananonymouscallerhadreportedthatawhitemaleandawhitefemalehadknockedonthecaller'sdoorandaskedtopurchasedrugs.Thecallersaidthosepeoplegotintoagray,midseizedfourdoorvehicle.Theofficerwasablockandahalfaway.Heimmediatelywenttothelocationnamedbythecaller.Hesawthecardescribedbythecallerinthatlocation.Awhitefemaleandawhitemalewasit.Ablackmaleapproachedthecarandstuckhishandintothedriver'ssidewindow.Thewhitefemalewasleaningforwardandlookingdownattheblackmale'shand.Whentheblackmalesawtheofficer,heimmediatelyremovedhishandandwalkedaway.Thecarleft.Thecarwasstoppedbasedontheofficer'sbeliefthathehadseenadrugtransaction.Thetrialjudgegrantedamotiontosuppress.Thecourtreversed. "Ananonymoustipmayprovide 0 thebasisforavalidstopiftheinformationhasacertaindegreeofreliability.Hetlandv.State,387 ` So.2d963(Fla.1980).Inevaluatingananonymoustipwemustlooktothespecificityoftheinformationprovidedandtheofficer'scorroborationoftheinformation....[Inthiscase][t]heanonymoustipwasvagueastothedescriptionofthecar;however,acarmeetingthatdescriptionwasintheexactplace...attheexacttime.Thedescriptionoftheoccupantsofthevehiclealsowasvague,but[thetwopeopleinthecar]fitthatdescription."Theremustalsobecorroborationofthetipthatthewhitefemaleandthewhitemaleweretryingtobuydrugs. Although,theofficersobservationsstandingalone @)$' wouldnothavebeensufficienttoestablishreasonablesuspicion,theyweresufficient,combinedwiththeofficersknowledge,toprovidethat ,`'* corroboration. "[Theofficer]receivedan  anonymoustipwhichwasvague,butheobservedavehiclemeetingthatdescriptionwithinminutesofthecallintheexactplacewherethecallerindicated.Then[theofficer]observedsuspiciousbehaviorwhich,basedonhisfouryears'experienceinthatarea,ledhimtothereasonablebeliefthatadrugtransactionhadoccurred.Thus,[theofficer]hadafoundedsuspiciontostopthevehicle." Statev.Santiago ,657So.2d12  p  (Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#     `    2(  3  )3  0 h  Othercircumstances .@ h(#h(#    `       `    2(  4  )3  0 h  Specificoffenses . h(#h(#     `  2  c  .3  0   Righttosearch,seize,°reeofrestraint |.(#(#     `    2(  1  )3  0 h The searchofthedefendant'spocketsexceededthe  properscopeofapatdownforofficer'ssafety. Peterson  v.State ,649So.2d326(Fla.1stDCA1995).ph(#h(#    `    2(  2  )3  0 h Thereasonablenessofthestopwasnotchallenged.The P officerhasobservedabulgeonthedefendant'spersonwhichhereasonablybelievedtobeaweaponorcontraband.Therehadbeenseveralburglariesintheareawheregunshadbeentakenandthedefendantwasrunningwhileholdinghissideasiftoconcealsomething. Uponstoppingthe P defendanttheofficerliftedthedefendant'sshirtandnoticedthebuttofapistol.Hedidthiswithoutpattingthedefendantdown.Thetrialjudgesuppressedthegun.    BasedonAdamsv.Williams,407U.S.143,92S.Ct.1921, ! 32L.Ed.2d612(1972),thecourtreversed.TheretheCourtfound "thatanofficer'sconductinreachingthespot #! whereagunwasthoughttobehiddenwithoutfirstconductingapatdown,wasalimitedintrusiondesignedtoinsuretheofficer'ssafetyandwas,therefore,reasonable." Thesamewastrueinthiscase.Apatdown `'"% underthecircumstanceswouldhavebeenfutile.Theofficerreasonablybelievedthattheobjectwasaweaponorcontraband. Statev.Hernandez ,658So.2d620(Fla.3d 0*%( DCA1995). h(#h(#  ,`'*    `    2(  3  )3  0 h Seediscussionaboveundersectionondetention. Stephens  v.State ,656So.2d531(Fla.2dDCA1995).h(#h(#    `     h      p    ` 2  5  .3  0  Consent . (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0   Burdenandstandards y. ` (#(#    `    2(  1  )3  0 h [Seefactsbelowunder"MotorVehiclesandBoats": @  "Durationofstop".}Thedefendantacquiescedtoasearchofhispersonalpropertybecauseofillegalpoliceconduct. "ItwasincumbentupontheStatetoshowbyclearand `  convincingevidencethatanyconsenttosearchthebag,theshoe,orthematchboxwasvoluntaryandnottheproductofappellant'sillegallyprolongeddetention."  0  Theremustbe "'anunequivocalbreakbetweenthestop   andtheconsent.'" Cooperv.State ,654So.2d229(Fla.  1stDCA1995). h(#h(#    `  2  b  .3  0   Authoritytoconsent P.(#(#     `       `  2  c  .3  0   Voluntariness I. `(#(#    `    2(  1  )3  0 h Officersknockedonthedefendant'smotelroomand @ announcedthemselves.Thedefendantvoluntarilyopenedthedoorandidentifiedhimself. "AlthoughTurnerdidnot  p invitetheofficersintotheroom,hewalkedintotheroomandleftthedoorajar.Thisallowedtheofficerstoentertheroombecausetherewasnodeceptionorevidenceofforcedentry.SeeByrdv.State,481So.2d468,472(Fla. 0 1985)('[A]nentryunderthosecircumstancesisconsensual,atleastwithrespecttotheareaimmediatelysurroundingthethresholdorvestibuleentranceoftheresidence,particularlywherethedefendantmakesnoobjection.')" Turnerv.State ,645So.2d444(Fla.1994).$"h(#h(#    `    2(  2  )3  0 h Voluntaryconsentmaybewithdrawn. Inthiscaseconsent p&!$ tosearchavehiclewaswithdrawnwhenthedefendantgrabbeditemsfromanofficeranddroveaway. Petersonv. P(#& State ,649So.2d326(Fla.1stDCA1995).@)$'h(#h(#    `  2  d  .3  0   Scope A  .,`'*(#(# Ї   `    2(  1  )3  0 h "Thesearchofdefendant'spocketsexceededthescopeof  eitherapatdownforprotectionortheconsenttheofficerhadreceivedtosearchthetruck.Petersonv.  State ,649So.2d326(Fla.1stDCA1995).h(#h(#     ` 2  6  .3  0  Incidentaltoarrestorprobablecause .P  (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0   Lawfulnessofarrest l.0 (#(#     `    2(  1  )3  0 h Therewassomedisputeastowhethertheinvolveddeputy's `  appointmentmightbeirregularbecausetheoathwasimproperlyadministered.Thiswasacasecertifiedfromcountycourt.Onappealthecourtfoundthatitwasunnecessarytoresolvetheissueastothevalidityoftheoathbecauseattheveryleastthedeputywasadefactoofficerat  thetimeofthearrest. "Itisclearlyestablishedthatthe  actsofofficersinthesecategoriesarevalidastothirdpersonsandthepublicuntiltheirtitletoofficeisjudiciallyadjudgedtobedefective." Farrellv.State ,650  So.2d88(Fla.4thDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  2  )3  0 h Thedefendantwasarrestedforanordinanceviolationfor P whichtherewasnojailsentence.Asearchincidentaltoarrestdiscoveredcocaine.Thetrialjudgedeniedamotiontosuppress.Onappealthecourtreversed. "Itwasillegalto  p arresthimforviolatingtheordinanceortosearchhimincidentaltothatillegalarrest....Thisordinancedidnotprovideforjailandthereforeitdidnotprovideforafullcustodialarrest.Consequently,theofficerhadnoauthoritytoconductafullcustodialsearchof[thedefendant]incidenttothe'arrest'." Thecourtnotedthat ! ifanofficerhasreasonablesuspiciontobelievethedefendantisarmedtheofficercandoapatdownevenwherethestopisforanordinanceviolationwithnopossiblejailterm. Belesv.State ,650So.2d1092(Fla.3dDCA1995).% #h(#h(#    `  2  b  .3  0   Probablecause . `'"%(#(#    `    2(  1  )3  0 h Theevidence,whenconsideredinalightmostfavorableto @)$' thestate,establishedthatatabout11:30p.m.anofficerwascontactedbyaknownCI.Theofficerhadusedinformationfromthisinformationmanytimesinthepastandithas ,`'* resultedinfelonyarrestsabout60to70percentofthetime.TheCItoldtheofficerthatablackmale,about5'10"tall,wearingablackjacket,whitetshirt,andbluejeans,wassellingpowderedcocaineonthesidewalkinfrontofaspecificaddress.Theofficerknewthatlocationtobepartofanareawithahighvolumeofstreetleveldrugsales.Theofficerhadseizedcocaineatthesamelocationacoupleofmonthsbefore.TheCItoldtheofficerthatthedrugdealerwrappedcocaineinsiderolleduponedollarbillsandplacedtheminhispantspocketreadytosell.Within15minutesofreceivingthetiptheofficersawthedefendantstandingonthesidewalkinfrontofthespecifiedlocation.Thedefendant'sclothesandappearancewasexactlyastheCIhaddescribed.Theonlyotherpersoninthelocationdidnotmatchthedescription.Theofficerapproachedthedefendant.hepatteddownthedefendantandfeltalarge,softbulgeinthedefendant'spocket.Theofficeraskedthedefendantaboutthebulge.Thedefendantsaidthatitwas28onedollarbills.Theofficerreachedintothedefendant'spocketandretrievedthemoney,butfoundnococaine.Hereachedintothepocketagainandretrievedanotherfoldeddollarbillwhichcontainedpowderedcocaineastheinformanthaddescribed.ThetrialjudgefoundthattheCIprovidedprobablecauseforanarrestandsearchconsideringthetotalityofthecircumstances.TheFirstDistrictreversedandcertifiedconflictwithotherdistricts.TheSupremeCourtreversedtheFirstDistrict.Thecourtwentthroughalengthyanalysis,butthesepointswereparticularlyimportant:(1)eventhoughthetipdidnotcontaintheexactbasisofknowledge,itdidprovideanabundanceofdetail;(2)personalknowledgecouldbeinferredfromthemannerofpackagingofthedrugsandtheirexactlocationonthedefendant'sperson;(3)therewasastrongshowingoftheCI'sveracity;(3) "Similarly,under #! Gatesanditsprogeny,weconcludethattheseemingly $" innocentactivityobservedherecouldbeusedbythepolicetoverifytheinformant'stip[;]" (4)withinminutes p&!$ thepolicecorroboratedeveryiteminthetipexceptforthefactthatthedefendantwascarryingdrugs;(5)theofficerhadotherinformationwhichtogethercontributedtotheimpactofthetotalityofthecircumstances.Thecourtgoesthroughthehistoryofthedevelopmentofthisareaofthelaw. Statev.Butler ,655So.2d1123(Fla.1995).,`'*h(#h(# Ї   `  2  c  .3  0   Proximitytotimeandplaceofarrest %. (#(#     ` 2  7  .3  0  Plainvieworopenview %.  (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Officersdidnothaveprobablecausetoconductawarrantlesssearch p ofapublicrestroomstallandtheydidnotobserveanyillegalconductthroughagapinastalldoor. "InMoorev.State,355So. P  2d1219(Fla.1stDCA1978),theofficerobservedthroughanarrowgapinthestalldoorthedefendantinjectinganeedleintohisarm.Insustainingtheintrusionthecourtconcluded,'Whereanofficerisinaplacewherehehasthelawfulrighttobeandheobserveswithinplainviewapersonengagedinthecommissionofafelony,orengagedinanactivitywhichcausetheofficerreasonablytobelievethatafelonyisthenbeingcommitted,theofficerhasarightthenandtheretoarrestsuchperson.'" Inthiscasetherewasnosuchobservation;therefore,the  officerimproperlyenteredthestall. Ramirezv.State ,654So.2d  1222(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#     ` 2  8  .3  0  Abandonment *.  (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Anofficerwantedtostopthedefendant.Heopenedhiscruiserdoor ` sothatthedefendant,whowasonabicycle,wouldhitandfall.Whenthishappenedthedefendantthrewthebagcontainingcocainetotheside.Thetrialjudgedeniedamotiontosuppress.Thestatearguedthatthebaghadbeenabandoned.Onappealthecourtreversed. "Aseizureinvolveseithertheapplicationofphysical ` forceorthesubmissiontoanofficer'sshowofauthority....Theofficerappliedashowofforcebyopeninghisdoorsothattheappellantwouldhitandfalloffhisbicycle.Theofficeradmittedthatthiswasintentional."   Itwasnotnecessaryfortheofficerto   touchthedefendantwithhishands. Clarkv.State ,648So.2d848 ! (Fla.4thDCA1995). (#(#    `     `  2  b  .3  0  Thedefendantwasobservedbyofficersplacinganobjectunderthe $" wheelofacar.Officersseizeditandfoundthatitwasacigarettepouchcontainingdrugs.Thetrialjudgegrantedamotiontosuppressbasedonhisconclusionthatithadnotbeenabandoned.Onappealthecourtfoundthatthiswaserror.Thecourtrecognizedthatthemainissueinsuchcasesis intent,"'tobeinferredfromthe @)$' wordsandactionsofthepartiesandothercircumstancessurroundingthepurportedabandonment.'"However,thecourtconcludedthattheconceptofabandonmentforproperty ,`'* purposesdiffersfromtheconceptasitrelatestosearchandseizureprinciples. ThecourtadoptedthepositionexpressedinCity  ofSt.Paulv.Vaughn,306Minn337,237N.W.2d365(1975).   "'Inthelawofproperty,thequestion...iswhethertheowner  hasvoluntarily,intentionally,andunconditionallyrelinquishedhisinterestinthepropertysothatanother,havingacquiredpossession,maysuccessfullyasserthissuperiorinterest....Inthelawofsearchandseizure,however,thequestioniswhetherthedefendanthas,indiscardingtheproperty,relinquishedhisreasonableexpectationofprivacysothatitsseizureandsearchisreasonablewithinthelimitsoftheFourthAmendment....Inessence,whatisabandonedisnotnecessarilythedefendant'sproperty,buthisreasonableexpectationofprivacytherein.Wherethepresenceofthepoliceislawfulandthediscardoccursinapublicplacewherethedefendantcannotreasonablyhaveanycontinuedexpectancyofprivacyinthediscardedproperty,thepropertywillbedeemedabandonedforpurposeofsearchandseizure.'" Thus,basedontheseprinciplesthe  propertyinthiscasewasabandoned. Statev.Kennon ,652So.2d  396(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#       ` 2  9  .3  0  Exigentcircumstances 8. ` (# (#    `  2   a  .3  0  Officershadafoundedsuspicionthatthedefendantmighthavebeen @ engagedinadrugtransaction.Theydidnotmakethestop.Insteadtheyletthedefendantgoonhisbicycleandwarnedanotherofficerthatthedefendantwascominghisway.Thedefendantenteredapublicrestroom.Withinminuteshecameoutandgotasmallbagandaaluminumbeercanfromhisbike.Hethenwentbacktotherestroom,enteredastallandclosedthedoor.Theofficerssuspectedthatthedefendantwassmokingcrack,buttheysawnoillegalactivity,smellednosmokeorthescentofburningdrugs.Nevertheless,theofficersrushedintotherestroomandenteredthestall.Theycaughtthedefendantinpossessionofcrackcocaine.Hismotiontosuppresswasdenied.Onappealthecourtreversed. The $" defendanthadareasonableexpectationofprivacyinthepublicrestroomstall."Wecannotconclude,however,thattheobservanceofanexchange,coupledwithahunchthatthesuspectintendstosmokecocainethroughabeercan,aresufficienttoreachafindingofprobablecause....(observationofbentbeveragecaninmotelroomdidnotgiveofficerprobablecausetoconductwarrantlesssearch.)Nordidmattersofexigencyprovidetherequisiteprobablecause;theofficershere ,`'* didnothavethe'fresh,direct,uncontradictedevidence'ofacriminaleventnecessarytoprevailupontheexigencyexception." Ramirezv.State ,654So.2d1222(Fla.2dDCA  1995). (#(#    `  2   b  .3  0  Officersreceivedatipthatstolenpropertywaslocatedonthe `  involvedpremisesandtheybelievedthattherewasprobablecausetosearchtheinvolvedbackyard. "That[theofficer]hadagood @  faithbelieftherewasstolenpropertyonthepremisesisnotdispositive.Inordertolegallysearchthepropertywithoutawarrant[theofficers]neededmorethanprobablecause,theyalsomusthavebeenfacedwithexigentcircumstancesnecessitatingimmediateactionontheirpart." Therewerenone @  inthiscase;therefore,theofficerswererequiredtosecureasearchwarrantforthebackyard.   Pottsv.Johnson ,654So.2d596(Fla.   3dDCA1995). (#(#      ` 2   10  .3  0  Motorvehiclesandboats B .  (# (#    `  2   a  .3  0   Generalrules C. (#(#    `    2 (  1  )3  0 h "[F]oundedsuspiciontostopavehicledoesnotcarry ` withitauthoritytosearchthevehicleoritsoccupants.Asearchmayonlybeconductedpursuantto(1)asearchwarrant;(2)avalidarrestbasedonprobablecause;or(3)exigentcircumstances."Tinsonv.State ,650So.2d  p 189(Fla.2dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2 (  2  )3  0 h "[O]nceavehiclehasbeenlawfullystopped,apolice @ officermayorderthedrivertogetoutofthevehiclewithoutviolatingtheFourthAmendment'sproscriptionofunreasonablesearchesandseizures.Pennsylvaniav. ! Mimms,434U.S.106,98S.Ct.330,54L.Ed.2d331 "  (1977)." Statev.Bernard ,650So.2d100(Fla.2dDCA #! 1995). h(#h(#    `  2   b  .3  0   Stopsfortrafficoffensesordrivingbehavior H .p&!$(#(#      `    2 (  1  )3  0 h Anofficerstoppedthevehiclebecausehecouldnotseea P(#& tag.Thestopwaslawful. Powellv.State ,649So.2d888 @)$' (Fla.2dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2 (  2  )3  0 h Seecasesbelowon pretextualstops. ,`'*h(#h(# Ї     `  2   c  .3  0   Investigatorystop K.(#(#     `    2 (  1  )3  0 h SeecasesaboveundersectiondealingwithTerrystops.h(#h(#    `    2 (  2  )3  0 h Defendant stoppedvehicleneartrailerwheredrugswere p sold +passengerenteredtrailer+passengerreturnedto `  vehicleinafewminutes. Noreasonablesuspicion. Powell P  v.State ,649So.2d888(Fla.2dDCA1995).@ h(#h(#    `    2 (  3  )3  0 h Officerssuspecteddrugswerebeingsoldataresidence+  p  defendantcametotheresidenceandleftinhiscar+severalcarshaddonethesamething. Noreasonablesuspicion.  P   Tinsonv.State ,650So.2d189(Fla.2dDCA1995).@ h(#h(#    `    2 (  4  )3  0 h Anofficersawthreepeoplewalkingthroughaconvenience   storeparkinglot.Theyappearedtobeintoxicated.Theofficersawthemgetintotwoseparatecars,atleastoneofwhichwasalreadyoccupied.Theothercarlefttheparkinglot.Beforeitlefttheparkinglottheofficerradioedforanotherofficertostopit.Whentheotherofficersawthecar,ithadnoheadlightsonanditwasdark,buttheywereturnedonafteranothervehiclesignalled.Thesecondofficerthenstoppedthecarbasedonhisfellowofficer'srequest.Afirearmwasobservedandthedefendantwasarrested.Thedefendant'smotiontosuppresswasdenied.Onappealthecourtreversed. "Inordertostopamovingvehicle,an  p officermusthaveafoundedsuspicionofcriminalactivityorcausetobelievethatheobservedatrafficviolation." Inthiscasetheofficerdecidedtomakethestop @ beforethevehicleevenlefttheparkinglotbecausehethoughtthethreepeoplehesawmightbeintoxicated.Therewasnotestimonythatthecar'sdriverwasoneofthethreepeople.Therewasnofoundedsuspicion. Paynev.State , "  654So.2d1252(Fla.2dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2 (  5  )3  0 h Officerssawthedefendantlawfullydrivinghiscar,inthe % # middleoftheday,inanareathathasareputationforhighcrimeactivity.Therearwindowofthevehiclewascompletelyknockedout."Thestateattemptedtojustifythisstopbasedupontheofficers'suspicionthatthecarwasstolenbecausethewindowwasbrokenout.However,bothofficerstestifiedtoaratherarbitrarypatternofinvestigatingsuchcars,dependentupontimeandplaceandwhatthey ,`'* happenedtobedoingatthetime.Furthermore,asignificantpercentageofcarsstoppedinthatconditionwerebeingdrivenbytheirowners,perhapsafterhavingbeenstolenorvandalized,aswasJackson's.Attheleast,theofficersshouldhaverunacomputercheckonthevehiclebeforepullingJacksonover." Jacksonv.State ,660So.2d312 `  (Fla.2dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `       `  2   d  .3  0   Probablecause Z. 0 (#(#    `  2   e  .3  0   Incidentaltoarrest }[.` (#(#     `  2   f  .3  0   Durationofstopandscopeofsearch E\. @ (#(#    `    2 (  1  )3  0 h Anofficerstoppedavehiclebecausehecouldnotseeatag.   Thestopwaslawful.Heascertainedthatthevehiclehadavalidtemporarytag.Theofficerretrievedhisnarcoticsdetectiondogfromhiscaranddiscovereddrugs.Itwasunclearwhetherhegotthedogbeforeorafterhedeterminedthatthevehiclehadatemporarytag,although,heacknowledgedthatitmayhavebeenbefore.Onappealthecourtreversedthedenialofamotiontosuppressbecause theburdenwasonthestatetoshowthevalidityofthe P warrantlessseizureanditfailedtomeetthatburden.Thedefendantshouldhavebeenallowedtoleaveoncetheofficerdeterminedthatthevehiclehadavalidtemporarytag. Powellv.State ,649So.2d888(Fla.2d ` DCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2 (  2  )3  0 h AnofficerstoppedthedefendantforDUI.Theofficer 0 seizedagunhesawinthedefendant'scar.Acheckonthegunshowedthatitwasregisteredtothedefendant.Oncetheofficerdeterminedthatthedefendantwasnotintoxicated,hereturnedhislicenseandtoldhimhewasfreetogo.Theofficerdidnotreturnthegun.Theofficerthenaskedthedefendantifhecouldsearchthecar.Whenthedefendantrefused,theofficertoldhimthataK9unitcouldbebroughttothescenetosnifffordrugs.Thedefendantthenwalkedtohiscarandbeganremovingitemsfromthebackseatandplacingtheminabagontheground.Oneofficersawthedefendantplaceamatchboxinthebag.Whenaskedaboutthematchbox,thedefendantdeniedthatitexisted.Accordingtooneofficerthedefendantconsentedtohim ,`'* retrievingthematchboxfromashoeinthebaganditcontainedcocaine.Amotiontosuppresswasdenied.Onappealthecourtreversedbecausetheinitiatestopandinvestigatoryseizureofthedefendant'sgunwasillegal. "At  notimewastheencounterconsensualinnature.Oncetheofficersdeterminedthat[thedefendant]wasnotintoxicatedandthat[thedefendant's]possessionofthefirearmwasnotillegal,therewasnolongeranylawfulreasonnottolethimgo." Thesubsequentrequesttosearch 0  thecarandthethreattobringthedogsamountedtoanillegaldetention. Cooperv.State ,654So.2d229(Fla.1st `  DCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2 (  3  )3  0 h Whenthedriverofavehiclecommitsatrafficinfraction,he 0  orshesubjectshimselforherselftotheinconvenienceofthestopand adrugdogsniffofthecarsolongasitis  "conductedwithinthetimerequiredfortheissuanceofthecitation." Inthiscasewhentheofficerorderedthe  partiesoutofthecar,heorderedthepassengeroverherobjectiontoleaveherpurseinthecarduringthedrugdogsniff.Iftheofficerwasconcernedaboutthecontentsofthepurseforsafetyreasonsasheclaimed,hecouldhavepattedthepursedown. Requiringthepassenger"toleaveit P behindsothatitwouldbeexposedtoadrugsniffisanimpermissibleseizure.Iftheofficercannotextendalawfulstopbeyondthetimeittakestowriteacitationinordertohavethek9unitperformitstask...certainlyhemaynotsubjectthosewhoarenotbeing'detained'underanylawfulauthoritytosuchatest." Thecourt @ concludedthatboththedefendantandherpropertywereseized. McNeilv.State ,656So.2d1320(Fla.5thDCA   1995). h(#h(#     `  2   g  .3  0   PretextualStop l.#!(#(#     `    2 (  1  )3  0 h Theofficerdidnotmakeapretextualstopwheretheofficer % # sawthedefendantrunatleastoneredlightanddrivesixtymilesanhourinathirtymileperhourzone.Itwasundisputedthatareasonableofficerwouldhavemadeastopforsuchconduct.Thus, "itdoesnotmatterthatthe @)$' officerinquestionwhointhiscasewasanarcoticsinvestigatormightoreven...wouldhavedetainedthe  +p&) occupantsifnoinfractionhadtakenplaceatall."State ,`'* v.Velez ,649So.2d310(Fla.3dDCA1995). h(#h(#     `    2 (  2  )3  0 h TheCourtdealtwiththefollowingcertifiedquestion: "Does  therulinginKehoev.State,521So.2d1094(Fla.1988),  requiresuppressionofevidenceobtainedasaresultofthestopofamotorvehicleforaminortrafficviolationwherethereisnoevidencethatthestopwaspretextual,butthestatefailstoaffirmativelyestablishbyevidencethatareasonablepoliceofficerwouldhaveroutinelystoppedamotorvehicleforthesameviolation?" The  p  Courtansweredwithaqualifiedaffirmatiive.InansweringthisquestiontheCourtreveiewedtheU.S.SupremeCourtdecisionsandotherdecisionsandconcludedthattherearethreedifferentapproachestothisissue,andtheU.S.SupremeCourthasnotresolvedthematter.Thethreeaproachesare:(1)thesubjectiveapproach(officer'sactualintent);(2)objectivetest(stoplawfulifofficerlawfullycouldhavemadestop);(3)reasonableofficerapproach(stoplawfulifareasonableofficerwouldhavemadethestopbasedonthetrafficoffensewithoutsomeotherreason).ThelastoftheseisthetestadoptedinKehoev.State521So.2d p 1094(Fla.1988). "Thereasonableofficertestisbetter ` suitedforanindividualizedinquirybecauseitalsoaskswhethertheusualpolicepracticewouldbetoeffectastopwhenconfrontedwithaparticularkindofminorinfraction.Insum,wouldtheofficerhaveeffectedthestopabsentanyimpropermotive?Iftheansweris"yes,"thenthestopwaslawfulevenifapretextualmotivemayhaveinfluencedtheofficer'sactions.Asisobvious,thistestbydefinitionwouldneverbarastopwherethereisprobablecausetosuspectmoreseriousoffenses,includingfeloniesorcrimesinvolvingharmorthethreatofharmtoothers,orwhereexigentcircumstancesexist.Moreseriousoffensesalwayswillprovideindependentjustification,howeverpretextualthestopmaybe.Rather,thereasonableofficertestappliesexclusivelywhereastopisjustifiedsolelybyaminorinfraction,generallythosethatarepurelyregulatoryinnatureandthatdonotaddressconductpotentiallyharmfultootherpersonsorproperty." TheCourtadoptedthepositionset @)$' forthinUnitedStatesv.Bates,840F.2d858(11th 0*%( Cir.1988).TheCourtconcludedthatinthiscasethecourtadoptedarule "thatastopforaminorinfractioncannot ,`'* bedeemedpretextualonappealwhere(1)theofficerwasactingwithintheproperscopeoflawfulauthority,and(2)therecordbelowcontainscompetentsubstantialevidencethatthestopwasnotobjectivelypretextualwithoutregardtoanysubjectiveintentions,asdemonstratedbythefactitwasausualpolicepractice,  `  and(3)thetrialcourthassofound."TheCourtfoundthatthiswasgenerallyconsistentwithstatedecisionallaw."[T]hefactthatastopfailsunderthereasonableofficertestdoesnotwarrantdismissalofevidenceifsomeothervalidbasisforthestopexisted,includingaprobable-causearrestorarrestbywarrant."TheCourtalsoreliedonthedecisioninDoctorv.State,596So.2d442(Fla.1992)andStatev. @  Riley,638So.2d507(Fla.1995)insupportofthe 0  propositionthatifthestopwasforconductthatisnotunlawful,thestopisumproperregardlessofwhattheevidenceshowsconcerningthepretextisssue."Inotherwords,itdidnotmatterwhetherthetrialcourtbelowhadfoundcompetentsubstantialevidencethatthesestopswerearoutinepracticeofsimilarofficers,becausethestopswereinherentlycontrarytolaw.Evencustomarypracticescannottransformanillegalactintoalegalone." Statev.Daniel , ` 20Fla.L.WeeklyS497(Fla.opinionfiledSept.28,1995). h(#h(#    `    2 (  3  )3  0 h Anofficerstoppedthedefendantbecausethedefendant'scar 0 "windshieldhadalargecrackandawindshieldwiperstuckdirectlyacrossthedriver'sview."Theofficersaidheintendedtogivethedefendantawarning.Thedefendantwasunabletoproducealicense.Theofficerarrestedhimonthatcharge,butnevergavehimacitationforthewindshieldmatter.Theofficersaidthiswasstandardprocedure.Drugswerediscoveredinapatdown.Theofficerhadarighttostopthevehicle."Section316.610(1),FloridaStatutes(1991),states:Anypoliceofficermayatanytime,uponreasonablecausetobelievethatavehicleisunsafeornotequippedasrequiredbylaw,orthatitsequipmentisnotinproperadjustmentorrepair,requirethedriverofthevehicletostopandsubmitthevehicletoaninspectionandsuchtestwithreferencetheretoasmaybeappropriate.""Section316.2952(4),FloridaStatutes(1991),states:Everywindshieldwiperuponamotorvehicleshallbemaintainedingoodworkingorder." "[T]hereisnoquestionthatlegal  +p&) authorityforthestopexistedpursuanttoavalidtraffic ,`'* safetystatute,andthatatrafficstopofthistypefellwithintheusualdutiesofofficersinDeal'sdepartment."Thereisapresumptionthattheofficerwouldcarryoutthisduty.""Insum,oncetheStatehasestablishedthatthetrafficstopwaslegallyauthorizedandthatitfellwithintheusualdutiesassignedtosimilarofficers,thenanylegitimatedoubtwhethertheStatehasmetitsburdenshouldberesolvedinfavoroftheState."    State @  v.Daniel ,20Fla.L.WeeklyS497(Fla.opinionfiledSept. 0  28,1995). h(#h(#    `    2 (  4  )3  0 h OncetheCourtconcludedthattheofficerwasauthorizedto P  makethestop,theCourtlookedatseveralotherfactorsthatdistinguishthiscasefromothercaseswherethecourthasruledthatthestopwaspretextual. First,thestopwas   immediatetherewasnodelay.Second,theofficertestifiedthat"heonlyintendedtogivethedefendantawarningabouthiswindshieldwiper--areasonablepoliceaction--andnothingintherecordimpugnsthisassertion."Third,theofficerwaswithinhisauthoritytoaskthedefendantforadriver'slicense... Theinitialstop p wasvalidandobjectivelynonpretextualunderthereasonableofficerrulebecauseitwasonlyintendedforissuingawarning." Statev.Daniel ,20Fla.L.WeeklyS497(Fla. @ opinionfiledSept.28,1995). h(#h(#    `    2 (  5  )3  0 h "Thedispositivefact...isthat,when[thedefendant]could ` notproduceadriver'slicense,probablecauseimmediatelyarosetobelievethathehadviolatedastatuteintendedtoprotectthepublicfromharm--therequirementofvalidlicensure.Theinitialstopwasvalidandobjectivelynonpretextualunderthereasonableofficerrulebecauseitwasonlyintendedforissuingawarning. Butoncea "  probableviolationofthelicensurestatutebecameapparent,thereasonableofficerrulesimplyceasedtobeabartofurtherpoliceaction.Aviolationofthelicensurestatutecannotbedeemedaminorinfractionbecauseofitsobviousrelationtopublicsafety,andofficersthereforeareindependentlyjustifiedinstoppingandarrestingforsuchaviolationwithoutregardtoanypretextualmotivetheymayhave."Statev.Daniel ,20 0*%( Fla.L.WeeklyS497(Fla.opinionfiledSept.28,1995). h(#h(#  ,`'*    `    2 (  6  )3  0 h Whethertheconductconstitutingtheallegedtraffic  infractionactuallyisaviolation,itisuptothetrialjudgetoresolveconflictsintheevidenceindeterminingwhetherthestopwaspretextual. Statev.Daniel ,20Fla.L.Weekly  S497(Fla.opinionfiledSept.28,1995). h(#h(#    `       `    2 (  7  )3  0 h Anofficerstoppedthedefendantforhavinganinoperative P  taillightandasaresultcontrabandwasdiscovered.ThecourtfoundthatthestopwasvalidbasedonthefollowinglanguagefromStatev.Fernandez,526So.2d192,193  p  (Fla.3dDCA1988): "'[T]heissue[ofpretextwithregard `  toalegalstop]doesnotariseunlessthereisasuggestedalternativereasonforthestopusuallyrelatedtotheofficer'swishtoapprehendthedriverbecauseofinformationandbeliefthatheisguiltyofsomeotheroffense.'" Inthiscasetheonlyevidencewasthattheofficer  wasoriginallymakingasimpletrafficstop.Thesearchofthevehicledidnottakeplaceuntiltheofficerdiscoveredthatthedefendanthadagun.ThisdecisionisinconflictwithDanielv.State,647So.2d220(Fla.1stDCA1994),  whichisonappealtotheSupremeCourt.TheretheFirstDistrictsaid: "'[S]uppressionoftheevidenceobtainedas ` aresultofstopofmotorvehicleforminortrafficviolationisrequiredwherethereisnoevidencethatstopwaspretextual,butstatefailstoaffirmativelyestablishthatareasonablepoliceofficerwouldhaveroutinelystoppedamotorvehicleforsameviolation." Roddyv. ` State ,658So.2d144(Fla.3dDCA1995).Ph(#h(#    `       `    2 (  8  )3  0 h Anofficerhadnofoundedsuspicionforthestopofacar. 0 Thecardroveashortdistancewithoutanyheadlights.Someonesignaledhimandheturnedonhisheadlight.Theofficerwhomadethestopsaidthathedidsobecauseanotherofficerhadtoldhimto.Thestopcouldnotbejustifiedbasedonthetrafficviolation. "[T]hestatefailed $" toshowthatunderthecircumstancesareasonableofficerwouldhavestoppedthe[car]forthebriefperiodofdrivingwithoutheadlights.Seev.Lagree,595So.2d `'"% 1029(Fla.1stDCA),reviewdenied,601So.2d553(Fla. P(#& 1992)(statefailedtoprovethatofficer'sstopofanautomobilewhichhesawpulloutoftheparkinglotanddriveonehalfofasmallcityblockbeforeturningontheheadlightswasnotpretextual). Theofficerissueda ,`'* citationfortheinfraction,butthatwasclearlynotthereasonforthestop. Paynev.State ,654So.2d1252(Fla.2d  DCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2 (  9  )3  0 h Officerssawthedefendantlawfullydrivinghiscar,inthe p middleoftheday,inanareathathasareputationforhighcrimeactivity.Therearwindowofthevehiclewascompletelyknockedout.Bothofficersstatedthatthebrokenrearwindowwasthebasisforthestop.Asaresultofthestopcontrabandwasdiscoveredinthedefendant'schangepurse.Thetrialjudgedeniedamotiontosuppress.Onappealthecourtreversedbecause:(1)neitherofficerknewwhetherdrivingacarwithabrokenrearwindowwasillegal;(2)infact,thedefendanthadcommittednoviolationbecausetheFloridaStatutesdealonlywithtintedwindows,but noneofthemrequirethatthereevenbearear  window; (3) "[t]hepolicearenotpermittedto  compensateforlackoffoundedsuspicionthatacrimehasbeenorisbeingcommittedbyjustifyingastoponanobscuretrafficviolationormalfunctioningequipment.  Doctorv.State,596So.2d442(Fla.1992)." "Becausethe p officershadobservednoviolationofthelaw,andbecausenoreasonablepoliceofficerwouldhavestoppedthedefendantbasedmerelyupontheconditionoftherearwindow"themotiontosuppressshouldhavebeengranted. ThecourtreliedonDanielv.State,647So.2d  p 220(Fla.1stDCA1994) Jacksonv.State ,660So.2d312 ` (Fla.2dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `  2    h  .3  0   Subjectofsearch  .0(#(#     `    2 (  1  )3  0 h Officersneednothavereasonablesuspicionofcriminal ! activitytosearchforweaponsinavehiclethatislawfullystopped. "'[T]hesearchofthepassengercompartmentof #! anautomobile,limitedtothoseareasinwhichaweaponmaybeplacedorhidden,ispermissibleifthepoliceofficerpossessesareasonablebeliefbasedon'specificandarticulablefactswhich,takentogetherwiththerationalinferencesfromthosefacts,reasonablywarrant'theofficersinbelievingthatthesuspectisdangerousandthesuspectmaygainimmediatecontrolofweapons....'Theissueiswhetherareasonablyprudentmaninthecircumstanceswouldbewarrantedinthebeliefthathis ,`'* safetyorthatofotherswasindanger.''" Theremustbe  alawfulstopandthisreasonablebelief.Thenofficersmaysearchthe passengercompartment. Thefactthatthe  occupantshavebeenremoveddoesnotalterthisauthority.Inthiscaseanofficersawa gunbag nexttothedriverof p thevehicle.Theofficerwasjustifiedinbeingconcernedforhissafety.Thedefendantarguedthattheofficerscouldnotlawfullyorderhimoutofthecarandsearchforweaponsbecausetheydidnothaveprobablecausetobelievethathewasillegallycarryingaconcealedweapon.Further,sincethegunbagwasinplainviewtheofficershadnoreasontobelievethattheywereindanger.Onappealthecourtsaid: P   "Whetherafirearmispossessedlegallyorillegally,itis @  stillafirearm,thepresenceofwhichposesathreattothesafetyofanypersonwhocouldbeinjuredorkilledifitwereused." Statev.Bernard ,650So.2d100(Fla.  2dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `       `  2   i  .3  0   Roadblocks ܬ.(#(#    2   E  .3  0 `  Exceptionstoconstitutionalrequirements .`` (#` (#     ` 2  1  .3  0  "GoodFaith"exception T. @ (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Theaffidavitforsearchwarrantwasdefectivebecauseitreferredto  p drugsbeinginthehouseatadayinthefutureratherthanthepresent.Thetrialjudgeheldthattherelianceoftheofficersonthewarrantwasobjectivelyreasonableandupheldthesearchbasedonthegoodfaithdoctrine.Onappealthecourtfoundtherewassufficientsupportintherecordforthefinding.Thesefactorswereconsideredtobesignificant:(1)thereliabilityoftheinformantwasdemonstrated;(2)therewasacontrolledbuyaswellaspriordrugdealingsbetweentheinformantandtheoccupantofthebuilding;(3)theofficershadtheinformantinsightconstantlyexceptwhilehewasinsidethebuilding;(4)therewasasolidconnectionbetweenthedrugsandthepremises;(5)therewerenofalsestatementsintheaffidavit. "[T]he'anticipatory'natureoftheaffidavitcould `'"% easilyhavebeeneliminatedbyputtingtheofficer'sbeliefinthepresenttensegivenSullivan'sassurancetotheinformant,oneofSullivan'spriorcocainecustomers,thathisstock,temporarilydepleted,wouldbe'reupped'onJune18,andgiventhefactthattheofficerdidnotexecutetheaffidavituntilwell ,`'* intotheafternoonofJune18.Furthermore,theofficertooktheproposedaffidavittoanassistantstateattorneyforapprovalastoformbeforeexecutingitbeforethemagistrate.Finally,theofficerproposedinhisaffidavitthatifawarrantwereissuedhewouldnotexecuteitunlessanduntilhehadsuccessfullyconductedacontrolledpurchasethroughtheinformantandtheinformantassuredhimthattherewasadditionalcocaineinthepremisestobesearched,conditionswhichtheofficerscrupulouslyobservedbeforeexecutingthewarrant." The 0  warrantdidnotsufferfromthedefectspresentintheaffidavitsin  p  Renckleyv.State,538So.2d1340(Fla.1stDCA1989)and `  Brownv.State,561So.2d1248(Fla.2dDCA1990).Therethe P  courtsfoundthatreliancewasnotobjectivelyreasonable. Pazosv. @  State ,654So.2d1000(Fla.4thDCA1995). 0 (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Officersreceivedatipthatstolenpropertywaslocatedonthe  involvedpremisesandtheybelievedthattherewasprobablecausetosearchtheinvolvedbackyard."That[theofficer]hadagoodfaithbelieftherewasstolenpropertyonthepremisesisnotdispositive.Inordertolegallysearchthepropertywithoutawarrant[theofficers]neededmorethanprobablecause,theyalsomusthavebeenfacedwithexigentcircumstancesnecessitatingimmediateactionontheirpart." Therewerenone P inthiscase;therefore,theofficerswererequiredtosecureasearchwarrantforthebackyard.   Pottsv.Johnson ,654So.2d596(Fla. 0 3dDCA1995). (#(#     ` 2  2  .3  0  InevitableDiscovery һ. P (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Thedefendant'svehiclewasstoppedforspeeding. Agunbagwas 0 observednexttothedriver'sseat. Theofficersaskedthe   defendanttoexitthecar. Anofficersawmarijuanainplainview ! whenthedefendantwasaskedtoexit. Oneofficeraskedthe "  defendanttoproducehislicense,registrationandproofofinsurance. Theotherofficerretrievedthegunbagandfound $" thatitcontainedafirearmandammo. Oneofficerspokewiththe % # defendant,whiletheotherofficerreturnedtothecarandlookedthroughthedriver'ssidetomakesurethattherewerenootherweapons.Whentheotherofficerbegantalkingtothedefendant,hesawthatthedefendantwaswearingahipbag.Itwasbulgingandappearedtobeveryheavy.Underthecircumstancestheofficerthoughtthatthedefendantmighthaveanotherweaponinthisbag,whichwasclosetothedefendant'shand. Theofficerthenasked ,`'* thedefendantifhehadanyweaponsinthebag.Thedefendantinquiredwhethertheofficerswerejustlookingforweapons.Theofficerresponded:"Why,doyougotdrugsinthere?"Thedefendantsaidyesandopenedthebagtorevealthemarijuana.   Theofficerthenseizedthebag.Otheritemswereseizedinthisprocess.Thedefendantarguedthattheofficerscouldnotlawfullyorderhimoutofthecarandsearchforweaponsbecausetheydidnothaveprobablecausetobelievethathewasillegallycarryingaconcealedweapon.Further,sincethegunbagwasinplainviewtheofficershadnoreasontobelievethattheywereindanger.Onappealthecourtsaid: "Whetherafirearmispossessedlegallyor `  illegally,itisstillafirearm,thepresenceofwhichposesathreattothesafetyofanypersonwhocouldbeinjuredorkilledifitwereused." Thecourtfoundthattheinevitablediscovery 0  doctrineappliedastomuchoftheevidencebecause:(1)itwaslawfulfortheofficerstoorderthedefendanttoexitthevehicleonceitwaslawfullystopped;(2)marijuanawasseeninplainviewasthedefendantexited;(3)theappearanceandlocationofthedefendant'shipbagsupportedtheofficer'sinquiryastowhethertherewereweaponsinthebag;(4)theinquirywasnotasearch;(5)thedefendantvoluntarilyopenedthebagrevealingthemarijuanasittingontopoftheotherthingsinthebag;(6) "[t]hediscoveryofthese ` itemsofcontrabandwouldhavesubjectedthedefendanttoarrest,subsequenttowhichhisentirevehicleandpersoncouldhavebeensearched." Statev.Bernard ,650So.2d100(Fla.2d 0 DCA1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Twostoreclerkstoldanofficerthatthedefendanthadstolen P cigarettes.Thedefendantwasdrivingoutoftheparkinglot.Theofficerstoppedhim.Thedefendantcouldnotproducealicense.Whenthedefendantsteppedoutofthecartheofficersawabrownpaperbagontheseatwithpartofaplasticbaggieprotruding.Theofficerseizedthebagandfoundthattheplasticbaggiecontainedcocaine.Nocigaretteswerefoundinthecar. Aftertheyarrivedat #! thestationtheofficerlearnedthatthedefendant'slicensewassuspendedandhewaschargedwiththat. Amotiontosuppress % # thecocainewasmade.Thetrialjudgefoundthat:(1)theofficerdidnotgroundstosearchthevehicleincidentaltoarrestbecausehehadnoprobablecausetoarrestthedefendantforshoplifting;(2)theofficerdidnothaveprobablecausetosearchfordrugsbasedonhisobservationoftheplasticbaggieprotrudingfromthebrownbag.However,thecourtconcludedthatthestatehadestablishedby a  +p&) preponderanceoftheevidence thatthecocainewouldhave ,`'* ultimatelybeendiscoveredbecauseaninvestigationofthedefendant'sdrivingstatuswouldhaveledtohisarrestfordrivingonasuspendedlicenseandasearchincidentaltothatarrest.Onappealthecourtreversed. "Theofficertestifiedthathediscovered  [thedefendant]hadasuspendedlicenseafterthearrestforpossession,whentheywereatthepolicestation.Whileatthescene,theofficerdidnotinvestigate[thedefendant's]lackofadriver'slicense.[I]tisspeculationwhattheofficerwouldhavedonehadhenotsearchedthecarandobservedthecocaine.Certainlyitwaspossiblethattheofficerwouldhaveinvestigated  p  thelackofalicenseatthescene,butitwasnotinevitable."  `  (emphasisbythecourt). Ruffinv.State ,651So.2d206(Fla.2d P  DCA1995). (#(#    2  F  .3  0 `  Electronicsurveillance .  ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 "[O]ralcommunicationsconductedoveracordlessphonewithinthe  privacyofone'sownhomeareprotectedbyFlorida'sSecurityofCommunicationsAct,chapter934,FloridaStatutes(1991)." The  interceptionofthecommunicationtakesplaceatthepointoforigin,notthepointofrecordation. Statev.Muzo ,655So.2d1115(Fla.1995).p (# (#   `    2  IV  .3  0   ADMISSIBILITYOFSTATEMENTSANDCONFESSIONS .(#(#   2  A  .3  0 `  Privilegeagainstselfincrimination F.` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0  Application  .p (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0  Anissueinthiscasewaswhetherthefactthatthedefendant's P  statementsmayhavebeenwithoutbenefitofMirandawarnings @  whentheywererequired,necessarilymeansthatsubsequentstatementsmadeafterthereadingofMirandarightsandthe  p  physicalevidencesecuredasaresultofthestatementsmustbesuppressed. "TheUnitedStatesSupremeCourthasdistinguished P  between(a)anunwarnedstatementand(b)aninvoluntarystatement.Oregonv.Elstad,470U.S.298,105S.Ct.1285,84 0  L.Ed.2d222(1985).AnunwarnedstatementisonewhichismadewithoutrequiredMirandawarnings.Aninvoluntary  statementisastatementthatistheproductofcoercion.470U.S.at304314." Inthiscaseifthedefendantwasincustodyatthe  policestationforMirandapurposes,thenhisunwarnedstatement  mustbesuppressed.Buttheymightnotbeinvoluntary,andifnot,thenthe"fruitofthepoisonoustree"doctrinewouldnotapplytoexcludesubsequentwarnedstatementsandphysicalevidencesecuredasaresultofthestatements. An"unwarnedstatement P doesnotviolatetheFifthandFourteenthAmendmentssolongastheunwarnedstatementisvoluntary...IfthedefendantissubsequentlygivenproperMirandawarningsandknowingly  p andvoluntarilymakesawarnedstatement,thenthewarnedstatementisadmissible." InElstadtheCourtsaid: "'Wehold P todaythatasuspectwhohasoncerespondedtounwarnedyetuncoercivequestioningisnottherebydisabledfromwaivinghisrightsandconfessingafterhehasbeengiventherequisiteMirandarights.'"Thefocusonthesecondstatementwas ! whetheritwasvoluntary.Similarlyanyphysicalevidencemustbejudgedbythesamestandards. Statev.Polanco ,658So.2d #! 1123(Fla.3dDCA1995). (#(#    ` 2  2  .3  0  CustodialinterrogationbypoliceagentsforpurposesofMiranda k. p&!$ (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Thetrialjudgedeniedamotiontosuppressstatementsmadeatthe P(#& policestationeventhoughthedefendanthadnotbeenadvisedofhisMirandarights.Onappealthecourtaffirmedbecausetherewas 0*%( competentevidencetosupportthedecision.Theinterviewingofficertestifiedthatthedefendantcametothestationvoluntarily. ,`'* Theofficersaidthatbeforetheinterviewbegantheyaskedthedefendantifhewouldanswerquestionsofhisownfreewill.Hesaidthathewould.Theyalsotestifiedthattheyhadtoldhimthathewasnotunderarrest andthathecouldleaveaftertheinterview  wasfinished. Aftertheinterviewwasfinished,theofficersasked p thedefendantiftheyhadpromisedhimanythingorifanythreatshadbeenmade.Hesaidno.Thedefendantthenleft. The P  defendantwasnotunderarrestorincustodywhenthestatementsweremade;therefore,Mirandawarningswerenot 0  required. Brownv.State ,658So.2d1166(Fla.5thDCA1995). p (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Thedefendantwasan18yearoldhighschoolstudentwhowas P  suspectedofbeinginvolvedinamurder.Detectivescametotheschooltotalkwithhim.Thedefendantwasbroughtfromclasstoaconferenceroom.Aftertalkingwiththedefendant,thedetectivesconcludedthatthedefendantwasoneofthelastpeopletoseethevictimaliveandaskedthedefendanttoaccompanythemtothepolicestation,whichwasashortdistancefromschoolforafurtherinterview.Thedetectivesmaintainedthatthiswasdonevoluntarilyandthatthedefendantwasnotincustody.thedefendanttestifiedthatthedetectivegavehimtheimpressionthathehadnochoice.Thedefendantandthedetectivesthenwenttothepolicestation.ThedefendantwasnotadvisedofhisMirandarightsattheschool P oruponarrivalatthestation.Afterquestioningthedefendantforonehourandtenminutesatthestationthedefendantconfessedtothemurder.HewasarrestedandadvisedofhisMirandarights.He  p thenconfessedagaintothemurder.Healsotoldthedetectiveswherehehaddisposedoftheweaponandhisbloodyclothing.Theyfoundthelatteritems.Thetrialjudgesuppressedallofthestatementsandevidence.Onappealthecourtreversed. "'In 0 determiningwhetherasuspectisincustody,'theultimateinquiryissimplywhetherthereisa"formalarrestorrestraintonfreedomofmovement"ofthedegreeassociatedwithformalarrest.'"" Inthiscasethefactthatdefendantobeyedtheschool's #! instructionstogototheconferenceroomtomeetwiththeofficersdidnotautomaticallymeanthathewasincustodyforMiranda % # purposes.Therewasnothingelseduringtheschoolinterviewwhichwouldhavemetthetest.Thedetectivestoldthedefendanttheywereconductinganinvestigationandhisnamecameup.Theydidnottellhimthatitwasamurderinvestigationorthathewasasuspect.Theinterviewtookplaceinanemptyofficeattheschool.Thequestionsrelatedsolelytothedefendant'swhereaboutsatacertaintimeandwhetherheknewthevictim.Attheconclusionof ,`'* theinterviewthedefendantwasaskedtocometothepolicestation.Therewasnoevidenceofanycoercivetacticsduringtheinterview.   "Weseenobasisonwhichtorulethatthedefendantwasin  custodyforMirandapurposesduringtheschoolinterview,nor  isthereabasisonwhichtoconcludethatthedefendant'sstatementswereinvoluntaryforFifthAmendmentpurposes."  `   Statev.Polanco ,658So.2d1123(Fla.3dDCA1995).P (#(#    `  2  c  .3  0  Apoliceofficerreceivedinformationthatthedefendanthadbeen 0  involvedinatheftandthathehadmadeawrittenconfessiontoastoreemployee.Afterreceivingtheconfession,theofficercalledthedefendant'shome.Thedefendantgotonthephone.Theofficeridentifiedhimselfandtoldhimthathewasinvestigatingthetheftatthestore.TheofficerdidnotadvisethedefendantofhisMiranda 0  rightsandaskedhimtoverifythecontentoftheconfession.Theofficertestifiedthathehadprobablecauseforanarrestbeforethetelephoneconversation,buthewouldhavedoneadditionalinvestigationifthedefendanthaddeniedtheconfession.Thedefendantwasthesolesuspectandfocusoftheinvestigation.Thetrialjudgegrantedamotiontosuppress.Onappealthecourtreversed.TherequirementthatMirandarightsbereadapplies only p toacustodialsetting. Whetherapersonisincustodydependson ` whatareasonablepersonwouldbelieveregardingwhetherhewasfreetogoanddoesnotdependontheofficer's "unarticulated @ plan." "[W]econcludethatareasonablepersonspeakingtoa 0 policeofficeroverthetelephoneinthesafetyandprivacyoftheperson'shomedoesnotconstituteacoercivecustodialsetting."  ` ThefactthatthedefendantwasthesolefocusoftheinvestigationwasnotimportantforMirandapurposes. Statev.D.M. 654So. @ 2d256(Fla.3dDCA1995). (#(#    `     ` 2  3  .3  0  Invocationofrights . ! (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  InDavisv.U.S.,114S.Ct.2350(1994),theCourtsaid: "Weheld #! inMirandathatasuspectisentitledtotheassistanceofcounsel $" duringcustodialinterrogationeventhoughtheConstitutiondoesnotprovideforsuchassistance.WeheldinEdwardsthat p&!$ ifthesuspectinvokestherighttocounselatanytime,thepolicemustimmediatelyceasequestioninghimuntilanattorneyispresent.Butweareunwillingtocreateathirdlevelprophylaxistopreventpolicequestioningwhenthesuspectmightwanta 0*%( lawyer.Unlessthesuspectactuallyrequestsanattorney,questioningmaycontinue." Thus,theCourtfoundthattherewas ,`'* norequirementthatquestioningceasewhenthedefendantsays"MaybeIshouldtalktoalawyer." "Wethereforeholdthat,after  aknowingandvoluntarywaiveroftheMirandarights,law  enforcementofficersmaycontinuequestioninguntilandunlessthethesuspectclearlyrequestsanattorney." Inastatecasethe p courtfoundthatthisrulingmightbeinapplicablebecauseTraylor `  v.State,596So.2d957(Fla.1992),maysupportabroader P  interpretationoftheFloridaconstitutioninthattherethecourtsaidthat, "UnderSection9,ifthesuspectindicatesinanymanner 0  thatheorshedoesnotwanttobeinterrogated,interrogationmustnotbeginor,ifithasalreadybegun,mustimmediatelystop." ThecourtcertifiedtotheStateSupremeCourtthequestion P  whetherDavisappliesinFloridainlightofTraylor. Statev. @  Owen ,654So.2d200(Fla.4thDCA1995).0 (#(#    ` 2  4  .3  0  Voluntarinessofstatement 5.  (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Indeterminingwhetherastatementisfreelyandvoluntarilygiven  thecourtmustconsiderseveralthings. First,theburdenisonthe  statetoprovethisbyapreponderanceoftheevidence. Second,  thedeterminationmustbemadebasedonthe totalityofthe p circumstances. Thismayinclude: (1)policeconductand ` interrogationtechniques;(2)"durationandnatureofthequestioning;"(3)locationoftheinterrogation"policestationinpolicecontrolledareas;"(4)whetherdefendantwastoldhewasfreetoleave(subjectiveintentoftheofficersisnotdeterminative);(5)ageoftheoffendervulnerabilitytoadultauthority;(6)emotionalmaturityormentalweaknessofthesuspect;(7)isolationoftheindividualfromotherswhomightsupporthimorher;(8)whethercontactwasinitiatedbythedefendantortheofficers;(9)whetherthedefendantwassubjectedto"'aninherentlycoercivecustodialinterrogation'"withoutbeingadvisedofhisMirandarights.  Snipesv.State , "  651So.2d108(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Theforegoingstandardswereappliedtojustifyreversalofan % # orderdenyingamotiontosuppressstatementsmadebyajuvenile.Thecourtreliedonthesefactors: (1)theyouth'smother `'"% hadgivenpermissionforhimtogowithofficerstothegrovewhereamurderhadtakenplaceandthenlatertothepolicestationforpolygraphexamination,butduringanentiredayandintothenighttheyouthwasnevertoldhewasfreetogo;(2)therewasevidencethatthedefendantwas"emotionallyimpaired;"(3)theofficer ,`'* acknowledgedthatthedefendantwasthefocusoftheinvestigation;(4)hewasajuvenileandvulnerabletoadultauthority;(5)atleastthreedetectivestookturnsquestioninghimduringalongperiodoftime;(6)theofficerslimitedthedefendant'scontactwithhismotheratvariouspoints,includingduringtheinterrogation;(7)thedefendantwasneveradvisedofhisMirandarights. Snipesv.State , `  651So.2d108(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  c  .3  0  Despitethefactthatthethepoliceliedtothedefendant,questioned 0  himforoverfourhours,withintermittentbreaks,andfalselypromisedtohelpfindhisfather'smurderer,theappellatecourtupheldthefindingofthetrialjudgethathisstatementswerevoluntary. Hollyv.State ,651So.2d707(Fla.5thDCA1995).@ (#(#     ` 2  5  .3  0  Unlawfularrestorentryintohome  .   (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Seecasesinsearch&seizuresectiondealingwiththelawfulnessof  arrest. (#(#      ` 2  6  .3  0  Impeachment  .  (# (#    `     ` 2  7  .3  0  Commentonexerciseofrighttoremainsilent . P (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  AfterbeingadvisedofhisMirandarights,thedefendantwas 0 questionedaboutwhathewasdoingintheinvolvedcounty.Heexplainedthathisvehiclehadbeguntooverheatandmisfire.Forthatreasonhegotofftheinterstateandgotlost.Theofficersaidthatwhenheaskedthedefendantwhyhepulledintoaresidentialdrivewaywithanupgrade,ratherthananearbyconveniencestore,thedefendantcouldnotanswer.Onappealthecourtfoundthatthis    wasnotanimpropercommentontheexerciseoftherightto ! remainsilent,butratherwasanexplanationofunsatisfactoryanswers. Perezv.State ,648So.2d715(Fla.1995).#!(#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Inrebuttalthedetectivetestifiedthathestoppedquestioningthe % # defendantoncethedefendantsaidhewantedtostop. "Thiswasa p&!$ directcommentontherighttoremainsilentthatwasnotinvitedbycrossexamination." Lewisv.State ,654So.2d617 P(#& (Fla.4thDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  c  .3  0  Duringthetrialthedetectivetestifiedthathe "attemptedto  +p&) interview" thedefendant.Onappealthecourtfoundthatthis ,`'* comment was"fairlysusceptibleofbeinginterpretedbythejury  asreferringto"thedefendant'sfailuretotestify. Hazelwoodv.  State ,658So.2d1241(Fla.4thDCA1995).(#(#    `    2  B  .3  0 `  RighttoCounsel . p` (#` (#    2  C  .3  0 `  AccidentReportPrivilege . P ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 SeematerialsonDUI.0  (# (#    2  D  .3  0 `  CorpusDelicti . ` ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 Inacaseofalewdandlasciviousactinthepresenceofachildunderthe @  ageof16yearsandincestthedefendant'sconfessionwasimproperlyadmittedbecausethestatefailedtoestablishthecorpusdelicit.Theonlyevidenceofthecorpuswas:(1)thetestimonyofthedefendant'sstepfatherthathesawthedefendantfullyclothed,inabedroomwiththedefendant'ssister,whowaswearingadresswithherunderweararoundherankles;(2)aboutamonthlateradoctorexaminedthedefendantanddeterminedthatherhymenwasabsent,whichindicatedthattherehadbeenpenetrationwithsomeobject. T.S.v.State ,651So.2d1292(Fla.2dDCA1995). p (# (#     ` 2  2  .3  0 SeematerialsonDUI.P (# (#      2  E  .3  0 `  Otherprivilegedcommunications s. 0` (#` (# ̀    2  F  .3  0 `  Electronicsurveillanceofconversations. I`` (#` (#     ` 2  1  .3  0 Digitaldisplaypagersarenotthesameaspenregistersunder934.07 @ and934.09. "[B]ecausetheinterceptionofapagermaydisclose 0 telephonenumbersandcodedmessagesasdialedbythecaller,monitoringapagerwithaduplicatedigitalpagerismoreintrusivethanusingapenregisteroratrapandtracedevice.Wethereforeholdthatanycommunicationviaapagerotherthanatoneonlypagerrequiresawiretaporderundersection934.07and934.09."Statev.Jackson , $" 650So.2d24(Fla.1995).  (# (#      `'"%  2  V  .3  0   PRETRIALMATTERS ". (#(#   2  A  .3  0 `  Righttoeffectiveassistanceofcounsel ".` (#` (#     ` 2  1  .3  0  Righttocounsel #.p (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0   Natureofright O$.P (#(#     `    2(  1  )3  0 h Onappealthecourtruledthatthetrialjudgedidnoterrorin 0  refusingtoallowcounseltospeakforthedefendantinadirectcriminalcontemptproceeding. "Whiledueprocess `  requirementsmaymandatearighttocounsel,thatrightisnotabsolute.'Thenarrowexceptiontothesedueprocessrequirementsincludesonlychargesofmisconductinopencourt,inthepresenceofthejudge,whichdisturbsthecourt'sbusiness,wherealloftheessentialelementsofthemisconductareundertheeyeofthecourt,areactuallyobservedbythecourt,andwhereimmediatepunishmentisessentialtoprevent"demoralizationofthecourt'sauthority***beforethepublic.'" ThecourtreferencedthedecisioninSaundersv. p State,319So.2d118(Fla.1stDCA1975),whereinthe ` courtheldthattherewasnorighttocounselindirectcontemptproceedings. Roundtreev.State ,651So.2d @ 1286(Fla.3dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `     `  2  b  .3  0   Waiver ).`(#(#     `    2(  1  )3  0 h Seecasesunder"selfrepresentation"and"problemswith @ counsel". h(#h(#      ` 2  2  .3  0  Righttoappointedcounsel +. ! (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Thedefendanthadbeenrepresentedbyprivatecounselduringthe #! investigationstageofthecaseinvolvingthemurderofhiswife.Whenhewaschargedheclaimedthathisresourceshadbeenexhaustedandthepublicdefenderwasappointed.Subsequentlythecountyattorneyfiledamotiontoreconsidertheappointmentbasedonthedefendant'sfinancialstatus.Thecountyattorneyofferedevidenceshowingthatthedefendanthadpreviouslyunknownresources. "Noevidencewaspresentedontheanticipatedcostof 0*%( defendingthecase." Thetrialjudgewithdrewtheappointmentof  +p&) counsel.Aboutamonthlateraprivateattorneyfiledanaffidavit ,`'* indicatingthat,basedonhisexaminationofthedefendant'sassets,thedefendantcouldnotpaytheanticipatedcosts.Thetrialjudgedeniedthedefensemotionforanevidentiaryhearingtoreconsiderhisstatusinlightofthisinformation.Thehighercourtgrantedawritofmandamusdirectingthatthetrialjudgeconductanevidentiaryhearing. "Beforeremovingthepublicdefenderupon `  afindingthatthedefendantisnolongerindigent,thecourtmustconsiderthefactorssetforthinsection27.52....Thesefactorsinclude'theprobableexpenseandburdenofdefendingthecase.'27.52(2)(c)(1,Fla.Stat.(1993)." Furthermore, once  p  theappointmentisrevokedasamatterofdueprocessthedefendantisentitledtoareasonabletimetohireprivatecounsel. Ifheisunabletodoso,hemustbegiventhechanceto @  presentevidenceshowingthathehasmadeareasonableattempt. Vannierv.Burk ,651So.2d789(Fla.4thDCA1995). (#(#    `     ` 2  3  .3  0  Selfrepresentation 3. (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0  Thedefendantswereallowedtorepresentthemselves.Onappeal  theyarguedthatthiswaserror.Thecourtagreed.Beforeadefendantcanbeallowedtorepresenthimselforherselfthedefendantmust makea"clearandunequivocal"requestforself ` representation. ThenthecourtmustdoaproperFarettainquiry, P whichincludesadvisingthedefendant "ofthedisadvantagesof @ selfrepresentation." Havingallowedthedefendanttorepresent 0 himselforherselfthecourtmust renewtheofferofcounsel"'at  p eachsubsequentstageoftheproceedingsatwhichthedefendantappearswithoutcounsel.'"(Rule3.111(d)). Theserulesmustbe P strictlyfollowedoranyjudgmentwillbereversedwherethedefendantisallowedtorepresenthimselforherself. Inthese 0 casesthecourtcommittedreversibleerrorbyallowingselfrepresentationbecause:(1)therequestswerenotclearandunequivocal;(2)thecourtfailedtoadvisethedefendantsofthedisadvantages;and(3)the "courtfailedtorenewtheofferof #! assistanceofcounselpriortovoirdireandtheevidentiaryportionofthetrial." Jonesv.State ,650So.2d1095(Fla.2d % # DCA1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Thedefendantadvisedthecourtthathewantedtorepresenthimself. P(#&  Priortotrialthetrialjudgeengagedinanextensivediscussion @)$' withthedefendantinwhichhedeterminedthatthedefendant:  0*%( (1)wantedtorepresenthimself,buthavethepublicdefenderdothejuryselectionandremainasstandbycounsel;(2)feltcompetentto ,`'* representhimself;(3)hadbeeninvolvedwiththesystemmanytimes;(4)hadrepresentedhimselfinafederalcaseandsecuredaverdictofnotguilty;(5)hadaclearunderstandingofwhathewantedtodoandwasadamant. Thejudgegrantedhisrequest.  Afterjuryselectionthejudgeagainofferedthedefendanttheopportunitytohavecounselappointedandconductedanothercolloquyduringwhichheascertainedthatthedefendant: (1)had P  completedschooluptothetwelfthgradeandwentbacktoschoolinprison;(2)wasfirmlycommittedtoselfrepresentationandunderstoodwhathewasdoing. Thetrialjudgeagainapproved  p  selfrepresentationandremindedthedefendantthatatanypointthathewantedhisstandbycounseltotakeoverthatwouldbedone.Thedefendantthensignedawaiverofcounsel.  @  Thedefendantsucceededingettinganacquittalontwoofthreecounts.Despiteallofthis,onappealthecourtreversedtheconvictionontheremainingcountbecause "thetrialcourtfailed  toadequatelyappriseappellantofthedangersanddisadvantagesofselfrepresentation.Specificallythetrialcourtfailedtoadviseappellantoftheseriousnessofthechargesagainsthim,thepotentialsentencehemightfaceiffoundguilty,ortheconsequencesofthehabitualization." Thereisastrong p dissentthatshouldbereadbecauseitpointsoutthefactthatthedefendantknewmanythingsnotmentionedbythemajorityopinion.Thedissentalsonotesthatthemajoritydecisionrequires "'trial @ judges...tomechanisticallyapplyFaretta'srequirementthat 0 thedefendantbemadefullyawareofthedangersanddisadvantagesofselfrepresentation...irrespectiveofagivendefendant'seducation,experienceorgeneralcompetence.'"  P  Dortchv.State ,651So.2d154(Fla.1stDCA1995).@(#(#    `  2  c  .3  0  "Beforepermittinganaccusedtherightofselfrepresentation...the   trialcourtmustassureitselfthattheaccusedisawareofsomeofthepitfallsofselfrepresentationsothatthewaiverofcounselisknowinglyandintelligentlymade.... Theaccusedshouldbeaware #! ofthedangersanddisadvantagesofselfrepresentation,theseriousnessofthechargesagainsttheaccused,andthepotentialsentenceiftheaccusedisfoundguilty....Thebestmethodtoascertainwhetherthewaiverisvalidlygivenistoconductaseparatepretrialhearingsotherecordwillsupportawaiver." P(#& Hardyv.State ,655So.2d1245(Fla.5thDCA1995).@)$'(#(#    `  2  d  .3  0  Inthiscasetheinquiryofthedefendantpriortoentryofhisplea  +p&) wassufficient.Thejudgeaskedthedefendant "abouthisage, ,`'* education,maritalstatus,competency,workhistory,familiaritywithcourtproceedings,andknowledgeoftheservicesattorneysperformincriminalcases." Thetrialjudgealsonotedthe  defendant's "apparentacquaintancewithcriminalprocedureby  themotions[thedefendant]alreadyhadfiledpriortothehearingandhispreviousexperienceinrepresentinghimself."  `  Thedefendantstatedthathehadpreviouslyrepresentedhimselfandwasrepresentinghimselfincasespendinginanothercircuit.Thejudge "warned[thedefendant]ofthedangersofself 0  representation,thesentencehefaced,andtherightshewouldberelinquishing." Thedefendantstatedthathewassatisfiedwith `  hisrepresentation. Hardyv.State ,655So.2d1245(Fla.5thDCA P  1995). (#(#    `  2  e  .3  0  "[B]eforeatrialjudgedetermineswhetheranaccusedshouldbe   allowedtoproceedprose,thetrialjudgeshouldconsiderwhethertheaccusedwouldbedeprivedofafairtrialbasedontheaccused'sage,mentalcondition,orlackofknowledgeoreducation.Alackofknowledgealonedoesnotrenderanaccusedincompetenttoproceedprose."  Hardyv.State ,655So.  2d1245(Fla.5thDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  f  .3  0  EventhoughthetrialjudgeconductedaproperFarettainquiryprior P tothedefendant'sentryofhisplea,thefailuretodosopriortothesubsequentsentencingwaserror. "Ifadefendantwaivestheright 0 tocounselatanystageofthecriminalproceedings,thetrialcourtmustrenewtheofferofassistanceofcounselateachsubsequentstageoftheproceedings.Fla.R.Crim.P.3.111(d)(5).Sentencingisacriticalstageincriminalproceedings;and,evenifadefendantdoesnotrequestappointmentofcounsel,thisomissionisnotconsideredaknowingwaiveroftherighttocounsel."    Hardyv.State ,655So.2d1245(Fla.5thDCA1995).!(#(#    `  2  g  .3  0  Thedefendanthadpreviouslysoughtremovalofhispublic #! defender,waivedhisrighttocounsel,andchosetorepresenthimselfafteraproperFarettainquiry.Atjuryselectionthejudge % # toldtheprospectivejurorsthatthedefendanthadelectedtorepresenthimselfandhadbeenfoundcompetenttodoso.Noofferofcounselwasmadeatthisproceedingandthejurywasselectedwithoutobjectionfromthedefendant.Twodayslater,thetrialbegan.Thejudgeonceagainadvisedthejurythatthedefendantwasrepresentinghimself.Aftertheprosecutor'sopeningstatementthedefendantsaid,"I'dalsoliketoknowwheremycocounselis ,`'* Susan."Thiswasareferencetotheattorneywhohadformerlybeenhisattorney.Thetrialjudgetoldthedefendantthatthejudgedidnotthinkthedefendanthadcocounsel.Thecourtdidnotrenewtheofferofcounselandthedefendantcontinuedtorepresenthimself.Hewasconvicted.Onappealthecourtreversed. "Atthebeginning p oftheactualtrial,whenAppellantaffirmativelyquestionedhisattorney'swhereabouts....thisstatementshouldhavesignalledtothetrialcourt,ataminimum,thatAppellantwasconfusedastowhetherhewasentitledtocounselandwhetherhewasrepresentedbycounselatthattime.ThetrialcourtshouldhavestoppedtheproceedingsatthatpointandconductedaFaretta `  inquiry." ThecourtfoundthatthedecisioninLambv.State,535 P  So.2d698(Fla.1stDCA1988),didnotcontrol.Therethecourtheldthatthetrialcourtdidnoterrinfailingtorenewtheofferofcounseljustbeforetrialwherethedefendanthadchosenselfrepresentationatapretrialconferenceafteraproperinquiry.ThecourtfoundthatinLambthe defendantshowednoconfusionas  towhetherhewasrepresentedbycounsel;whereas,herethedefendantshowedsuchconfusion."Thisconfusionshouldhavetriggeredfurtherinquirybythetrialjudge." Thereisa  concurringopinionthatshouldalsoberead.ItsuggeststhatthedecisioninTraylorv.State,596So.2d957(Fla.1992), requires ` thatthedefendantwhohaschosenselfrepresentationbeadvisedofhisorherrighttocounselpriortojuryselectionandagainpriortotheevidentiaryportionofthetrialandthatawaiverofcounselbesecuredateachofthesepoints. The  p concurringJudgefeltthatthiswasrequiredwhetherornotthedefendanthadseemedconfused. Robertsv.State ,655So.2d184 P (Fla.1stDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  h  .3  0  Thetrialjudgealsoerredinfindingthatthedefendantwas 0 incapableofrepresentinghimself.Hiscommentaboutnotunderstanding,whentakenincontext, clearlyrelatedtothe ! defendant'sagitatedstateofmindinbeingtoldthatanewprosecutorwashandlingthecase. Theinquirywasalsodefective #! because "thetrialcourtfailedtoexplorewiththeappellantthe $" complexitiesofajurytrial,thedangersanddisadvantagesofselfrepresentation,theseriousnessofthechargespendingagainsthim,andthepotentialsentencesfacinghimuponconviction,whichincludedminimummandatorysentencesasahabitualviolentfelonyoffender....Withoutsuchwarnings,Faretta'smandatethattherecordestablishthatadefendanthas 0*%( knowinglyandintelligentlyexercisedtherightofselfrepresentation'witheyesopen'cannotbefulfilled." Jonesv. ,`'* State ,658So.2d122(Fla.2dDCA1995).(#(#    `  2  i  .3  0  AcopyofJudgeAltenbernd'sconcurringopinionisattached  becauseit setsforthaprocedurefordoingaNelsonandFaretta  inquiry. Jonesv.State ,658So.2d122(Fla.2dDCA1995).p(#(#    `  2   j  .3  0  AFarettainquirywasnotrequiredwherethedefendant "never P  madeanunequivocalrequestforselfrepresentation."Whereheonlyaskedforanopportunitytohirehisownlawyer,noFaretta 0  inquirywasnecessary.Augsbergerv.State ,655So.2d1202  p  (Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    `  2   k  .3  0  Thedefendantwasunrepresentedbycounselatthebeginningofthe @  violationhearing. Thetrialjudgeadvisedhimthatthefirstthing 0  heneededtodowastodecidewhetherhethoughtheneededalawyer.Thedefendantrespondedbyadmittingthathehadviolatedhisprobation.Thetrialjudgeagainraisedtheissueofrepresentationandaskedthedefendantwhetherheknewthatalawyerwouldbeappointedifhecouldnotaffordone. Itis  unclearwhetherthedefendanthadcounselappointedatanearlierstage.Thedefendantadmittedthatheknewhehadtherighttocounselandunsuccessfullyattemptedtoexplainajustificationfortheviolation.Hewassentencedandadvisedofhisrighttoappealandtherighttohavecounselappointedforthatappeal.Thedefendanttooknoactiontohavecounselappointedortopursueanappeal.Eightmonthslaterhefiledamotionforpostconvictionreliefraisingtheissueconcerningcounsel.Onappealthecourtfoundthattheissuehadbeenwaivedbythefailuretopursuetheappeal. "Fromourrecord,wecannotdeterminewhetherthis @ hearingwasaninitialFarettahearingorarenewalofferof 0 counselatasubsequentstageinthecase....Undereithercircumstance,itisdoubtfulthatthelimitedinquirywassufficienttosatisfytherequirementofFaretta." Kilpatrickv. "  State ,658So.2d1158(Fla.2dDCA1995).#!(#(# ̀   `  2   l  .3  0  Seecasesbelowunder"Dealingwithcomplaintsaboutcounsel."% #(#(#    `  2   m  .3  Ԁ0  Seecasesaboveunder"RighttoAppointedCounsel."`'"%(#(#    `     h      ` 2   4  .3  0  Interferencewithright Yn. @)$' (# (# ̀    ` 2  5  .3  0  Dealingwithproblemswithcounsel o.  +p&) (# (#  ,`'*    `  2  a  .3  0  Wherethedefendantmademerely generalizedcomplaintsabout  counselandcouldidentifynospecificactsofincompetence,despitethetrialjudge'squestionsabouthisdissatisfactionwithhisattorney,noNelsoninquirywasrequired. Lowev.State ,  650So.2d969(Fla.1994). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Wherespeedytrialhadrunandthejuryhadbeenimpaneledandthe P  defendantrefusedtowaivehisrightsunderthespeedytrialrule, it @  wasnotreversibleerrorforthetrialtojudgetodeemthedefendant'scomplaintsaboutcounseluntimelyandtofailtoconductaNelsoninquiry. Newellv.State ,651So.2d718(Fla. `  5thDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  c  .3  0  Pursuantto27.53(3) "'Onceapublicdefendermovesto 0  withdrawfromtherepresentationofaclientbasedonaconflictduetoadverseorhostileinterestsbetweenthetwoclients,undersection27.53(3),FloridaStatutes(1991),atrialcourtmustgrantseparaterepresentation....[A]trialcourtisnotpermittedtoreweighthefactsconsideredbythepublicdefenderindeterminingthataconflictexists.Thisistrueeveniftherepresentationofoneoftheadverseclientshasbeenconcluded.'Guzmanv.State,644So.2d996,998999(Fla.1994)." Inthis ` casethepublicdefenderdeterminedthataconflictexistedbecausetheirofficehadpreviouslyrepresentedtheallegedvictimandmovedtowithdraw.Thetrialjudgeshouldhavegrantedthemotion. "The 0 trialcourtisnotpermittedtoreweighthefactsconsideredbythepublicdefenderindeterminingifaconflictexists." Hopev. ` State ,654So.2d639(Fla.4thDCA1995).P(#(#    `  2  d  .3  0  "The'publicdefender'sofficeisthefunctionalequivalentofa 0 lawfirm.Differentattorneysinthesamepublicdefender'sofficecannotrepresentdefendantswithconflictinginterests.'Bouiev.State,559So.2d1113,1115(Fla.1990)." "  Hopev.State ,654So.2d639(Fla.4thDCA1995).#!(#(#    `  2  e  .3  0  Thedefendantfiledamotiontodismisshiscourtappointedattorney % # afterhistrial,butbeforehissentencing.Thetrialjudgesummarilydeniedthemotion.Thiswaserror.Thetrialjudgemustconductaninquiry.Ifthecomplaintisinspecific "thecourtmustattemptto P(#& clarifythedefendant'scomplaints." Masonv.State ,654So.2d @)$' 1225(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  f  .3  0  "Adefendanthasnoconstitutionalrighttodifferentcourt ,`'* appointedcounsel;therefore,itispresumedthatadefendantwhofilesamotiontodismisshiscourtappointedcounselisexercisinghisrighttoselfrepresentation.... Thecourtisrequired  inthissituationtodeterminewhetherthedefendantisknowinglyandintelligentlywaivinghisrighttocourtappointedcounsel.Thisinquirymustcoverthedefendant'sage,mentalstatus,education,experience,andthenatureandcomplexityofthecase." Masonv. P  State ,654So.2d1225(Fla.2dDCA1995).@ (#(#    `  2  g  .3  0  Thedefendant'sfirsttrialendedinamistrial.Priortothefirsttrial  p  thedefendanthadcomplainedthathisattorneywasineffectiveandfiledawrittenmotiontodischargetheattorney.Priortothesecondtrialthedefendantagaintoldthecourtofhisdissatisfactionwithhiscourtappointedattorney.HealsopresentedacopyofacomplainthehadfiledagainsttheattorneywithTheFloridaBar.Thetrialjudgedidnotmakeinquiryofthedefendantorhisattorneyaboutthecomplaint,excepttoconfirmthatitwas"basicallythesamestuff"hehadtalkedwiththetrialcourtaboutbeforethefirsttrial.Thetrialjudgeimmediatelyaskedifthedefendantwantedtorepresenthimself.Thedefendantsaidthathewouldbecausehedidnotwantacourtappointedattorney.ThetrialjudgethenconductedaFarettainquirydirectedatthedefendant'sabilitytorepresent ` himself. "Thisinquiryestablishedthattheappellantfinishedthe P tenthgrade,thathecouldreadandwrite,thathehadparticipatedinajurytrial,andthatheknewhowtoselectajuryandexamineandcrossexaminewitnesses." Duringthe  p inquirythedefendantbecameupsetbecausetherewasanewprosecutor.Thetrialjudgeaskedthedefendantifheknewabouttheburdenofproofinacriminalcase.Thedefendantsaid,"Idon'tunderstandnoneofthis." Thetrialjudgeimmediatelymadea 0 findingunderFarettathattheappellantwasincapableof   representinghimself. Thetrialjudgealsoannouncedthathehad ! reviewedthedefendant'spreviousmotiontodischargehisattorneyandtheBarcomplaintandhaddeterminedthatthedefendanthadnotdemonstratedthathisattorneywasineffective.Thedefendantthenwenttotrialwithhiscourtappointedattorney.InthiscasethecourtfailedtofollowtheproceduresetforthinNelsonv.State,274 p&!$ So.2d256(Fla.4thDCA1975),inthatthejudgedidnotmakeinquiry ofthedefendantandhiscourtappointedcounselasto P(#& whetherthere"wasreasonablecausetobelievethatcounselwasbeingineffective."Thecourtmustexamineboththedefendantandtheattorney.Thetrialjudgealsofailedtomakeadequatefindingsastowhyhewasdenyingtherequesttodischargethe ,`'* attorney.Thetrialjudgealsofailedtoadvisethedefendantthatifhepersistedinhisdesiretodischargetheattorney,substitutecounselwouldnotbeprovidedandhewouldbeexercisinghisrighttorepresenthimself. "[E]veniftrialcourtconducted  adequateinquiryinfindingcounselcompetent,trialcourtstillobligatedtoadvisedefendant(1)attorneycouldbedischarged,(2)statenotrequiredtoappointsubstitutecounsel,and(3)defendanthadrighttorepresenthimself."  Jonesv.State ,658 @  So.2d122(Fla.2dDCA1995). 0 (#(#    `  2  h  .3  0  Priortojuryselectionthedefendanttoldthetrialjudgethat"hedid `  notfeelhiscourtappointedcounselhad'served[him]right'becausecounselhadonlyconferredwithhimontwooccasionsforbriefperiodsoftime."Thetrialjudgeaskedthedefendanttostatespecificallywhattheproblemwas.Thedefendantsaid"'Ijustdon'tknow.Idon'tfeelhe'sservemeright.'"Thedefendantthenaskedfortimetohirehisownattorney.Thetrialjudgerefusedbecausethedefendantdidnothavesufficientfundsandhisappointedattorneywascompetent.OnappealthedefendantarguedthatthetrialjudgefailedtoconductaproperNelsoninquiry.Thecourt  disagreedbasedonthedecisioninLowev.State,650So.2d969 p (Fla.1994).InthatcasetheCourtfoundthattheinquirywassimilar. "[O]nthebasisofLowe,weconcludedthatthetrial P courtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionundertheNelsonstandard @ becauseitsinquirywasas's[pecificandmeaningful'asitcouldhavebeen,giventhe'generalizedgrievances'assertedby[thedefendant]whichwereunsupportedby'specificactsofcounsel'sallegedincompetence.'Furthermore...[defendant's]unarticulatedbeliefthatcounselwasnot'serving'himproperlywasnothingmorethananexpressionofgenerallossofconfidenceortrustwhich,standingalone,doesnotrequirewithdrawalofcounsel....[defendant's]statedbasisfordissatisfactionwasobviouslyfoundedonwhatheperceivedtobeinadequateconferenceswithhisattorneywhich,withoutamorespecificclaimofincompetence,doesnotrequireafullNelsoninquiry....Justasimportanttoouranalysisisthe % # criticalfactorthat[defendant]nevermadearequestforreplacementofcounselwithanothercourtappointedcounsel,whichisthefundamentalprerequisiteofaNelsoninquiry.As P(#& wenotedinMatthews,'[w]henadefendantrequeststhetrial @)$' courttodischargehiscourtappointedattorneyandreplacehim 0*%( withanotherappointedattorney,thecourtshouldfirstdetermine  +p&) whetheradequategroundsexistforreplacementofthe ,`'* defendant'sattorney.'584So.2dat1106(emphasisadded)." In  thiscasethedefendantonlyaskedforadditionaltimetohirehisownattorney. Augsbergerv.State ,655So.2d1202(Fla.2dDCA  1995). (#(#    `  2  i  .3  0  Thedefendantwasconvictedoffourcountsofmurderandrelated `  charges.Priortotrialthestatemovedtohavetheattorneyforthedefendantdisqualifiedforconflictofinterest.Onappealthecourtruledthatthedefendantwasdeprivedofeffectiveassistanceofcounsel.Thestatepresentedevidencethat:(1)amanconvincedthedefendanttoarrangethemurderoftheman'sformerwife;(2)thedefendanthiredBarretttocommitthemurder;(3)insteadofkillingtheformerwife,Barrettmurderedfourmen;(4)afterthemurders,thedefendantgavemoneytoBarretttofleetoOhio,wherehewascaught.Thestatemadeadealwiththedefendantforhistestimonyagainsttheformerhusband,whohadsolicitedthemurders.Theprosecutorwaslateradvisedbytheattorneyfortheformerhusbandthatthedefendant'sattorneyhadattemptedtodiscussfavorabletestimonyfromthedefendant.Thehusband'sattorneyinferredfromthestatementsmadebythedefendant'sattorneythathemighthaveintendedtopassonanofferthatthedefendantwouldperjurehimselfinreturnfortheformerhusbandgivingfinancialassistancetothedefendant'sfamily.TheprosecutorfiledacomplaintwiththeFloridaBaragainstthedefendant'strialattorney.Theprosecutionplacedthedefendant'sattorneyonitswitnesslistandmovedtodisqualifytheattorney.Thestateindicatedthatifthedefendantwascalledasawitnessanddeviatedfromhisoriginalstatement,thestatewouldcallhisattorneyasarebuttalwitness.Thedefendantopposedthemotiontodisqualifyandprevailed.Thedefendantlatermovedtostriketheattorneyfromthestate'switnesslist.Thetrialjudgerefusedtoruleonthatmotion,thusleavingopenthepossibilitythattheattorneymightbecalledtotestifyagainstthedefendant.Thedefendantclaimedthathewasdeniedeffectiveassistanceofcounselbecausethepossibilitythattheattorneywouldtestifyagainsthimcreatedaconflictofinterestbetweenthem."Thatis,if[thedefendant]testified,trialcounselmighthavetotestify,and,iftrialcounseltestified,hecouldbeopentochargesofwitnesstampering.Theonlywaytrialcounselcouldavoidthisliability,[thedefendant]argues,wastoadvise[thedefendant]nottotestify."Inordertoreverseaconvictionbecauseofineffectiveassistanceofcounselthedefendantmustshowthesetwothings:(1)counsel'sperformancewassobadthatheorshewasnotfunctioningasthe"'counsel'"guaranteedbytheSixthAmendment;(2)thedefective ,`'* performanceprejudicedthedefensetheattorney'serrorsdeprivedthedefendantofafairtrial."Thesecondprong,prejudice,ispresumedincasesinvolvingtheactualorconstructivedenialofassistance....Inconflictofinterestcasesprejudiceispresumed'onlyifthedefendantdemonstratesthatcounsel"activelyrepresentedconflictinginterest"andthat"anactualconflictofinterestadverselyaffectedhislawyer'sperformance."'"ThecourtreliedonthedecisioninCuylerv.Sullivan,446U.S.335,100S. @  Ct.1798,64L.Ed.2d333(1980).Whereanattorneyrepresentedmultipledefendant"anactualconflictoccursif,duringthecourseoftherepresentation,thedefendants'interestsdivergewithrespecttoamaterialfactualorlegalissueortoacourseofaction."Inthiscasethedivergenceofinterestisbetweenthedefendantandhisattorney."'Asituationinwhichtheattorney'sowninterestsdivergefromthoseoftheclientpresentsthesamecoreproblempresentedinthemultiplerepresentationcases:theattorney'sfealtytotheclientiscompromised.'"Thusthepresumptionofprejudicealsoappliestothissituation. "Weconcludethat,becauseofthestate's  threattocalltrialcounselasawitnessif[thedefendant]testifiedcontrarytohisproffer,trialcounselhadapersonalstakeinthedecisionwhethertoput[thedefendant]onthestand....Thefactthattheprosecutormaynothavemadeanirrevocabledecisiontocalltrialcounselasawitness,orthefactthatthetrialcourtdidnotmakeafinaldecisionwhethercounselcouldberequiredtotestify,didnotcausetheconflicttobeamerepotentialone.Itwasanactualconflictanytimeconsiderationwasgiventothequestionwhether[thedefendant]shouldtestify." ThesecondprongofCuyler,requiresashowing P thattheconflictadverselyaffectthelawyer'sperformance.Inthiscasethedefendantarguedthatthistestwasmetbecausetheconflictadverselyaffectedthetrialcounsel'sabilitytoadvisethedefendantastowhetherheshouldtestify.Thetrialcounseltestifiedthatthedefendantmadethefinaldecisionnottotestify,butitisclearthattheattorneyadvisedhimnottotakethestand.Whereineffectiveassistanceofcounselconsistsof "anactofomission,the $" defendantmustshow:'First,someplausiblealternativedefensestrategyortacticmighthavebeenpursued.Heneednotshowthatthedefendantwouldnecessarilyhavebeensuccessfulifithadbeenused,butthatitpossessedsufficientsubstancetobeaviablealternative.Second,hemustestablishthatthealternativedefensewasinherentlyinconflictwithornotundertakenduetotheattorney'sotherloyaltiesorinterest.'" In  +p&) thiscasethedefendantmadethisshowing.Asthedefendantstated ,`'* athissentencing,hecouldhavetestifiedthatBarrettwassocrazyafterthemurdersthatthedefendantandothersfearedfortheirsafety.ThismighthaveconvincedthejurythatthemurdersresultedfromBarrett'sderangedmindratherthananyconspiracy.Thealternativeofhavingthedefendanttestifywasinconflictwiththeattorney'sinterestinhisprofessionalreputation.Furthermore,theattorneyhadtestifiedagainstthedefendantduringtheprosecutor'sinvestigation.Thiswasanactofcommissionwhichhadanadverseeffectontheattorney'srepresentationofthedefendant. Burnside 0  v.State ,656So.2d241(Fla.5thDCA1995). p (#(#   2   B  .3  0 `  Preliminaryhearings . P ` (#` (#   2  C  .3  0 `  Pretrialrelease  . 0 ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0  Delayinfilingcharges d.  (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Morethan40dayspassedwithoutchargesbeingfiled.Thecourt  scheduledanadversarypreliminaryhearing.ThestatetoldthejudgethatithadnotfiledaninformationbecauseofanewpolicyintheStateAttorney'sOfficewhichrequiredthatalivelineupbeconductedbeforethefilingofcharges.Thetrialjudgereleasedthedefendantonhisownrecognizancebutconditionedthatreleaseonthedefendant'sappearanceatalivelineup.Suchaconditionofreleasewasimproper. "Onthefortieth(40th)dayafterhis 0 arrest,petitionerwasentitledtoanunconditionalreleaseonhisownrecognizance.SeeFla.R.Crim.P.3.134(2).Therefore,the ` trialcourtwasnotallowedtoconditionpetitioner'sreleaseonhisappearanceatalivelineup.Becausethetrialcourt'sconditionalreleaseofpetitionerwasimproper,thecapiasissuedinconnectiontherewithwasequallyquestionable."Kellyv.   Goldstein ,649So.2d921(Fla.4thDCA1995).!(#(#    ` 2  2  .3  0  Righttobail ɶ. #! (# (#     ` 2  3  .3  0  Settingofbail . % # (# (#     ` 2  4  .3  0  Estreature&forfeitureofbond 9.`'"% (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0  Pursuantto903.28(6),thetrialcourthadtheauthoritytopermit @)$' aremissionofaforfeitureofupto50%.Thecourtdidnothavetheauthoritytopermitaremissionof100%onthegroundsthatunderthecircumstancesitwouldbeunfairtodootherwise.Theforfeiture ,`'* didnotdeprivethesuretyofanyconstitutionalright. LeonCounty  v.AloiWilliamsBonding ,652So.2d464(Fla.1stDCA1995).(#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Thedefendant'smotherpostedacashbond.Thetrialjudgeordered  thatbondforfeitedtopayrestitution.Themothersubsequentlyobjected.Onappealthecourtfoundthatthetrialjudgehadnoauthoritytoforfeitathirdparty'sbondwithouttheirconsenttopayobligationsofthedefendant.Thestatearguedthatthedefendantconsented. "[W]hetherheconsentedorwaivedtheissueis 0  entirelyirrelevant.Asthecashbondwasnotgivenbyhimbutinsteadby[hismother]therealissueiswhethersheconsented `  orwaivedtheissue.Shewas,afterall,notapartytothecriminalproceedings.Noristhereanysuggestionthatshewasgivenanypriornoticeofthepossibleforfeitureofherproperty.Thestatedoesnotsuggesthoworwhenshewassupposedtomakeherobjectionandlackofconsentknown,ifshewasnotapartyandwasnotgivenanypriornotice." TheFloridastatutes  controlbailbonds,includingforfeiture.903.16and903.17authorizeasuretytopostacashbondforthedefendant.Herethemotherbecameasurety.She "gaveaspecificundertaking...and  thatundertakingcontainsnoagreementbyherthathercashbondcouldbeforfeitedtopayrestitution." Therearenotice ` provisionsinthestatutesthatmustbefollowedpriortoforfeiture.Inthiscasenoneofthemwerefollowed. "Nobreachofany @ undertakingorconditionoccurred;thedefendantappearedwhenrequiredtodoso;andinanyeventnonoticeofanykindwasevergiventothisdepositor.Henceneitherthestatutesnorthisspecificundertakingauthorizedaforfeitureunderthefactsofthiscase." 903.105(5)allowsthecourttodeductafineor @ courtcostsfromacashbondpostedbythedefendant.Itdoesnotmakesuchaprovisionforrestitution.Thecourtdidnotruleonwhetherthatwouldotherwisebeproper.Thecourtorderedthatthestaterepaythemoneytothemotherandthatthedefendantrepaythestateininstallmentsashehadoriginallyagreedtodo. Minasianv. #! State ,655So.2d1143(Fla.4thDCA1995).$"(#(#    `     ` 2  5  .3  0  Modification&revocation . p&!$ (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Thedefendantwaschargedwithtwocountsofsexualactivitywith P(#& aminorundertheageofeighteen.Theminorwashisseventeenandhalfyearoldstepdaughter.Therewererelateddomesticproblemswiththewife.Thewifeofthedefendantleftamessageonthedefendant'sansweringmachineindicatingthatsheneededtotalk ,`'* withhimandstatingthatshewouldcallback.Shedidnotcallbackwhenshesaidshewould.Twodayslaterthedefendantcalledher.Thedefendantallegedlythreatenedthewifeduringthephonecall.Thestateattorneyfiledanoticeofhearingforamotionrevokingdefendant'sbond.Nomotionwaseverfiled.Afterthehearingthetrialjudgerevokedthedefendant'sbond,"citingthetelephonecallandtheallegedthreatattheendofittogetherwiththefactthatifconvictedthepetitionercouldservetimeinprisonthusgivinghimareasontopossiblycarryoutathreat."Thedefendantfiledamotionforawritofhabeascorpus.Thecourtgrantedthewrit.UnderRule3.131(g)thecourtmaydirectthearrestandcommitmentofadefendantwhoisonbailiftherehasbeenabreachofundertakingorthecourtissatisfiedthatbailshouldbeincreasedorneworadditionalsecurityisrequired. "Underthesesections, 0  however,theorderforarrestandcommitmentmustrecitethefactsonwhichitisbased,whichwasnotdoneinthiscase.Moreover,ifrecommitmentisordered,thecourtshall  determineconditionsofrelease,ifany,subjecttotherequirementsofRule3.131(b)." Thecourtfailedtofollowthese  requirements. "[T]hetrialcourtdidnotconsiderwhetherany  conditionsofreleasewouldprotectthecommunityandthewitnessesandassurethedefendant'sappearanceattrial."  ` Exceptforcapitalfeloniesoroffensespunishablebylifeimprisonment,bailisrequiredforeveryothercrimewithoneexception. "Onlywherenoconditionsofreleasecanreasonably 0 protectthecommunityfromtheriskofphysicalharmtopersons,assurethepresenceoftheaccusedattrial,orassuretheintegrityofthejudicialprocess,maytheaccusedbedetained." Thedefendantwasentitledtopretrialreleaseon @ reasonableconditionspursuanttoArt.I14,Fla.Const. "Itisthe 0 state'sburdentoprovetheneedofpretrialdetention.Section907.041(4)(f),Fla.Stat.,whichitmustshowbeyondareasonabledoubt.SeeFla.R.Crim.P.3.132(c)(1)." Thecourt "  foundthatthiswasnotharmlesserrorbecausetherewasevidenceintherecordsupportingrelease. Merdianv.Cochran ,654So.2d $" 573(Fla.4thDCA1995). (#(# Ѐ   `  p&!$    2  D  .3  0 `  Disqualificationofthejudgeorprosecutor . `'"%` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 Thetrialjudgeissuedanordertoshowcausetoanattorneywhyheshould @)$' notbeheldindirectcriminalcontemptfordisobeyingthetrialcourt'sorderprohibitingnegativeimpeachmententeredinanothercriminalcasetheattorneywastryingbeforethejudge.Theattorneyfiledamotionto ,`'* disqualifythetrialjudgeonthegroundsofbiasbasedonanadversarialrelationship.Themotionallegedthat:(1)inchambersthejudgeofferedtonotissuetheordertoshowcauseiftheattorneywouldnotbillthecounty$1000.00foraspecialpublicdefender'sfeeinanothercriminalcasebeforethejudge;(2)basedonthisincidenttheattorney'spartnersfiledacomplaintwiththeJQC;(3)theattorneytoldthejudgeontherecordthatherefusedtheofferconcerningthefee.Thejudgedeniedthemotionfordisqualificationongroundsoflegalinsufficiency.Onappealthecourtreversed. "[T]hetestiswhetherthemotiondemonstratesawellfounded 0  fearonthepartofapartythathewillnotreceiveafairtrialatthehandofthetrialjudge....Further,thefactsandreasonsgivenmusttendtoshowpersonalbiasorprejudice.Thus,wedeterminethelegalsufficiencyofamotionfordisqualificationbasedonwhetherthefactsallegedwouldplaceareasonablyprudentpersoninfearofnotreceivingafairandimpartialtrial." Themotionwassufficientbasedon   thesestandards. Levinev.State ,650So.2d666(Fla.4thDCA1995). (# (#    ` 2  2  .3  0 Atanearliersentencinghearinginanothercasethejudgemadestatements  indicatingthathehadconcludedthatthedefendanthadlied.Thisgaverisetoawellfoundedbeliefthatthejudgewouldnotbelievethedefendantinfutureproceedings. Thedefendant"isentitledtohaveatrialjudge p presideovermattersinvolving[thedefendant's]credibilityinthepresentcasewhohasnotevaluatedthedefendant'scredibilityandcharacterinanegativefashion...." Holmesv.Goldstein ,650So.2d87 @ (Fla.4thDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2  3  .3  0 Thetrialjudgeproceededagainstanattorneybyissuinganordertoshow ` causewhysheshouldnotbeheldinindirectcriminalcontemptunderrule3.840forconductshowingdisrespectandcriticismofthecourt.Thejudge,whowasthechiefjudge, voluntarily disqualifiedhimselfandassigned 0 anotherjudgetohearthematter.TheattorneymovedtodisqualifythesecondjudgeonthegroundsthatthejudgetohearthematterhadtobeappointedbythechiefjusticeoftheFloridaSupremeCourt.Thesecondjudgedeniedthemotionfordisqualificationonthegroundsthattheappointmentbythechiefjusticeisnotrequiredwherethefirstjudge voluntarily disqualifieshimselforherself.TheattorneyfiledaPetitionfor % # WritofProhibition.Thecourtgrantedthepetition. "Rule3.840(e)states: p&!$ 'Ifthecontemptchargedinvolvesdisrespecttoorcriticismofajudge,thejudgeshalldisqualifyhimselforherselffrompresidingatthehearing.Anotherjudgeshallbedesignatedbythethechiefjusticeofthesupremecourt.'"Thevoluntarinessofthedisqualificationisnotrelevant.  Castrov.Luce ,650So.2d1067(Fla.2dDCA1995). +p&) (# (#  ,`'*    ` 2  4  .3  0 AmotionfordisqualificationpursuanttoFloridaRuleofJudicial  Administration2.160allegedthatuponplacingdefendantonprobationin1993theassignedjudgestatedthat hewould"bury"thedefendantifhe  everappearedbeforehimagain. Thiswasnotgroundsfor  disqualification becauseitwassimplydesignedtoimpressonthe p defendantthatsuchalenientsentencewouldnotbelikelyagain.Unfortunately,inrulingonthemotionthetrialjudgestated: "That'snot P  inthetranscript?Idon'ttalktoanybodyofftherecord.Ihaveneverusedthosewords,'I'llburyyou.'" Onappealthecourtsaid: "Because 0  thisconstitutesanimpermissiblechallengebythetrialjudgeastothetruthoftheallegationsinthemotiontodisqualify,wearecompelledtograntthepetition." Cooperv.Speiser ,651So.2d718(Fla.4thDCA P  1995).  (# (#    ` 2  5  .3  0 Thetrialjudgeerredindenyingamotionfordisqualification.Thejudge   waspresidingoverthedefendant'sresentencingafterthereversalofhisdeathsentence.Thedefendantallegedinanaffidavitthatthetrialjudgeassistedinhisfirsttrialasanassistantstateattorney.Theassistanceappearedtobeminor,but "itclearlyalignedthejudgewiththestate's  interestinthisparticulardefendant'scase.Moreover,atthetimeofpetitioner'sconvictionthetrialjudgewasthesupervisingstateattorneyofthedivisioninwhichpetitionerwastried." Duestv.Goldstein ,654 ` So.2d1004(Fla.4thDCA1995).  (# (#    `   2  E  .3  0 `  Severanceandconsolidation . 0` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 Thecourtcommittednoerrorindenyingthedefendant'smotionfor ` severancebasedonthefactthatacodefendant'sstatementwasintroducedandthecodefendantdidnottestify. Thestatementfellwithinthe @ coconspiratorsprovisionofthehearsayrulesetforthin90.803(18)(e)andassuchwasadmissibleagainstthedefendant. The   trialjudgefailedtoinstructthejurythattheycouldonlyconsiderthestatementagainstthedefendantiftheyfirstfoundthataconspiracyexisted.Thiserrorwasharmlessbecausethejudgeinfacttoldthejurythestatementcouldnotbeconsideredatallagainstthedefendant. Brownv.State ,648 $" So.2d268(Fla.4thDCA1995).  (# (#    `   2  F  .3  0 `  MotionsToDismiss b.`'"%` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0  Deficiencyinchargingdocumentorprocedure . @)$' (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Theclaimthatonecountofaninformationwasdefectivebecause  +p&) itallegedmultipleoffenseswaswaivedbythefailuretochallenge ,`'* theinformation. Jozensv.State ,649So.2d322(Fla.1stDCA  1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Onecountoftheinformationallegedthatthedefendantcommitted  aviolationof800.04bycommittingasexualbatteryonthevictimwhowas6or7yearsofage.Onappealthecourtheldthat this `  countdidnotallegeacrimeandaconvictionconstitutedfundamentalerror. Thebasisforthisdecisionwastheholdingin @  Statev.Hightower,509So.2d1078(Fla.1987),thatsexual 0  intercoursewithachildunder12yearsofageconstitutesasexualbatteryregardlessofunchastityorconsentandcannotbelewdandlasciviousconductundersection800.04. Jozensv.State ,649So. P  2d322(Fla.1stDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  c  .3  0  Inchildsexualabusecasesitiscommonfortheretobemultiple   incidents. "Itiswellsettledthatseparateanddistinctoffenses  maynotgenerallybeallegedinasinglecountofanindictmentorinformation." Inchildabusecasesthereissubstantialauthority  fromotherjurisdictionssetforthinthisopinionforleavingthistothediscretionoftheprosecutor.Butthatwasnottheconclusioninthiscase. "Itisnotasituationwheretheabusewasallegedto p haveoccurredweeklyorevenmonthly.Thisisacaseencompassingapproximatelytendistinctoccasions.Whereitisreasonableandpossibletodistinguishbetweenspecificincidentsoroccurrences,asitisinthiscase,theneachshouldbecontainedinaseparatecountoftheaccusatorydocument."   p  Statev.Dell'Orfano ,651So.2d1213(Fla.4thDCA1995).`(#(#    `  2  d  .3  0  Thechargingdocumentallegedthattheincidentsofchildabuse @ tookplaceoveraperiodoftwoandhalfyears.Theprosecutortestifiedthattheyhaddoneeverythingtheycouldthinkoftojogthechild'sminds.Thetrialjudgedisagreedanddismissedtheinformation.Onappealthecourtfoundthattheprosecutionwasnotrequiredtouseimpracticalmethodssuchastruthserumorhypnosistojogthechild'smemory. Heretheprosecutionhad"shown $" clearlyandconvincinglythatithadexhaustedallmethodsofnarrowingthetimeframe." Thisdecisionwasbasedon p&!$ Dell'Orfanov.State,616So.2d33(Fla.1993). Statev. `'"% Dell'Orfano ,651So.2d1213(Fla.4thDCA1995).P(#&(#(#    ` 2  2  .3  0  PretrialIntervention . 0*%( (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Atarraignmentonasaleandpossessionchargethestateagreedthat ,`'* thedefendantcouldparticipateinthepretrialinterventionprogramfordrugoffenders.Thedefendantwasorderedintothatprogram.Sheparticipatedintheprogramfortwelvemonthsasrequiredandappearedrepeatedlyincourt.Thejudgeconsistentlytoldherhowwellshewasdoingandthatifshekeptupthegoodworkthechargeswouldbedismissed.Theprosecutorwaspresentandmadenoobjection.Afterthedefendantcompletedtheprogramsheappearedincourttohavethechargesdismissedandthestateobjectedforthefirsttimeonthegroundsthatshewaschargedwithsalesofdrugsaswellaspossession.Thetrialjudgedismissedthecharges.Onappealthecourtaffirmed. "Clearly,thelawiswell `  settledthattheStateAttorneyhasthesolediscretiontoprosecute....[H]owever,asjudges,[we]havetoprovidealllitigantsatalllevels,withaforumoffundamentalfairnessfilledwithequity,justiceandfairplay....Oncetheprosecutoroffered[thedefendant]adrugcourtprogram,and[she]acceptedtheoffer,therewasessentiallyapleabargain.Thepleabargainwastrackedandmonitoredundertheauspicesofthecourtandsection948.08(6),FloridaStatutes(1993)....[B]ecausetheStateofferedand[thedefendant][acceptedtoenterthedrugprogram,andbecausetheStateacquiescedtoastatutorydismissalif[thedefendant]performedundertheagreement,andbecausewewillnottolerateagovernmentalbreachoffaithinajudicialforum,thetrialcourtproperlydismissed[thedefendant's]chargesundersection948.08(6)(c)(2),FloridaStatutes(1993).Statev.Upshaw ,648  p So.2d851(Fla.3dDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Thetrialcourt'sorderdismissingprosecutionpursuitto948.08(6) @ was voidbecausenoinformation hadbeenfiledandthestate 0 couldstillproceedtofiletheinformation. Statev.Cody ,650So.   2d1030(Fla.3dDCA1995). (#(#    ` ̀     ` 2  3  .3  0  (C)(4)Motion .#! (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0  Inreferencetothestate'straversethecourtsaid: "Initially,it % # shouldgowithoutsayingthatanydenialbytheStatemustbeingoodfaith,andnotbebaseduponspeculation,conjecture,presumptionorassumption....Moreimportantly,theStateisentitledtoadenialofadefendant'sswornmotiontodismissonlyiftheStatefilesatraversethatwithspecificity,deniesunderoaththematerialfactorfactsallegedinthemotionto  +p&) dismiss.Fla.R.ofCrim.P.3.190(d)." InthiscasetheStatefiled ,`'* an unsworntraverse.Thatwasinsufficienttorequireautomatic  denialofthemotion. Statev.Gutierrez ,649So.2d926(Fla.3d  DCA1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  EvenwheretheStatefailstofileatraverseorfilesonethatis p insufficient, "thetrialcourtmuststilldeterminewhetherthe `  defendantmethisinitialburdenofdemonstratingthattherewerenogenuineissuesofmaterialfactandtheundisputedfactsfailedtoestablishaprimafaciecaseofguilt." Thisburdenismet 0  iftheundisputedfacts "'failtoestablishaprimafaciecaseor...  p  establishavaliddefense(eitheranaffirmativedefenseornegationofanessentialelementofthecharge.')" Ifthemotion P  failstodothesethingsonitsfacethemotionshouldbedenied.Inthiscasethemotionfailedtomeettheburden "ofdemonstrating 0  thecompleteabsenceofanymaterialfacts." Thedepositionofa   witnesswasattachedtothemotioninwhichthewitnessgavetestimonyinitiallysupportingtheburglarycharge,butlaterseemedtorecantthattestimony.Thatwassufficienttorequirethatthemotionbedenied. "Onamotiontodismiss,iftheaffidavitsand  depositionsfiledinsupportoforinoppositiontothemotioncreatematerialdisputedfacts,itisimproperforthetrialcourttodeterminefactualissuesandconsidertheweightofconflictingevidenceorthecredibilityofwitnesses." Statev. P Gutierrez ,649So.2d926(Fla.3dDCA1995).@(#(#    `  2  c  .3  0  C4Motionwas aninappropriatemethodofraisingtheissueof  p knowledge asanelementofconstructivepossessioninadrugcase. `  Statev.St.Jean ,658So.2d1036(Fla.5thDCA1995).P(#(#    ` 2  4  .3  0  DoubleJeopardy 0.0 (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0   Generalprinciples .!(#(#    `    `    2(  1  )3  0 h Retrialisnotbarredwherereversal isbasedonimproperly #! admittedhearsay. T.S.v.State ,651So.2d1292(Fla.2d $" DCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  2  )3  0 h Wherethejuryisswornandthecourtthenhearsa `'"% motiontosuppressanderroneouslygrantsit,trialonremandisbarred. Statev.Kennon ,652So.2d396(Fla. @)$' 2dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  3  )3  0 h "Todeterminefordoublejeopardypurposeswhether ,`'* offensesareseparatecriminaloffenses,thecourtmustlookonlyatthestatutoryelementsoftheoffenses....Thelegislaturehasdeclaredthat'offensesareseparateifeachcriminaloffenserequiresproofofanelementthattheotherdoesnot,withoutregardtotheaccusatorypleadingortheproofadducedattrial.'" Onthisbasisit `  wasimproperforthedefendanttobeconvictedofkidnappingandhavethatoffenseenhancedtoalifefelonybasedonanaggravatedbatteryandalsotobeconvictedoftheaggravatedbattery.Inotherwordsproofoftheaggravatedbatterydidnotrequireproofofanyelementsnotrequiredtoestablishtheenhancedkidnappingcharge. Bradhamv.State ,657So.2d40(Fla.1stDCA1995).@ h(#h(#    `  2  b  .3  0   Waiver w.  (#(#    `    2(  1  )3  0 h "Novatonv.State,634So.2d607(Fla.1994)isdispositive  ofthiscase.InNovaton,theFloridaSupremeCourtruled  that adefendantwaivesanydoublejeopardyclaimthat  affectshisconvictionorsentencebyenteringintoanegotiatedpleaagreementwhereinthedefendantagreestoeachcrimeandsentence. Asinthiscase,absentthe ` negotiatedpleaagreement,thedefendantinNovatoncould P havereceivedamuchmoreseveresentenceduetothepossibilityofbeingsentencedasanhabitualfelonyoffender.Uponexecutionofthenegotiatedpleaagreement,bothdefendantsreceivedthebenefitoftheirbargains." Powellv. ` State ,657So.2d37(Fla.5thDCA1995).Ph(#h(#    `  2  c  .3  0   MultipleProsecutions . 0(#(#    `    2(  1  )3  0 h ThedefendantwaschargedwithDUIasafourthoffense, ! fleeingandattemptingtoeludeapoliceofficeranddrivingwithasuspendedlicense.Thedefendantpledguiltytofleeingapoliceofficeranddrivingwithasuspendedlicense.Hewassentencedonthosecharges.HemovedtodismisstheDUIondoublejeopardygrounds.Themotionwasgranted.OnappealthecourtreversedbasedonDixon.The `'"% courtappliedtheBlockburgertest. "Thecrimesforwhich P(#& thestatechargedGregory,drivingwithasuspendedlicenseandfleeingorattemptingtoeludealawenforcementofficerallcontainelementsnotpresentintheother....WhileGregorydoesnotevenarguethathe ,`'* wouldprevailunderthe"sameelements"test,wenotethat,underDixon,prosecutionoftheD.U.I.chargeis  notbarredbydoublejeopardy." Statev.Gregory ,648  So.2d1220(Fla.2dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  2  )3  0 h Duringaprobationviolationhearingthedefendanttestified `  thatshehadneverusedanynameotherthanDenisNewryandthatshewasnottheJacquelineNewrywhohadbeenplacedonprobationbyanotherjudgeinaseparateproceeding.Thenextdayshewasplacedunderoathandrepeatedherdenial.Thedefendantwasfingerprintedatthehearinganditwasrecessedsothatacomparisoncouldbemade.Twodayslateratanotherhearingthestateprofferedexperttestimonythatthedefendantwasthesamepersonwhohadbeenplacedonprobation.Thetrialjudgetoldherthatiftheprofferturnedouttobecorrectafteranevidentiaryhearing,hewouldholdherincontemptforperjuryontheprioroccasions.Thatiswhathappened.Thestatethensoughttoprosecutethedefendantforperjurybasedonthesameincident.Hermotiontodismisswasdenied.Onappealthecourtreversed. "Whetherdouble p jeopardybarstheinformationturnsonwhetherthecontemptproceedingwassummary."Thefactthatthecontemptoccurredinthepresenceofthejudge[i.e.sheliedtothejudge]didnotmeanthattheproceedingwassummary. Thatterm"summary" "'referstoaprocedure  p whichdispenseswiththeformality,delayanddigressionthatwouldresultfromtheissuanceofprocess,serviceofcomplaintandanswer,arguments,awaitingbriefs,submissionoffindings,andallthatgoeswithaconventionalcourttrial.Thepurposeofthatprocedureistoinformthecourtofeventsnotwithinitsownknowledge.Theruleallowssummaryprocedureonlyastooffenseswithintheknowledgeofthejudgebecausethe[y]occurredinhis[orher]presence.'"[fromSacher $" v.UnitedStates,343U.S.1(1952).] Inthiscaseitisclear % # thatthejudgedidnotknowwhetherthedefendantwastellingthetruthandhadtohavetwohearings.Thus,theproceedingwasnotsummary. Newryv.State ,654So.2d P(#& 1292(Fla.4thDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  3  )3  0 h "[A]defendantheldincontemptforviolatingadomestic  +p&) violenceinjunctionmaybeprosecutedlaterfora ,`'* substantiveoffensestemmingfromthesameconductthatgaverisetothecontemptadjudication." Inthiscasethe  substantivechargewasaggravatedstalking. Williamsv.  State ,658So.2d665(Fla.4thDCA1995).Seealso State  v.Miranda ,644So.2d342(Fla.2dDCA1994).ph(#h(#    `    2(  4  )3  0 h ThedefendantwasissuedaUTCcharginghimwiththe P  felonyofdriverslicensefraudinviolationof322.212(5).Thecitationindicatedthattheoffensewasacriminalviolationofastatestatuterequiringacourtappearance.Itdidnotindicatethatitwasatrafficinfraction.Hewastransportedtothecountyjailwherehewasinitiallydeniedbondforpretrialrelease.Thedefendant'sfirstappearanceindicatedthathewasto"'appearbeforetheCircuitCourtondemand.'"Therewasafindingofprobablecauseandthedefendantwassubsequentlyreleasedon$2500.00bond.Abouttwomonthslaterthestatefiledaninformationchargingthefelony.Despitealltheclearindicationsthatthedefendantwaschargedwithafelony,hisattorneyfiledanoticeofappearanceandanoticeofintenttoparticipateindiscoveryincountycourt.Accordingtothedefendant,thestateofferedtoallowhimtoappearbeforethecourtclerktoenteranocontestplea,tohaveadjudicationwithheld,andtopayfinesandcosts.Aboutsixmonthslaterthedefendantsignedaformindicatingthathewaselectingundersection318.14(10)(a)tohaveadjudicationwithheldbytheclerk.Theformalsoindicatingthathewasenteringapleaofnocontestandprovidingproofofcompliance.Therecordalsoreflectsaclerk'sreceiptforafineandcosts.Twodayslaterthedefendantmovedtodismissthefelonychargebasedondoublejeopardy.Thetrialjudgegrantedthemotion.Onappealthecourtreversedbecause: (1)anyattempted ! dispositioninthecountycourtwasvoidinthattheoffensewithwhichthedefendantwaschargedisnotonelistedin318.14(10)(a),therefore,theclerkhadnoauthoritytoacceptanoloplea;(2)evenifthedefendantwascorrectthathewaschargedwithafelonyandamisdemeanor,thecountycourthadnojurisdictionbecausetheyaroseoutofthesamecircumstancesandtheinformationchargingthefelonywasfiledincircuitcourt. Statev.Engel ,656So.2d546(Fla.5thDCA 0*%( 1995). h(#h(#  ,`'*    `    2(  5  )3  0 h Thedefendantwasconvictedofgrandtheftauto.Heargued  thattheconvictionwasbarredbyanearlierpleaagreementresultinginapleaofguiltytounrelatedchargesinexchangeforthestatenolleprossingachargeofselling,possessing,  offering,concealingordisposingofamotorvehiclewithnoserialnumber.Thatoffenseisathirddegreefelony.OnappealtheCourtheldthattheBlockburgertestwouldapply P  andthatthegrandtheftchargeandtheotherchargeinvolvingacarwithoutaserialnumbereachhaddifferentelements.Therefore,doublejeopardydidnotbarprosecution.Thedefendantalsoarguedthathecommittedonlyonecoreoffensetheftofthevehicle,andthatthepossessionofthevehiclewithanalteredVINwasmerelyanaggravationofthegrandtheftoffenseand,therefore,pursuanttoSirmonsv.State,634So.2d153(Fla.1994),   therecouldnotbeaconvictiononthegrandtheftcharge.Onappealthecourtrejectedthispositionbecausebothoffenseswerethirddegreefelonies,theoffensesarenotinterrelated,andthestatuteonthealteredVINchargesspecificallystatesthatitdoesnotprecludepunishmentforanytheftofthevehicle. Rogersv.State ,656So.2d245 p (Fla.5thDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  6  )3  0 h Aggravatedbatteryisnotalesseroffensesubsumedbythe @ crimeofsexualbattery.Theyeachrequireanelementthattheotherdoesnot. Bradhamv.State ,657So.2d40(Fla.  p 1stDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  7  )3  0 h SeesectiononDUI.@h(#h(#    `     `  2  d  .3  0   Multiplechargesinthesameprosecution @.  (#(#    `    2(  1  )3  0 h Inatwocountinformationthedefendantwaschargedwith "  lewdandlasciviousconductbyplacinghispenisbetweenthelegsofthevictiminviolationof800.04(1)andsexualactivitybypenetratingthevictim'svaginainthesameencounter.Thestatearguedthatitcoulddividethesexualencounterintotwosequentialoffenses.Onappealthecourtheldthat thewordingoftheinformationmadethelewd P(#& andlasciviousconductacategorytwolesserincludedoffenseofthecrimeofsexualactivityandthedefendantcouldnotbeconvictedofboth. McConnv.State ,648  +p&) So.2d836(Fla2dDCA1995).,`'*h(#h(# Ї   `    2(  2  )3  0 h Thedefendantmadefalserepresentationofamortgage  applicationandreceivedacheckfromthemortgagecompany.Shewaschargedwith grandtheftandobtaining  amortgagebyfalserepresentation. Onappealthecourt  ruledthattherecouldbeaconvictiononbothchargesbecausetheyeachrequireanelementthattheotherdoesnot.Grandtheftrequiresproofofanintenttodeprive;whereas,theotheroffenserequiresproofofanofferoffalseinformation. Adamsv.State ,650So.2d1039(Fla.3d 0  DCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  3  )3  0 h Convictionsandsentencesforboth possessionofafirearm P  onschoolpropertyanddischargingafirearmonschoolpropertybasedononeincidentviolatesprohibitionagainstdoublejeopardy. Whitev.State ,651So.2d   1264(Fla.1stDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  4  )3  0 h Thedefendantwaschargedwithtwocountsofmanslaughter  andtwocountsofvehicularhomicidebasedontwodeaths.ThetrialjudgedismissedthechargesofvehicularhomicidebasedonStatev.Chapman,625So.2d838(Fla.1993).On p appealthecourtruledthatthiscasestoodforthepropositionthatonecannotbeconvictedofbothcharges,butnotthatonecannotbechargedwithbothoffenses.Bothchargescanbesubmittedtothejury. Statev.Lewek ,656So.2d268 0 (Fla.4thDCA1995). h(#h(#    `     `  2  e  .3  0   Mistrialbasedonmanifestnecessity L.P(#(#     `  2  f  .3  0   CollateralEstoppel M. (#(#     `    2(  1  )3  0 h Thedefendantwasoriginallychargedwithbeinga "  convictedfeloninpossessionofafirearm,carryingaconcealedfirearm,andcarryingaconcealedweapon.Thedefendantwasfirsttriedandfoundnotguiltyoffeloniouspossessionofafirearmand/orcarryingaconcealedweapon,towit:aknife. Hemovedtodismiss `'"% theremainingchargesofcarryingaconcealedfirearmandcarryingaconcealedweapononthegroundofcollateralestoppel.Thetrialjudgegrantedthemotionastothecarryingaconcealedweaponchange,butdenieditastothecarryingaconcealedfirearmcharge.Thedefendantwas ,`'* convicted.Hearguesthat theissueofwhetherhe  possessedafirearmwasdecidedinhisfavorinthefirsttrialandcouldnotberelitigatedinthesecondtrial. On  appealthecourtagreed.Thecourtpointedoutthatthe doctrineofcollateralestoppelisbasedontheFifth p Amendmentguaranteeagainstdoublejeopardyand"providesthatwhenanissueofultimatefacthasoncebeendeterminedbyavalidandfinaljudgmentinacriminalcaseitcannotbeagainlitigatedbetweenthesameparties." Wherethepriorjudgmentwasbasedona  p  generalverdict, "thecourtisrequiredtoexaminethe `  recordandconcludewhetherarationaljurycouldhavegroundeditsverdictuponanissueotherthanthatissuewhichthedefendantseekstoforeclose." Inthiscasethe 0  defendantstipulatedthatthedefendantwasaconvictedfelon;therefore,theonlyrationalbasisforthenotguiltyverdictwasthejury'sconclusionthatthedefendantdidnotpossessafirearm. "Collateralestoppel...doesnotdepend  onwhetherthereisanyevidencethatthejurymayhaveexerciseditspardonpower." Jonesv.State ,657So.2d  922(Fla.2dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  2  )3  0 h Thedefendantwaschargedwithpossessionofafirearmby P aconvictedfelon.Ajuryfoundhimnotguiltyofthatcharge.Subsequently,hewastriedforrobberywithafirearmbasedontheexactsameincident.Onappealthecourtfoundthattheconvictionwasbarredbythedoublejeopardyclausebecauseontherecord,therewas "no P possibilitythatarationaljurywouldhaveacquittedthe"defendantbasedonalackofproofthathewasaconvictedfelon.Theonlyreasonableconclusionwasthatthejurymusthavedecidedthatthestatefailedtoprovethepossessionofafirearm. Thus,thedefendantcouldnot "  beconvictedoftherobberywiththefirearm.Thedefendantcouldnotbeconvictedofsimplerobberybecausetheonlyevidenceoffearonthepartofthevictimsrelatedtothefirearm.Theonlychargehecouldbeconvictedofwaspetittheftbecausehehadtakesomemoney. Cuthbertsonv. `'"% State ,657So.2d20(Fla.4thDCA1995).P(#&h(#h(#    `  2  g  .3  0   Sentencing `[. 0*%((#(#    `    2(  1  )3  0 h Seecasesunderthepenaltysectionofthisoutlinedealing ,`'* with modificationandenhancement .h(#h(# ̀   ` 2  5  .3  0  Constitutionality ']. (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0  865.015, the"openhouseparty"statuteisnot p unconstitutionallyvague .Itprohibitsadultswhoareincontrolof `  premisesfromhavingapartyandknowinglypermittingaminorfromconsumingorpossessingalcoholicbeveragesordrugsonthepremises.Theadultmayavoidprosecutionbyendingthepartyortakingsomereasonableactiontopreventtheconsumptionorpossessionofthesubstancesaftertheadultfindsoutaboutit. State `  v.Manfredonia ,649So.2d1388(Fla.1995).P (#(#    `     `  2  b  .3  0  Thedefendantwaschargedwithmakingobsceneorharassing 0  telephonecallsinviolationof365.16(1)(a),Fla.Stat.(1991).Thestatuteprovides:"Whoever:(a)Makesatelephonecalltoalocationatwhichthepersonreceivingthecallhasareasonableexpectationofprivacy;duringsuchcallsmakesanycomment,request,suggestionorproposal,whichisobscenelewd,lascivious,filthy,vulgar,orindecent;andbysuchcallorsuchlanguageintendstooffend,annoy,abuse,threaten,orharassanypersonatthecallednumber...isguiltyofamisdemeanoroftheseconddegree...."Thedefendantarguedthatthisprovisionimpingedonfirstamendmentrightsbecauseitwasnotlimitedtocaseswherethelistenerdidnotconsenttotheuseofthelanguage.Onappealthecourtfoundthestatuteconstitutional.Aswordedthestatuteassumesanunwillinglistener.Thecourtfoundthattheterms"offend"and"annoy"wereunconstitutionallyvague,butthestatutewasotherwisevalid. "We P concludethattheintentofthisstatuteistoprohibitintentionalabusive,threatening,andharassingconductbyuseofthetelephoneinthemannerspecifiedagainstapersonwherethatpersonhasanexpectationofprivacy."Gilbreathv.State ,650 ! So.2d10(Fla.1995). (#(#    `  2  c  .3  0  893.13enhancesthepenaltyforsellingcontrolledsubstances $" ifitisdonewith200feetofa"publichousingfacility. "That % # provisionhasbeenheldtobeunconstitutionallyvague. Harrisv. p&!$ State ,649So.2d923(Fla.1stDCA1995).`'"%(#(#    `     `  2  d  .3  0  876.18Fla.Stat.(1993),makesitafirstdegreemisdemeanorto @)$' placeorcausetobeplacedonanotherperson'spropertyaburningcrossorinanymannertoexhibitsuchacross,realorsimulated,withoutfirstgettingwrittenpermissionofthelandowneror ,`'* occupant.TheCourtupheldthisstatuteagainstattacksthatitviolatedtheFirstAmendmentandthedoctrineofoverbreadth.IntheopiniontheCourtrecognizedthat:(1)contentbasedrestrictionsarepresumptivelyinvalid;(2)thereareexceptionswherethespeechorexpressiveconductisnotanessentialpartofanyexpositionofideasandisofsuchslightsocialvalueasasteptotruththatanybenefitthatmaybederivedfromitisoutweighedbyasocialinterestinorderandmorality;(3)suchspeechcanberegulated "'becauseof[its]proscribablecontent;'" (4)examplesof 0  proscribablespeechincludedefamation,obscenity,threatsofviolenceagainstindividuals,andfightingwords;(4)thisstatuteprohibitsconductthatconstitutesathreatofviolence;(5)thehistoryofcrossburninginthiscountryhas "inextricably"beenlinkedto @  manyformsofviolence ;(5)inR.A.V.v.CityofSt.Paul,112 0  S.Ct.2538(1992),theCourtfoundanordinancewhichprohibitedcertainconductdesignedtoarouseanger,alarmorresentmentbasedonrace,color,creed,religion,orgender,unconstitutionalbecauseitprohibitedfightingwordsonlyinthespecialcaseslistedinthelaw;(6)theFloridastatute "isanevenhandedandneutralban  onamanifestlydamagingformofexpressiveactivity;" (7)the  overbreadthargumentfailedbecausetheconductembracedbythestatuteisbeyondtheprotectionoftheFirstAmendmentandanythreatofencompassingprotectedconductisspeculativeandinsubstantial. Statev.T.B.D. ,656So.2d479(Fla.1995).@(#(#    `  2  e  .3  0  827.05Fla.Stat.,whichprohibitednegligenttreatmentof  p children,wasfoundtobeunconstitutionalonthegroundsthatitcriminalizedconductwhichconstitutedonlysimplenegligence.ThatwasthesolebasisfortheSupremeCourt'sdecision.ThechangesinthelawinCh.77429,2,LawsofFloridadidnotcuretheproblem.Thechangeswere theadditionofthewords"though   financiallyable"and"orpermitsachildtoliveinanenvironment,whensuchdeprivationorenvironmentcausethechild'sphysicaloremotionalhealthtobesignificantlyimpaired." "Plainly,thesewordsdonotaddressthelackof $" willfulness,scienter,ormensrea."Statev.Mincey ,658So.2d % # 597(Fla.4thDCA1995). (#(#    `     ` 2  6  .3  0  Limitations t.P(#& (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0  AburglarywascommittedonJuly26,1991.OnJune6,1994a 0*%( warrantwasissuedforthearrestofthedefendantforthecrime. On  +p&) thatdatethedefendantwasinaFloridaprison. OnJune20, ,`'* 1994aninformationwasfiledchargingthedefendantwiththecrime.Thewarrantwasnotservedonthedefendantuntilafterthethreeyearstatuteoflimitationshadexpired.Thedefendantmovedtodismissonthosegrounds.Thestatepresentednoexplanationforthedelay,butthetrialjudgedeniedthemotiontodismiss.Onappealthecourtreversedbasedonthesefactors: (1)oncethe `  statuteoflimitationsisraised,theburdenisonthestatetoshowthatprosecutionisnotbarred;(2)whenaninformationiffiledprosecutionisdeemedcommencedwhenthewarrantisservedonthedefendant"withoutunreasonabledelay;"(3)wherethereisprearrestdelaythestatemustshowthereasonablenessofthedelayandthatitwasdiligentinitseffortstoservethewarrant;(4)inthiscasethestatefailedtomeetitsburdeninthatitgavenoexplanationaswhetherithadmadeanyeffortatalltoservethewarrantdespitethepresenceofthedefendantinastateprison. Bonelv.State ,651So.2d774(Fla.3dDCA1995).(#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Thetollingprovisionofsection812.035(10),whichtollsthestatute  oflimitationswhilethedefendantwasoutofthestate,didnotapplytocrimesoccurringbeforetheeffectivedateoftheamendment. Oneattempttoserveacapiasatdefendant'soutofstate p addresslistedonarentalcaragreementdidnotconstituteadiligentsearch. Salterv.State ,651So.2d1228(Fla.2dDCA P 1995). (#(#    `  2  c  .3  0  Thedefendantarguedthattheinformationshouldhavebeen  p dismissedbecausethestatuteoflimitationhadexpired.Theinformationchargingtrespasswasfiledinatimelymanner,butthecapiaswasnotexecuteduntilafterthetwoyearlimitationperiodhadexpired.775.15(2)(c)requiresthatprosecutionbecommencedatthetimetheinformationisfiled "providedthecapiasissuedon   theinformationisexecutedwithout'unreasonabledelay.'" The ! inabilitytofindthedefendantdespiteadiligentsearchistobeconsideredindeterminingwhetherthedelayisreasonable.Inthiscasethestatearguedthattheyhadnotfailedtofollowanypromisingleads.Thecourtnotedthattherehadbeennosearchatall.   "[T]hecompleteabsenceofasearch,diligentorotherwise, p&!$ precludedthediscoveryofleadsinthiscase.Inshort,thestatefailedtoestablishadiligentsearch,andthedelayinexecutingthecapiaswasthereforeunreasonable." Colemanv.State ,655 @)$' So.2d1239(Fla.1stDCA1995). (#(#    `     ` 2  7  .3  0  Mattersrelatingtothevalidityoftheapprehensionofthedefendant .,`'* (# (# Ї    ` 2  8  .3  0  Conductofinformantsandlawenforcementofficers.  (# (#     2  G  .3  0 ` Competency 2. ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 Thetrialcourtinitiallydeterminedthatthedefendantwasincompetentto p standtrialandplacedhiminatreatmentfacility.Adoctorevaluatedhimtwicebeforecommitmentandtwiceafterwardandopinedthatthedefendantwasmalingeringbasedontheresultsofneurologicaltestingandtheinappropriateresponsesgivenbythedefendantduringtesting.Anotherdoctorexaminedthedefendantfor40minutesandconcludedthathewasincompetentandrecommendedneurologicaltesting,butthisdoctoracknowledgedthatthetreatinghospitalhadexcludedorganicbraindisorder.Thedoctoradmittedthathecouldnotexcludethepossibilitythatthedefendantwasmalingering.Thetrialcourtconcludedthatthedefendantwascompetenttogototrial.Inapretrialhearingthedefendantbecameverydisruptiveandcouldn'tbecontrolled.Thedefenseattorneyaskedthecourttoappointamentalhealthexpertandtoperformneurologicaltestingtodeterminewhetherthedefendantwascompetenttogototrial.Afterbeingcautionedbycounselthedefendantreturnedtothecourtroomandwasconvicted.Onappealthecourtfoundnoerror. "Evenifadefendant  iscompetentatthecommencementoftrial,thecourtmustbealerttocircumstancessuggestingthathisconditionhaschangedandheisnolongerabletomeetthestandardofcompetence." Inthiscase,however, P therewassufficientevidencetoconcludethatthedefendantwasmalingering. Youngbloodv.State ,651So.2d227(Fla.1stDCA1995).0 (# (#    ` 2  2  .3  0 Rule3.210(b)requiresthatthecourtappointexpertstoexaminethe ` defendant, "[i]fatanymaterialstageofacriminalproceeding,thecourt P ...hasreasonablegroundtobelievethatthedefendantisnotmentallycompetent." Sentencingisamaterialstage. Inthiscasethecourterred 0 indenyingthedefenserequestforthisprocedureatthesentencing. "[T]he   testforcompetencyis'whether[thedefendant]hassufficientpresentabilitytoconsultwithhislawyerwithareasonabledegreeofrationalunderstandingandwhetherhehasarationalaswellasfactualunderstandingoftheproceedingsagainsthim.'" Thebasisforthecourt's $" decisionwas:(1)noneoftheindividualswhotestifiedthatthedefendantwascompetentwereexpertsandnoneofthemcouldtestifyaboutanythingconcerningthedefendant'smedication;(2)therecordindicatedthatthedefendanthadaseizuredisorder,ametalplateinhishead,troublewithmemory,andtheneedforPhenobarbitalandDilantineveryday;(3)thedefendant'sattorneyexpressedconcernabouthiscompetency;(4)thedefendant'sbehavioratthehearingindicatedmentalincompetence. Callowayv.State ,651So.2d752(Fla.1stDCA1995).,`'* (# (# Ї   ` 2  3  .3  0 Itwasimpropertoinvoluntarilycommitanindividualfoundincompetent  toproceed wheretheevidencedidnot"clearlyandconvincinglyshow  thatshemetthecriteriasetoutinsection916.13(1),FloridaStatutes(1991)." ThesestandardsareincorporatedintotheFloridaRulesof  CriminalProcedurebyreferencepursuanttoRule3.212(c).Inthiscasetherewasno clearandconvincingevidence ofa"'substantiallikelihood `  thatinthenearfuture[appellantwouldhave]...inflictedseriousbodilyharmonh[er]selforanotherperson,asevidencedbyrecentbehavior....'916.13(1).[A]'nondangerousindividual,capableofsurvivingsafelyinfreedombyherselforwiththehelpofothers,shouldneverbeinvoluntarilycommitted.'" Ozbournv.State ,651So.2d795 `  (Fla.1stDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2  4  .3  0 Itwasimproperforthetrialjudgetodismissaninformationwherethe 0  evidencewasthatthedefendantwasnotcompetenttostandtrialandwasnotlikelytobecomecompetent, butfiveyearsfromthedetermination  ofincompetencyhadnotelapsed. Statev.Johns ,651So.2d1227(Fla.  2dDCA1995).  (# (#   2  H  .3  0 `  Venue . ` (#` (#    2  I  .3  0 `  Continuances ?. `` (#` (#    ` 2   1  .3  0 Inafirstdegreemurdercasethedefendantarguedthatthetrialcourterred @ indenyinghismotionforcontinuancebasedonthefactthathistrialcounselannouncedherresignationfromthepublicdefender'sofficethemonthbeforethetrialwastobegin.OnappealtheCourtfoundnoabuseofdiscretionbasedonthesefactors:(1)thetrialwasoriginallycontinuedforseveralmonthsexpresslysoitcouldbetriedonthespecifieddate;(2)theleaddefenseattorney,whohadnotresigned,hadbeenrepresentingthedefendantfromthetimethepublicdefender'sofficewasappointed. "The   timetobegivenadefendanttoobtaincounselandprepareforhisdefenseiswithinthediscretionofthetrialcourt,'controlledbywhatisfair,right,andreasonableineachparticularcase.'"Sinclairv. #! State ,657So.2d1138(Fla.1995).$" (# (# ̀   2   J  .3  0 `  Changesofplea .p&!$` (#` (#     ` 2   1  .3  0 "'Thepurposeofthefactualbasisistoavoidadefendantmistakenly P(#& pleadingtothewrongoffense....Inordertowithdrawaguiltypleaaftersentenceforlackoffactualbasis,adefendantmustshowprejudiceormanifestinjustice.'" Inthiscasethedefendantplednolo  +p&) contendereandstipulatedthatthedocumentsinthefileestablishedaprima ,`'* faciecase.Thedefendantsoughttohavethepleawithdrawnbecausethecourtfailedtotakeafactualbasis.Thetrialjudgedeniedthemotion.Onappealthecourtaffirmedbecausethedefendantfailedtoshowmanifestinjusticebecausethepleawassupported "bythearrestaffidavit,the  information,andthevictim'sdeposition." Blackwoodv.State ,648So. p 2d294(Fla.3dDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2   2  .3  0 "Adefendantneednotbeadvisedofeverycollateralconsequenceofa @  pleaeitherbycourtorcounsel,includingwhetherornothemaypossessagun,beforepleadingtoachargewhichwouldgivehimafelonyconviction." Inthiscasethedefendantwasaccusedofviolatinghis `  felonyprobationbypossessingafirearm.Hemovedtosuppressthepriorfelonyconvictiononthegroundsthathewasunawarethathehadbeenadjudicatedguiltyonthefelony.Heclaimedhewouldnothavecarriedthegunifhehadknownhehadbeenconvicted.Thetrialjudgegrantedthemotion.Onappealthecourtreversedbecausetherecordwasclearthathehadbeentoldthathewasbeingadjudicated. Statev.Lach ,651So.2d694  (Fla.2dDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2   3  .3  0 Thetrialcourtmadeanoffertothedefendantinafirstdegreemurdercase.  Hecouldenterapleatofirstdegreemurderandtakeapolygraph.Ifhepassedthetestthepleawouldbevacatedandthechargedismissed.Ifhefailedthechargewouldbereducedtoseconddegreemurderandacertainsentencewouldbeimposed.Thestatedidnotagreewiththeoffer.Thedefendantdidagree.Hefailed.Hesubsequentlyobjectedtothesentencebecausetherewasnomutualityinthatifhehadpassedthetestthestatewasundernoobligationtodismissthecharges.Onappealthecourtreliedonbasiccontractprinciples: "'Wantofmutualityisnodefenseinthecase P ofanexecutedcontract,andapromiselackingmutualityatitsinceptionbecomesbindingonthepromisorafterperformancebythepromisee.'" Herethestateagreedtothereductionafterthedefendantfailed   thetest. Clarkv.State ,651So.2d1309(Fla.3dDCA1995).! (# (#    ` 2   4  .3  0 Thetrialjudgerefusedtoacceptabestinterestpleaofguiltypursuantto #! Rule3.172. Thejudgehadapolicyofneveracceptingapleaofguilty $" unlessthedefendantadmittedhis/herguilt. Thedefendantsoughtawrit % # ofmandamus.Itwasgranted.Thecourtmadethefollowingobservations:(1)thetrialjudgehasnodiscretiontorefusetoacceptanunconditionalandunqualifiedbestinterestguiltypleaornocontestpleaifitisvoluntaryandthereisafactualbasis;(2)thetrialjudgehasthediscretiontorejectanegotiatedpleabasedontheconclusionthatit"isinsomeidentifiablerespectagainstthepublicinterest." "Iftherulewasfashionedtoallow  +p&) defendantstopleaguilty,voluntarilyandknowinglywithafactual ,`'* basis,intheir'bestinterests,'itishardtoconceivewhatdiscretionremainstoallowtrialjudgestorefusesuchapleawhenmade,ashere,withoutoppositionfromthestateandwithoutconditionsorqualifications." Thecourtrejectedtheideathatthetrialjudgeshouldbe  givenunfettereddiscretiontorejectsuchpleasbecausethevictimshavearighttoclosure. "Guiltypleasserveimportantsocietalintereststoo, `  evenwhenmadewithoutactofcontrition.Thatthelegitimateconcernsofallthepersonswhoseinterestswereaffectedbythecrimehavenotbeenaddressedbytheruleorthepleaissimplyanacknowledgementofthepoorpowerofthejudicialbranchofgovernmenttorighteverywrong,tocureeveryevil,tocomforteveryvictim." Rigabarv. `  Broome ,658So.2d1038(Fla.4thDCA1995).P  (# (#    ` 2   5  .3  0 Thetrialjudgeissuedapolicystatementadvisingthathewouldnotaccept 0  anegotiatedpleawhereaspecificsentencebargainiscontemplated,Alford   (bestinterest)pleas,andnocontestpleas. Theappellatecourtgranted  mandamusbecausethetrialjudgerefusedtoexercisehisdiscretion.   TherefusaltoacceptanocontestorbestinterestpleaisindirectcontraventionofthedecisioninRigabarv.Broome,658So.2d1038(Fla.  4thDCA1995). Boykinv.Garrison ,658So.2d1090(Fla.4thDCA  1995).  (# (#    ` 2   6  .3  0 PursuanttoRule3.172(f),thedefendanthastherighttowithdrawhis P guiltypleabeforeitisformallyacceptedbythetrialjudge.Itiserrortorefusetoacceptawithdrawalpriortoacceptance. Mennellav.State ,658 0 So.2d1114(Fla.5thDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2   7  .3  0 If thetrialjudgemisledthedefendantabouttheactualamountoftime P thatthedefendantwouldserveonaplea ,andthedefendantwouldnot @ haveotherwiseenteredhis/herplea,thedefendantmustbeallowedtowithdrawtheplea. Letov.State ,658So.2d1108(Fla.4thDCA1995).  (# (#   2   K  .3  0 `  Absenceofdefendant . " ` (#` (#    ` 2   1  .3  0 Thedefendantwasnotpresentatapretrialconference.Onappealthecourt $" foundthatthiswaserror. "FloridaRuleofCriminalProcedure3.180 % # statesthat'thedefendantshallbepresent...atanypretrialconference,unlesswaivedbythedefendantinwriting.'Here,althoughthedefenselawyerpurportedtowaiveConey'spresenceatthemeeting,therewasnoexpresswaiver." Sincetheconferencewasaroutinestatus @)$' conferenceinvolving"severaltechnical,procedural,andlegalissues"thecourtfoundthattheerrorwasharmless. Coneyv.State ,653So.2d1009  +p&) (Fla.1995).,`'* (# (# Ї0     (#(#  2   VI  .3  0   COMMONEVIDENTIARYPROBLEMSARISINGDURINGTRIAL .(#(#   2  A  .3  0 `  Relevanceandprejudice o. ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 "'[W]henasuspectedpersoninanymannerendeavorstoescape,or p evadeathreatenedprosecutionbyflight,concealment,resistancetoalawfularrestorotherexpostfactoindicationofadesiretoevade P  prosecution,suchfactmaybeshowninevidenceasoneofaseriesofcircumstancesfromwhichguiltmaybeinferred.'" Thedecisionin 0  Fenelonv.State,594So.2d292(Fla.1992),doesnotchangethisrule.It  p  merelyprohibitsemphasizingthisitemofevidenceoverotheritemsofevidencebygivingajuryinstruction. "Itisnecessary,ofcourse,that P  therebesomeevidenceotherthantheflighttoshowthatthefleeingwastoavoidprosecution."  Statev.St.Jean ,658So.2d1036(Fla.5th 0  DCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2  2  .3  0 Thevictim'shomewasburglarizedbysomeonewhoenteredthrougha  brokenwindowinthebackbedroom.Thedefendant'sfingerprintwasfoundonthatwindowtriminalocationwhereonemightplacehisorherhandstopushthewindowupfromtheoutside.Thiswastheonlyevidenceconnectinghimtothepremises.Thedefendantadmittedthatheneverhadconsenttobeontheproperty,butstatedthatheandotheryoungpeopleintheareasometimesusedapaththatcrossedthevictim'sbackyard.Healsosaidthatwhenthehousewasbeingpaintedthepainterlethimpaintasmallportionnearthebedroomwindow.Hedidnotremembertouchingthewindowtrim,buthecouldnotsaythathedidnotdoso.Thevictim'slandlordtestifiedthathewaspresentwhenthehousewaspaintedandthatthedefendantwasnotpresent.Thetrialjudgedeniedamotionforjudgmentofacquittal.Onappealthecourtaffirmed.Theprintwasfoundinaplacenotaccessibletothegeneralpublicandtherewasevidencecontradictingthedefendant'sexplanationastohispresencewhenthehousewaspainted. "[T]heunauthorizeduseofapathwayacrossthebackyardofahouse ! doesnotindicatereasonableaccesstothesillofabedroomwindow.Therearefewplacesthatcannotbe'accessed'byillegaltrespassbutthatdoesnotnegatetheevidentiaryvalueoffingerprintsfoundatthesceneofthecrime." Walkerv.State ,656So.2d950(Fla.5thDCA % # 1995).  (# (#    ` 2  3  .3  0 Forthefactsseediscussionofcasebelowunderreasonablesuspicion.The P(#& courtrejectedthesuggestionthatthecontactwiththedefendantwasmerelyaconsensualencounter.Thetrialjudgeerredinrulingthatifthedefendantshowedhistattoostothejuryhewouldbetestifyingandthedefendantcouldbecrossexaminedandimpeached.Awitnesstestifiedthatthe ,`'* defendantwasnotwearingashirtatthetimeofthecrimeandshesawnotattoos.Thestatearguedonappealthattheconvictionshouldnotbereversedbecausethedefendantfailedtoestablishaproperfoundationthatthetattooswerepresentatthetimeoftheoffense.Thecourtrejectedthiscontentionbecausenoobjectiononthosegroundswasraisedbythestateorthejudgeatthetime.Thus,thecourtremandedthecaseforthepurposeofallowingthedefendanttoshowtheproperfoundation.Uponsuchashowinganewtrialwouldberequired. "'Afoundationmustbelaidfor @  theintroductionofevidence,butif,whenevidenceisoffered,thereisnoobjectionbasedonlackofafoundation,andtheevidenceisreceived,thepointisnotavailableonappeal." Whittingtonv.State , `  656So.2d1346(Fla.1stDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2  4  .3  0 Seecasesbelowunder," Othercrimesorbadactsassubstantive 0  evidence."  (# (#     2  B  .3  0 `  Hearsay J.` (#` (#     ` 2  1  .3  0  Whatconstituteshearsay?  (# (#     `  2  a  .3  0  Thedefendantswereaccusedoftraffickingincocaine.The  defendantsmaintainedthattheywereentrappedbyaninformant.Thedefendantsclaimedthattheinformanttoldthemastoryofpersonalproblemsinvolvinghischildandsaidhehadtofindacertainamountofdrugstofreehischildfromkidnappers.Thedefenseattemptedtointroducetestimonyfromasupervisorconcerningoverhearingsimilarstatementstheinformanthadmadetootherpeoplewhoworkedintheplacewherethedefendantsandtheinformantworked.Thetrialjudgerefusedtoallowitonthegroundsthatitwashearsay. The"profferedtestimonywasnot @ hearsay,inasmuchasitisclearfromtherecordthatthetestimonywasnotofferedtoprovethetruthofthematterassertedthat[theinformant's]childhadbeenkidnappedandthat[theinformant]neededthemoneytofreehimbutwasofferedtoprovethecommonschemeoftheinformantandtocorroborate[thedefendant's]testimonyconcerningthemethodsused." Ortizv.State, 654So.2d1002(Fla.4thDCA1995).% #(#(#     ` 2  2  .3  0  Spontaneousstatementsandexcitedutterances . `'"% (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Thenightbeforethevictimwaskilledherboyfriendwasdriving @)$' herhomewhentheysawanothercarontheroad.Theboyfriendtestifiedthatwhentheysaythecar,thevictimwasinfear,andsaid  +p&)  "ohmyGod." Hefurthertestifiedthatshestartedcrying.On ,`'* appealthecourtheldthatthestatementwas anexcitedutterance.   Thefactthatshewasinfearandstartedcryingwerecommentsaboutherphysicaldemeanoranddidnotconstitutehearsay. Laymanv.State ,652So.2d373(Fla.1995).(#(#       ` 2  3  .3  0  Testimonyastowhatwitnesswastoldtoprovidelogicalsequence p. `  (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Inarobberyandarmedburglarycaseanofficertestifiedthatafter @  speakingtoanunidentifiedandnontestifyingjuvenilehewenttothevictim'sstolencarandarrestedthedefendant.Onappealthecourtfoundthatitwasobviousthatthejuveniletoldtheofficerthatthedefendantwasinvolvedinthecrime.Thiswashearsay. "'When P  thelogicalimplicationtobedrawnfromthetestimonyleadsthejurytobelievethatanontestifyingwitnesshasgiventhepoliceevidenceoftheaccused'sguilt,thetestimonyshouldbedisallowedashearsay.'" Trotmanv.State ,652So.2d506(Fla.  3dDCA1995). (#(#    `     ` 2  4  .3  0  Priorconsistentstatements .  (# (#    ` 2  5  .3  0  Priorinconsistentstatements t. p (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Awitnessrecantedhertestimonybeforetrialinanattemptedsecond P degreemurdercase.Attrialshetestifiedthatthedefendanthadbrieflychokedherinselfdefense.Therewasnocontraryevidenceexceptherpriorstatement. "[S]uchpriorinconsistentstatements  p maybeusedforimpeachmentbutcannotbeconsideredassubstantiveevidenceagainstadefendant." Santiagov.State , P 652So.2d495(Fla.5thDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Seecasesbelowunderimpeachment. (#(#      ` 2  6  .3  0  Statementsformedicaldiagnosisandtreatment . "  (# (#     ` 2  7  .3  0  Priortestimony UԀordepositions.$" (# (#       `  2  a  .3  0  Apriorinconsistentswornstatementmadebeforethegrandjury p&!$ couldbeadmittedassubstantiveevidence,but "acriminal `'"% convictioncouldnotbesustainedbasedonthisevidenceifthestatementwas'thesoleevidenceofacentralelementofthecrimecharged.'" Astatementmadeduringpoliceinterrogation 0*%( isnotonethatqualifiesundersection90.801(2)(a)asastatementmadein"otherproceedings." J.J.H.v.State ,651So. ,`'* 2d1239(Fla.5thDCA1995). (#(#    `     `  2  b  .3  0  Whereawitnessclaimed theFifthAmendment,hisdeposition  testimonywasadmissible onthetheorythathewasunavailable  pursuantto90.804. Mattearv.State ,657So.2d46(Fla.4th p DCA1995). (#(#     ` 2  8  .3  0  Businessrecords .@  (# (#    `    ` 2  9  .3  0  Childabusecases .  p  (# (#    `  2   a  .3  0  "Thecourtreferredtotheremotenessofthetimeoftheincident P  (whichoccurredabouttwoandonehalfyearspriortothetrial)andthelaterreportingtime,butindicatedwithoutfurtherexplanationthatthatfactorwasovercomebytheapparentcandorofthechild'sstatement,thegraphicnatureofherdescriptionofthesexactsandtheneutralexamconductedbythechildprotectionteaminvestigatorandthedetective."Onappealthecourtheldthatthetrialcourt'ssummaryfindingswereinadequatetoallowthehearsaystatementsintoevidence. "Inconsideringthetime,content,and  circumstancesofthehearsaystatement,thecourtmayconsiderthementalandphysicalageandmaturityofthechild,thenatureanddurationoftheabuseoroffense,therelationshipofthechildtotheoffender,thereliabilityoftheassertion,thereliabilityofthechildvictimandanyotherfactdeemedappropriate.90.803(23)(a)1.,Fla.Stat.(1993)." Kertellv.  p State ,649So.2d892(Fla.2dDCA1995).`(#(#    `  2   b  .3  0  Thechild'sstatementscouldnotbecorroboratedbythefather's @ (i.e.defendant)statementspriortoproofofthecorpusdelicti. "[R]elianceonthevictim'soutofcourthearsaystatementsto   provethecorpusdelicitipresupposesthestatements'admissibility." Kertellv.State ,649So.2d892(Fla.2dDCA "  1995). (#(#    `  2   c  .3  0  Thestatementsofachildwhoisonlyawitnesstoacrime, % # ratherthanavictim,arenot  admissibleunder90.803(23). For p&!$ thechild'sstatementtobeadmissible "theprosecutionofthe `'"% defendantmustbebaseduponthevictimizationofthechildwhosestatementsarebeingrelated." Thetheorythatthechildis @)$' avictimbyvirtueofhavingwitnessedthecrime,andforthatreasonthechild'sstatementsareadmissibleundertheexception,wasspecificallyrejected. Statev.Dupree ,656So.2d430(Fla. ,`'* 1995). (#(#    `  2   d  .3  0  Thedefendantwaschargedwithlewdandlasciviousassaultupon  achild.PriortotrialtheStategavenoticeofintenttointroducehearsaystatementsunder90.803(23).Thechild'shearsaystatementswereintroducedattrial.Thedefendantdidnotobjectandtherewasnohearingasrequiredbythestatute.Thechildwascalledasawitness,butthetrialjudgefoundherincompetenttotestify.Thedefendantwasconvicted.Thedistrictcourtaffirmedbecausetheirhadbeennoobjectiontothehearsay.Thatcourt "concludedthattherewasnocorroborativeevidenceofthe `  offenseandrecognizedthatthetrialcourtmadenofindingastothereliabilityofthehearsaytestimony." TheSupremeCourt @  reversedtheconviction. "Thisconvictionwasbasedonhearsay 0  statementsmadebyachildfoundincompetenttotestifywhentherewasnodeterminationofthestatements'reliabilityandnocorroboratingevidence.Weholdthattheevidenceinthisrecordwasinsufficienttosustaintheconviction." Thecourtconfinedits  decisiontothefactsofthecaseand refusedtoadopt"ablanket  rulethatnoconvictioncanstandbasedsolelyonhearsaytestimony." Andersonv.State ,655So.2d1118(Fla.1995).p(#(#    ` 2   10  .3  0  Statementsagainstinterest -.P (# (#     ` 2   11  .3  0  Activitiesofapublicoffice .0 (# (#     ` 2   12  .3  0  Conspiracy . ` (# (#    `  2   a  .3  0  Thisdealswiththecoconspiratorexceptionsetforthin @ 90.803(18)(e)wheretherewasnoconspiracycount. "[T]he 0 admissibilityofhearsaystatementsofcoconspiratorsisnotdependentupontheexistenceofacountchargingconspiracy....Rather,theadmissibilityofthesestatementsdependsonthelanguageofsubsection90.803(18)(e)exceptingsuchstatementsfromthegeneralrulewhichmakeshearsayinadmissibleifcertainevidentiarypreconditionsareestablished....Whetherornotaconspiracyischarged,thethresholdconditionofadmissibilityofacoconspirator'sstatementiswhetherevidenceexistsindependentofthestatementthatthedefendantandthedeclarantparticipatedtogetherinaconspiracy...." Inthiscase @)$' theindependentevidencecamefromthetestimonyofawitnesswhowaspresentastheconspiracywasexecuted. Brownv.State ,648  +p&) So.2d268(Fla.4thDCA1995).,`'*(#(# Ї   `  2   b  .3  0  ForfactsseediscussionunderRighttocounsel/conflictofinterest.  Therewasallegedlyaconspiracytocommitmurder.Afterthemurdershadbeencommittedtheperpetratorleftthestate.HestayedwithafriendinanotherstateandtoldhimthathehadkilledfourpeopleinFloridabecauseitwasnecessarytodosotocarryoutacontracttokilloneperson.Thetrialjudgeallowedthistestimonyintoevidence.Onappealthecourtfoundthatthiswaserrorbecauseitwashearsay. Itwasnotadmissibleunderthe @  conspiracyexceptionsetforthin90.803(18)(e)becauseanyconspiracyhadendedbeforethestatementwasmade.Itwasnotastatementmadebyacoconspiratorinfurtheranceoftheconspiracy.Furthermore,itwasnotadmissiblepursuantto90.804(1)onthetheorythatthedeclarantwasunavailable.Burnsidev.State, 656So.2d241(Fla.5thDCA1995).0 (#(#    ` 2   13  .3  0  Invitedresponse .  (# (#    `  2   a  .3  0  InamurdercasetheStatewantedtointroducetestimonythatthe  victimtoldanotherwitnessthatshewasafraidofthedefendantandhadtakenstepstohidefromhim.TheStatearguedthatthishearsaywasadmissibleunder90.803(a)(1),whichprovidesthatahearsaystatementisnotinadmissiblewhenitisastatementofthedeclarant's"thenexistingstateofmind,emotion,orphysicalsensation...when...offeredto[p]rovethedeclarant'sstateofmind,emotion,orphysicalsensationatthattimewhen suchstate 0 isanissueintheaction." Thecourtnotedthatsuchevidenceis  p generallyinadmissiblebecausethevictim'sstatementofmindisnotrelevantorthestateisreallyintroducingtheevidencetoshowthedefendant'sstatementofmind. Inthiscasetheevidencewasonly @ admissibleinrebuttalandthenonlyifthedefendantclaimedthatthevictimvoluntarilylethiminthecarandthatishowhisfingerprintsgotthere. Thehearsaywasnotadmissibletoprove ! thatitwasthedefendantwhokilledthevictim,butitwouldbeadmissibletorebutthedefensetheoryconcerningentryintothecar.Allowinghearsayevidenceinrebuttalisnodifferentthatallowingotherinadmissibleevidenceinrebuttalwhentheothersidehasopenedthedoor. Statev.Bradford ,658So.2d572(Fla.5th p&!$ DCA1995). (#(#        2   C  .3  0 `  Impeachment E .@)$'` (#` (#     ` 2  1  .3  0  Subjectofimpeachment  . +p&) (# (#   ,`'*    `  2  a  .3  0  Thevictim'stestimonywassupportedbyherfriendwhowasan  eyewitnesstothecrime.Thedefendantsoughttocrossexamineboththevictimandherfriendastotheirrelationship,whichthedefendantclaimedwasahomosexualone.Thetrialjudgerefusedtoallowthiscrossexamination.Onappealthecourtfoundthatthiswaserrorbecause "itmayhaveshownbiasofthewitnessin `  favorofthevictimandagainstthedefendant." Stanleyv.State , P  648So.2d1268(Fla.4thDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Thedefendanttestifiedondirectthatthevictimofpropertycrimes  p  andthedefendant'sexwifewereinvolvedinarelationship,sotheywerebiasagainsthim.Oncrossexaminationtheprosecutoraskedthedefendant whetheritwastruethathehadstolenmoneyat @  thevictim'sbirthdayparty. Onrebuttalthevictimandtheexwife 0  werecalledbythestateandallowedtotestifythattheyweresurethatthedefendanthadstolenmoneyatthebirthdayparty.Onappealthecourtfoundthatthiswasimproperimpeachmentonacollateralmatter. Lawsonv.State ,651So.2d713(Fla.2dDCA1995).(#(#    `  2  c  .3  0  "[A]witness'answerduringthecrossexaminationtoa  nonmaterialcollateralmatterisconclusiveandcannotbeimpeachedbynormalmeansofimpeachment,includingcontradictorytestimonybyanotherwitness.Dupontv.State,556 P So.2d457(Fla.4thDCA1990).'Thetestiswhethertheproposedtestimonycanbeadmittedintoevidenceforanypurposeindependentofthecontradictions.'Dupont,556So.2d  p at458.Twotypesofevidencepassthistest:(1)factsrelevanttoaparticularissue;and(2)factswhichdiscreditawitnessbypointingoutthewitness'bias,corruption,orlackofcompetency.Gelabertv.State,407So.2d1007,10091010(Fla. 0 5thDCA1981).Thetestofrelevancyandmaterialityiswhetherthecrossexaminingpartycouldhaveforanypurposeotherthanimpeachment,introducedevidenceonthesubjectinitscaseinchief."Lawsonv.State ,651So.2d713(Fla.2dDCA #! 1995). (#(#    `  2  d  .3  0  "Indeterminingiftheissueiscollateralsothatcollateral p&!$ impeachmentbyextrinsicevidenceisdisallowed,thequestiontobeposediswhethertheimpeachingevidencewouldbeadmissibleforanypurposeotherthancontradiction....Twotypesofevidencepassthistest:(1)evidencewhichisrelevanttoindependentlyproveamaterialfactorissue;(2)evidencewhichwoulddiscreditawitnessbypointingoutthewitness'sbias, ,`'* corruptionorlackofcompetency." Inthiscaseawitnesstestified  thatthedefendantwasathomewhenthecrimeoccurred.Shesaidthatshewasatthehomewatchingcabletelevisionwiththedefendant'smother.ShealsosaidthatthedefendantwassickandthatshegavehimsomeTylenol.Thestatecrossexaminedthewitnessconcerningwhatshewaswatchingontelevision,whereshegavethedefendanttheTylenol,andwhetheranyoneelsehadstoppedbythehomethatday.Inrebuttalthetrialjudgethenallowedthestatetocallthedefendant'smothertoimpeachthewitness'stestimonybycontradictingthetestimonyastowhereshegavethedefendanttheTylenolandwhoelsewasinthehousethatday.Inrebuttalthetrialjudgealsoallowedtheintroductionofthetestimonyofthecablecompanyrecordscustodiantoshowthattherewasnocabletelevisioninthehome. "Thereisadistinction 0  betweenthewidediscretionallowedincrossexaminationofawitnessoncollateralmattersandthemuchmorelimiteddiscretionaffordedtoimpeachmentbyextrinsicevidenceonmattersinquiredintooncrossexamination.When[thewitness]tookthestandtogivetestimonysupportingdefendant'salibi,sheputhercredibilityinissueandwidelatitudewasproperlygivenduringcrossexaminationtotestthedetailsofthealibi....Obviously,thestateisallowedtodelveintoallmatterswhich'maymodify,supplement,contradict,rebutormakeclearerthefactstestifiedtoinchief....'" Thecourtheldthatthestateproperly @ crossexaminedthewitnessonthedetailsofwhereshegavethedefendantthemedicine,whowaspresentthroughouttheday,andwhethershewaswatchingcabletelevision. "However,notallof ` thesedetailscomprisedmaterialpartsofdefendant'salibidefenseandtherefore,thetrialcourterredinallowingthestatetopresentrebuttalevidenceintheformofthetestimonyofotherwitnesses.See90.608(5),Fla.Stat.(1991)." Thiscase   illustratestheproblemwithpermittingtheintroductionofextrinsicevidencetoimpeachacollateralmatter.Itbecameafeatureofthetrial.Thewitnesstestifiedduringthetrialthatshecouldnotrememberwhethershewaswatchingcabletelevision.Thestatethenimpeachedherwithapriorinconsistentstatementfromherdepositionwhereshesaidthattherewascabletelevision.Onrebuttalthestatethenintroducedcablerecordstoshowthattherewasnocabletelevisioninthehomeatthattime.Thisactuallyconstitutedimpeachmentofthepriorinconsistentstatementinthedeposition.Whetherornottherewascabletelevisionwasaminorpointandyetitbecameamaterialpartofthestate'sattack. "Itis  +p&) wellestablishedthatifapartycrossexaminesawitness ,`'* concerningacollateralmatter,thecrossexaminermust'take'theanswer,isboundbyit,andmaynotsubsequentlyimpeachthewitnessbyintroducingextrinsicevidencetocontradictthewitnessonthatpoint." Correiav.State ,654So.2d952(Fla.4th  DCA1995). (#(#    `  2  e  .3  0  Thedefendantwasaccusedoffondlinghisdaughter'sfriendontwo P  successiveweekends.Thedaughtertestifiedforthedefendant.Oncrossexaminationtheprosecutoraskedthedaughterwhethershehadaccusedthedefendantoftouchingthevictim.Thedaughteransweredthatnosuchaccusationhadbeenmade.TheStatethencalledanothergirlinrebuttalwhowasallowedtotestifyoveradefenseobjectionthatsheoverheardthedaughtertellthedefendant:"Howcouldyoudothis,youpromisedmethatyouwouldn'ttouchanymoreofmyfriends.You'remakingmelosemyfriendsslowly."OnappealtheStateconcededthatthiswasimproper,butarguedthatitwasharmlesserror.Thecourtdisagreed. Thestate  acknowledgesthegeneralrulethatifawitnessiscrossexaminedonacollateralorirrelevantmatter,thecrossexaminermust'take'andbeboundbytheanswerandmaynotsubsequentlyimpeachthewitnesswithextrinsicevidenceincontradiction."  p  Woodv.State ,656So.2d605(Fla.1stDCA1995).`(#(#     ` 2  2  .3  0  Criminalhistoryandpriorbadacts ,+. @ (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Duringcrossthestate'switnessstatedthathehadconvictedmore  p thantentimesoffelonies.Whenaskedwhetheritcouldbemorethantwentytime,thewitnesssaid,"'[t]hatwouldbeaguesstimation.'"Thedefenseattorneythenattemptedtointroducecertifiedcopiesofeighteenpriorfelonyconvictions.Thetrialjudgerefusedtoallowsuchevidence.Onappealthecourtfoundthatthiswaserror. "Because[thewitness]didnotanswerthequestion ! concerningpriorconvictionsinastraightforwardmanner,thedefenseproperlysoughttoimpeachhimwithcopiesofhispriorfelonyconvictions."Perezv.State ,648So.2d715(Fla.1995).$"(#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Duringcrossthedefendantwasquestionedabouthisflightfrom p&!$ officersandsaidthathehad"'beenjumpedonbythepolicebefore.'"Theprosecutorwasthenallowedtoaskthedefendantwhetherhehadbeenpreviouslyconvictedofabatteryonalawenforcementofficerandhaddonetimeforit.Thiswasaskedbasedonthetheorythatthedefendanthadopenedthedoor.Onappealthecourtdisagreed. Kylev.State ,650So.2d127(Fla.4thDCA ,`'* 1995). (#(#    `  2  c  .3  0  Thedefendantwasconvictedofgrandtheftoffirearmsandrelated  crimes.Hetestifiedondirectthatthevictimandthedefendant'sexwifewereinvolvedinarelationship,sotheywerebiasagainsthim.Oncrossexaminationtheprosecutoraskedthedefendant whether `  itwastruethathehadstolenmoneyatthevictim'sbirthdayparty. Onrebuttalthevictimandtheexwifewerecalledbythe @  stateandallowedtotestifythattheyweresurethatthedefendanthadstolenmoneyatthebirthdayparty.Onappealthecourtreversedonthegroundsthatthistestimonywasnotrelevanttoanymaterialfactinvolvedinthecaseand "wasrelevantonlytoshow P  [thedefendant's]badcharacterandcriminalpropensity."  @   Lawsonv.State ,651So.2d713(Fla.2dDCA1995).0 (#(#    `     ` 2  3  .3  0  Circumstancesshowingbias 5 .   (# (#    `       ` 2  4  .3  0  Statements 7.  (# (#       2  D  .3  0 `  Othercrimesorbadactsassubstantiveevidence 7.` (#` (#     ` 2  1  .3  0 Thedefendantwaschargedwiththreecountsoflewdandlasciviousactin ` thepresenceofachildundertheageof16.Hewasfoundguiltybecauseheexposedhimselftothreeminors.Avideotapedinterviewwasconductedwiththeboysduringwhichtheydescribedmanythingsthattheyhadbeentoldbyothersregardingothersexualactivitiesandcrimesbythedefendant.Thetrialjudgeallowedthevideotapedinterviewintoevidenceonthegroundsthatitwasrelevanttoshowhowthedefendantgainedthetrustoftheboysbyallowingthemtohaveaccesstohishomeandhisbelongings.Onappealthecourtfoundthatthiswaserror.Thecourtconcludedthatthetrustwasnotamaterialissue. "Theonlymaterialissuewaswhetherhe   exposedhisgenitalsinalewdmanner.Motive,opportunity,intent,preparation,plan,identity,etc.werenottheissue." Furthermore,any "  probativevaluewasoutweighedbytheprejudicialimpactofthetestimony. #!  Petersenv.State ,650So.2d223(Fla.5thDCA1995).$" (# (#    ` 2  2  .3  0 Inanarsoncasethestatewasallowedtointroduceevidenceofanotherfire p&!$ basedontheconclusionthatitwassufficientlysimilartothefireinvolvedinthearsoncasebeingtriedto"'establishmotivefortheinstantfire,opportunity,intent,preparation,plan,knowledge,theidentityoftheperpretrator,andabsenceofmistakeoraccident.'"Onappealthecourtreversed. [T]heprejudicialvaluefaroutweighedtheprobativevalue....  +p&) Inthefirstfire,therewasnotestimonythat[thedefendant]benefitted ,`'* atallfromthefire.Shewasrentingthemobilehomeandthestatepresentednoevidencethat[she]startedthefire.Thereweresimplynotenoughuniquecharacteristicstomakethecrimessimilar...." Thestate  madethefactthatthereweretwofiresthecentralissueinthetrial. Thus,  thepriorfirebecamethefeatureofthetrial. Bellv.State ,650So.2d p 1032(Fla.5thDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2  3  .3  0 Thedefendantwasprosecutedfordeliveryofcocaine.Anofficerwas @  allowedtotestifythatthedefendantsaidtohim:"thisisn'taboutanythingthearrestdoesn'tmeananythingthebonddoesn'tmeananythingthathewouldbebacktomorrow."Thedefendantobjectedbecausethisimpliedthathewouldbebacksellingcocaine.Thedefendantwasarrestedseveraldaysafterthecontrolledpurchasebytheundercoverofficer.Thearresttookplaceatthesamelocationastheoriginalbuy.Thedefendantattemptedtowalkawayfromtheofficers.Hewasloud,boisterous,andcockyatthearrest.Thejurycouldinferfromhisstatementsthatthedefendantadmittedhispresenceatthelocationandhewouldbebackdoingthesamething. "Thefactthatthecommentimpliedfuturecriminalactivitiesdoesnot  renderitinadmissibleifitcanbeinterpretedasanadmissionagainstinterest."  Henryv.State ,651So.2d1267(Fla.1stDCA1995). (# (#    ` 2  4  .3  0 Thisistheruleconcerning reverseWilliamsRuleevidence:"'Thetestfor ` admissibilityofsimilarfactevidenceisrelevancy.Whenthepurportedrelevancyofpastcrimesistoidentifytheperpetratorofthecrimebeingtried,wehaverequiredaclosesimilarityoffacts,auniqueor'fingerprint'typeofinformation,fortheevidencetoberelevant.ifadefendant'spurposeistoshiftsuspicionfromhimselftoanotherperson,evidenceofpastcriminalconductofthatotherpersonshouldbeofsuchanaturethatitwouldbeadmissibleifthatpersonwereontrialforthepresentoffense.'Statev.Savino,567So.2d892,894 0 (Fla.1990)." Inthiscasethedefendantdidnotmeetthistestbecausethe   similaritiesbetweentheunderlyingoffenseandthesimilaractwerethevictim'snationalityandthefactthatthesamepersonclaimedineachcasetohavebeenoutsideoftheresidenceswheretheshootingstookplace. Stokesv.State ,658So.2d1159(Fla.2dDCA1995).$" (# (#    ` 2  5  .3  0 ThiscaseinvolvedreversedWilliamsruleevidence.TheCourtsetforththe p&!$ followingrulefromStatev.Savino,567So.2d892(Fla.1990): "'When `'"% thepurportedrelevancyofpastcrimesistoidentifytheperpetratorofthecrimebeingtried,wehaverequiredaclosesimilarityoffacts,auniqueor'fingerprint'typeofinformation,fortheevidencetoberelevant.(Citationsomitted).Ifadefendant'spurposeistoshiftsuspicionfromhimselftoanotherperson,evidenceofpastcriminal ,`'* conductofthatotherpersonshouldbeofsuchanaturethatitwouldbeadmissibleifthatpersonwereontrialforthepresentoffense." This  isamatterofjudicialdiscretion.Inthiscasethedefendantwasaccusedoffirstdegreemurderandarmedrobbery.Thesecrimesaroseoutofadrugtransactioninwhichthedefendantwasaccusedofkillingoneoftheparticipates.Thedefendanthadsoughttointroduceevidencethatanotherpersonhadinitiatedtwo"ripoffs"ofdrugdealersbeforeandshortlyaftertheinvolvedmurder.Thetrialjudgerefusedtoallowevidenceofthesetwoincidentstobeadmittedbecausethefactsofthetwootherincidentswerenotsufficientlysimilartothoseinthecaseatbar.Thecourtfoundthattheentriesintotheapartments,thepersonsinvolved,andtheconductintheapartmentwasdifferent. Applyingtheaforementionedstandards,the P  courtfoundnoabuseofdiscretion. Trainav.State ,657So.2d1227 @  (Fla.4thDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2  6  .3  0 Thedefendantwaschargedwithtwocountsofindecentassaultinvolving  minors.Thestatewasallowedtointroduceevidenceofpriorcrimesforthepurposeofidentification.Onappealthecourtreversed. "Whenthe  materialissueinthecaseisidentity,meregeneralsimilarityofincidentswillnotrenderthesimilarcrimeadmissible.Theremustbeidentifiablepointsofsimilarityshowingsuchauniquecombinationofcharacteristicsthatitleadstoaconclusionthatonlytheaccusedwouldhavecommittedbothcrimes." Inthiscasethattestwasnotmet.These P werethesesimilarities:(1)thevictimsweregirlsofaboutthesameage;(2)theywereapproachedbyamaninthecar;(3)themanaskedfordirections;(4)themanaskedthemiftheywantedtomakefivedollars."Thesimilaritiesendthere.Inthechargedcrime,theperpetratormasturbatedwhileseatedinthecar.Inthecollateralcrime,theperpetratorsimplyaskedwhetherthevictimhadeverseenaman.Theeventswereseveralmonthsapartandindifferentstates.Thefactthatthemanaskedfordirectionsandaskedthegirlsiftheywantedtomakefivedollarsishardlyunique.Childrenarewarnedeverydaynottoapproachstrangersinvehicles,nottoapproachvehiclestogivedirections,ortoacceptmoneyorcandy.Thefactthatthemonetaryamountwasthesameineachinstanceishardlysouniqueastomakeitanunusualpatternofcriminalactivity." Lewisv. $" State ,654So.2d617(Fla.4thDCA1995).% # (# (#    ` 2  7  .3  0 Seecasesaboveunder," Relevanceandprejudice." `'"% (# (# Ѐ   `  P(#&   2  E  .3  0 `  Otherbadactsandothergoodacts Y .@)$'` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 Inanarsoncasethestatewasallowedtointroduceevidenceofanotherfire  +p&) basedontheconclusionthatitwassufficientlysimilartothefireinvolved ,`'* inthearsoncasebeingtriedto"'establishmotivefortheinstantfire,opportunity,intent,preparation,plan,knowledge,theidentityoftheperpetrator,andabsenceofmistakeoraccident.'"Onappealthecourtreversed. [T]heprejudicialvaluefaroutweighedtheprobativevalue....  Inthefirstfire,therewasnotestimonythat[thedefendant]benefittedatallfromthefire.Shewasrentingthemobilehomeandthestatepresentednoevidencethat[she]startedthefire.Thereweresimplynotenoughuniquecharacteristicstomakethecrimessimilar...." Thestate @  madethefactthatthereweretwofiresthecentralissueinthetrial. Thus, 0  thepriorfirebecamethefeatureofthetrial. Bellv.State ,650So.2d  p  1032(Fla.5thDCA1995).  (# (#    `   2  F  .3  0 `  Taperecordings <_.@ ` (#` (#     2  G  .3  0 `  Character _. ` (#` (#     ` 2  1  .3  0 Inadrugcaseitwasimproperfortheprosecutortosayinopening  statementthatthedefendantandthecodefendant"'werenostrangerstothedrugscene.'"Thisplacedthedefendant'scharacterinissue. "An  accused'scharactercannotbeplacedintoevidenceunlessanduntilthedefendantplaceshisgoodcharacterinissue." Indecidingwhethersuch p acommentrequiresamistrial,"'theextentofpossibleprejudicearisingfromtheimpropercommentmustbeevaluatedinthecontextofthesurroundingcircumstances.'"Amistrialshouldbegrantedonly "when @ errorissoprejudicialastovitiatetheentiretrial." Inthiscasethetrial 0 judgedidnotabuseherdiscretionindenyingamotionformistrial. Traina  p v.State ,657So.2d1227(Fla.4thDCA1995).` (# (#    `     2  H  .3  0 `  Privilegedcommunications d. @` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 Thedefendantwrotealettertoadetective.Thestatearguedthattheletter   waivedthespousalprivilege.Alettermaywaivethespousalprivilegepursuantto90.507. "Theissuethenwithrespecttothewaiveris "  whetherthecircumstancessurroundingtheletterandthecontentoftheletterdemonstratethatthisdefendantvoluntarilyconsentedtolawenforcementofficerstalkingwithhisspouseaboutherknowledgeoftheallegedcriminalactivities....Bolin'svoluntarilyconsenttothequestioningofhisformerspouseaboutherknowledgeofthecriminalactivitiesforwhichBolinwasbeinginvestigatedwouldpermithisformerspousetotestifyastoBolin'sstatementstoherregardingthemurderbecausethestatementscomprisedpartofwhatsheknewabouthisactivities."Bolinv.State ,650So.2d21(Fla.1995). +p&) (# (#  ,`'*    ` 2  2  .3  0 Thestatewasallowedtocallthedefendant'shusbandasawitnessbecause  thetrialcourtconcludedthathewasavictimofthedefendant'sarson. Pursuantto90.504(3)(b)thespousalprivilegedoesnotapplywhere  thespousehashisorherpersonorpropertyinjuredordamaged. In  thiscasethespouseaidedinthecommissionofthecrime,whichconsistedofburningthepropertyofbothpeopleforthepurposeofcollectinginsurancepremiums.Thus,hewasacoconspirator andtheexceptionto P  thespousalprivilegedidnotapply. Bellv.State ,650So.2d1032(Fla. @  5thDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2  3  .3  0 Thetrialjudgeproperlyconductedan incamerahearingpursuanttoRule `  3.220(m)todeterminewhetherthewitness'sprofferedtestimonywouldimpingeontheattorneyclientprivilege. "[T]hetrialcourtconductedthe @  incamerahearinginthepresenceofdefendantanddefensecounsel,the 0  courtreporter,andthewitness.However,thetrialjudgealonequestionedthewitnessandthedefendant." Statev.Young ,654So.2d962(Fla.3d  DCA1995).  (# (#   2  I  .3  0 `  EyewitnessIdentification o.` (#` (#     ` 2   1  .3  0 "[A]showupisinherentlysuggestivebecauseawitnessispresented p withonlysuspectforidentification." Herethecourtappliedthefactors ` setforthinBiggersandconcludedthattherewasnotasubstantial P likelihoodofmisidentification.Thefactorsherewere:(1)theidentificationwasmadeshortlyafterthecrime;(2)duringtheassaultitwasbroaddaylight;(3)duringtheassaultthewitnessandtheperpetratorwerewithineighttotenfeetofeachother;(4)thewitnesshadaclearviewoftheoffenderforaboutaminute.Thus,theoutofcourtidentificationwasadmissible.Theincourtidentificationwasadmissibleindependentoftheprioridentificationbecauseofthevictim'sabilitytoobservethedefendantatthecrimescene. Perezv.State ,648So.2d715(Fla.1995).  (# (#    2   J  .3  0 `  Credibility At." ` (#` (#    ` 2   1  .3  0 Seecasesunder scientificevidence. $" (# (#    ` 2   2  .3  0 Seecaseson crossexamination. 󀀀p&!$ (# (#   2   K  .3  0 `  Evidenceofevasionofprosecution Mv. P(#&` (#` (#    ` 2   1  .3  0 Seediscussionaboveof relevanceandprejudice. 0*%( (# (#    +p&)      2   VII  .3  0   SCIENTIFICEVIDENCEANDOPINIONTESTIMONY. xԀ(#(#    2  A  .3  0 `  Predicateandstandardsforexpertopinion. xԀ ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 "'Inadmittingtheresultsofscientifictestsandexperiments,the p reliabilityofthetestingmethodsisatissue,andtheproperpredicatetoestablishthatreliabilitymustbelaid.Ifthereliabilityofa P  test'sresultsisrecognizedandacceptedamongscientists,admittingthoseresultsiswithinatrialcourt'sdiscretion.Whensuchreliableevidenceisoffered,"anyinquiryintoitsreliabilityforpurposesofadmissibilityisonlynecessarywhentheopposingpartymakesatimelyrequestforsuchaninquirysupportedbyauthoritiesindicatingthattheremaynotbegeneralscientificacceptanceofthetechniqueemployed."'" TheCourtfollowedtheseprincipleandconcludedthat P DNAtestresultswereproperlyadmittedintoevidencewhere:(1)theresultswerepresentedthroughthetestimonyofthesupervisorofthepersonwhoconductedthetests;(2)thesupervisortestifiedastothescientificreliabilityofthetestsandinterpretedtheresults;(3)thesupervisorworkedasateamwiththepersonwhoactuallyperformedthetestandsupervisedherassheconductedthetest;(4)thepersonwhoperformedthetestsubmittedanaffidavitwhichstatedthatshehadperformedover1200suchtests,hadnospecificrecollectionoftheinvolvedtest,andwouldhavetorelyonlabnotestodiscusstheprocedure. "[Thesupervisor's]familiarity @ withthetest,hissupervisionover[thetechnician's]workand[thetechnician's]affidavitlaidaproperpredicateforadmissionoftheDNAtestresults."  Washingtonv.State ,653So.2d362(Fla.1994).   (# (#    ` 2  2  .3  0 Thedefendantsoughtappointmentofanexperttotestifythatthreatofthe   electricchairissufficienttoovercomethevoluntarinessofaconfession.Thetrialjudgerefused.Onappealthecourtfoundnoabuseofdiscretion. "  "[N]oexpertwasrequiredatbarsinceitissafetosaythatthejurywas p# capableofassessingwithouttheaidofanexpertwitnessthatthethreatofdeathintheelectricchairmayhaveacoerciveeffectonwhetherasuspectgivesanincustodystatement."  Bullardv.State ,650So.2d631 @&!" (Fla.4thDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2  3  .3  0 Inorderforexpertopinionbasedona newornovel scientificprinciplethis )`$% fourstepprocessmustbefollowed: (1)"[T]hetrialjudgemustdetermine *P%& whethersuchexperttestimonywillassistthejuryinunderstandingtheevidenceorindeterminingafactinissue."(2)"[T]hetrialjudgemust +0'( decidewhethertheexpert'stestimonyisbasedonascientificprincipleordiscoverythat'sufficientlyestablishedtohavegainedgeneralacceptanceintheparticularfieldinwhichitbelongs.'"[ThisistheFrye  test.](3)Thetrialjudgemustdetermine"whetheraparticularwitnessisqualifiedasanexperttopresentopiniontestimonyonthesubjectinissue."(4)"[T]hejudgemaythenallowtheexperttorenderanopiniononthesubjectofhisorherexpertise,anditisthenuptothejurytodeterminethecredibilityoftheexpert'sopinion,whichitmayeitheracceptorreject." Theprimaryfocusofsteptwoisthedeterminationof 0  "whetherthescientifictheoryordiscoveryfromwhichanexpertderivesanopinionis reliable ."Theburdenisontheproponentto "provethegeneral `  acceptanceofboththeunderlyingscientificprincipleandthetestingproceduresusedtoapplythatprincipletothefactsofthecaseathand"byapreponderanceoftheevidence. Thehearingonadmissibilityisan 0  adversarialprocessandmustbeconductedinafairmanner. Conflicting   evidencemustbeallowed. Thepreferredprocedureistoconsiderthese  mattersinapretrialhearingsothatthereisminimalinconveniencetothejury. Ramirezv.State ,651So.2d1164(Fla.1995). (# (#    ` 2  4  .3  0 Inalibelcaseapoliticalscientistwaspermittedtotestifyasanexpert  witnessonpublicopinion,specialtaxdistricts,andthepoliticalsysteminFloridaingeneral.Hetestifiedastothewhythethreeletters,whichwerethebasisfortheaction,weredefamatory.Hewasalsoallowedtotestifyastothemeaningofordinarywordsinthelettersandasalegalexpertonwhetherinfluencepeddlingwasacrime.Thecourtfoundthatthiswaserror. "'Becausetheimportanceandvalidityofanexpertwitnessare  p increasedinthemindofthejury,allowinganexpertwitnesstotestifytomattersofcommonunderstandingcreatesthepossibilitythatthejurywillforegoindependentanalysisofthefactswhenitdoesnotneedassistanceinmakingthatanalysis.Thisisparticularlytruewhentherearenounusualorcomplicatedcircumstancessurroundingtheincidentaboutwhichtheexperttestifies.'" Themeaningofthewordswaswithin ! theunderstandingofordinaryjurors. Seropianv.Forman ,652So.2d490 "  (Fla.4thDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2  5  .3  0 "InutilizingtheFryetest,theburdenisontheproponentoftheevidence % # toprovethegeneralacceptanceofboththeunderlyingscientificprinciple p&!$ andthetestingproceduresusedtoapplythatprincipletothefactsofthecaseathand.Thetrialjudgehasthesoleresponsibilitytodeterminethisquestion. ThegeneralacceptanceundertheFryetestmustbe @)$' establishedbyapreponderanceoftheevidence." Ramirezv.State ,651 0*%( So.2d1164(Fla.1995); Brimv.State ,654So.2d184(Fla.2dDCA  +p&) 1995).,`'* (# (# Ї   ` 2  6  .3  0 Adissentingopiniondealingwiththeadmissibilityofexpertopinion  testimonyonPostTraumaticStressDisordershouldberead forthe  excellentdiscussionoftheapplicationoftheFryestandard.Clarkv.  State ,654So.2d984(Fla.4thDCA1995).p (# (#    2  B  .3  0 `  Typesofscientificevidence b.P ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0  Polygraph  . 0  (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Foradiscussionofdevelopmentonpolygraphssee Cassamassima `  v.State ,657So.2d906(Fla.5thDCA1995).P (#(#     ` 2  2  .3  0  Batteredwoman'ssyndrome . 0  (# (#    ` 2  3  .3  0  Sexoffenderprofiles . (# (#      ` 2  4  .3  0  Psychologicaltestimonyastovictim ~.  (# (#    ` 2  5  .3  0  Childabusecases J.  (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Inachildsexualabusecasethestateelicitedfromapsychologist ` testimonythatitwasunusualforchildrentoeagerlytalkaboutsexualabuse.Inthiscaseonevictimwashesitanttotalkaboutwhathappenedtoher.Thevictimsallhadlowermentalagesthantheirchronologicalages.Thepsychologistwasalsoallowedtoexplainthattheyunderstoodthesignificanceoflyingandthedifferencebetweentruthandfabrication.Healsostatedthatitiscommonforsexualabusevictimstodelaytellingabouttheabuseandchildrenarelikelytoconveyconfusingandinconsistentinformation.Theimpactofthistestimonyandtheonlyreasonforitwas tobolster   thecredibilityofthechildrenwhotestified. TheDoctorwasnot ! askeddirectlyaboutthetruthfulnessofthechildrennordidhemakeanystatementsindicatingthatthedefendantwastheperpetrator.Thesethingsareprohibited. "Nevertheless,whenthetestifying $" victimsareofacertainage,thejurydoesnotneedanexpert'shelptodecidewhetherornottheincidentsactuallyoccurred."  p&!$ Thetrialjudgetriedtoconfinethetestimonytoevidencethatthevictim'sbehaviorwasconsistentwiththatofsexuallyabusedchildren,whichispermitted.Thecourtnotedthatthistypeoftestimonyishelpfulwherethevictimsareyoungerchildrenwhoareunabletotestifyattrial. "Whenthevictimisolder,however,and  +p&) thereexistsnocorroboratingmedicalorphysicalevidence,these ,`'* caseswillofteninvolveacredibilitycontestbetweentheallegedabuserandtheabused.Aslongasthechildiscapableofaccuratelyrelatingeventstothejury,theexpert'sopinionwillinvariablyconstituteasealofapprovalfortheallegedvictimandahighlyprejudicialstampofcondemnationfortheallegedperpetrator." Ballv.State ,651So.2d1224(Fla.2dDCA1995).` (#(#    ` 2  6  .3  0  Hypnoticallyrefreshedtestimony o. @  (# (#    ` 2  7  .3  0  Differenttheories 7.  p  (# (#    `  a.0  "Theprimaryissue...iswhether,inconsideringarequestfor P  admissionofthestatisticalconsequencesoftheanalysisofmatchingDNAsamples,acourtmustexcludeallorpartofthatanalysisifthecourtispresentedwithevidenceoftwodifferingbutgenerallyacceptedviewswithinthescientificcommunityconcerningtheproperpopulationfrequencystatisticstobeapplied."ThedefendantarguedthattheDNAevidenceshouldnotbeallowedbecause"theDNApopulationfrequencystatisticsdidnotmeetthetestforadmissionofnovelscientificevidenceestablishedinFryev.United  States,293F.1013(D.C.Cir.1923)."Hearguedthatsincethere p isadebateconcerningtheproperstatisticalpopulationbasetouse,thestatisticalfrequencyfiguresarenot"'generallyaccepted'intherelevantscientificcommunity."Thestatearguedthattheevidencewasadmissiblebecauseboththeoriesaregenerallyaccepted. "[T}heruleonFryewasestablishedasareliabilitytest,onthe  p theorythatonceascientificsuppositionisgenerallyacceptedamongtherelevantscientists,itismorelikelytobereliable.TheFryecourtemphasizedthatitisthescientificprincipleor @ discoveryfromwhichdeductionsaremadethatmustgenerallybeaccepted.Theexistenceofonereliabletheoryordeductionfromunderlyingreliablescientificevidencedoesnotnecessarilyexcludetheexistenceofanotherreliabledeductionortheory....[W]eholdthatthetrialcourtwascorrectinfindingthattheevidencepresentedheresatisfiestheFryetest.Wherethereare $" twodifferent,butbothgenerallyaccepteddeductionsthatcanbemadefromgenerallyacceptedscientificevidence,theymaybothbeadmittedprovidedthattheunderlyingscientificevidencesatisfiesFrye." ThecourtcertifiedconflictwithVargas P(#& v.State,640So.2d1139(Fla.1stDCA1994). Brimv.State ,654 @)$' So.2d184(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    2  C  .3  0 `  LayOpinion . ,`'*` (#` (#     2  D  .3  0 `  Appointmentofexpert 7. ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 Thedefendantsoughttohaveanexpertappointedtotestifythatthethreat  ofdeathintheelectricchairissufficienttoovercomethevoluntarinessofaconfession.Thetrialjudgerefused.Onappealthecourtfoundnoabuseofdiscretion. Thetrialcourthasa"dutytoappointanexpertwitness P  whenrequiredbyanindigentdefendant,andwhenthatexpert's @  opinionisrelevanttotheissuesofthecase....Wealsofullyacknowledgethatanindigentdefendantrequiresmorethanmereaccesstothecourts,butalsorequiresthenecessaryrawmaterialstobuildhisdefense....However,anindigentdefendant'srighttotheappointmentofexpertsisnotunfettered,andisobviouslylimitedtothosesituationswheretheexpert'stestimonyisrelevantandnecessary." Bullardv.State ,650So.2d631(Fla.4thDCA1995).  (# (#     2  VIII  .3  0   OTHERISSUESARISINGDURINGTHETRIALORSUBSEQUENTTOTRIAL . (#(#    2  A  .3  0 `  Jurymatters ޳.` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0  Waiver . p (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Thedefendanthasnotwaivedtherighttoajurytrialbyvirtueof P  hisattorneysigningawrittenwaiverwherethereisnocolloquybetweenthejudgeandthedefendantestablishingthatthewaiverwasfreelyandvoluntarilyentered. Rule3.260isnotthesole  p  methodforwaivingtherighttoajurytrial.Thedefendantcanwaiveitontherecordwithafullexplanationoftheconsequencesofthewaiverbythetrialjudge."'[I]tisabetterpracticefortrialcourtstousebothapersonalontherecordwaiverandawrittenwaiver."Statev.Upton ,658So.2d86   (Fla.1995). (#(#     ` 2  2  .3  0  Discriminationinchallenges M. (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0   Meetinginitialburden . (#(#    `    2(  1  )3  0 h Appliestomalejurors. Thompsonv.State ,648So.2d ` 323(Fla.3dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  2  )3  0 h ThedefendantwasaHispanicmale.hechallengeda 0 Hispanicmaleprospectivejuror.Theprosecutordemandedaraceneutralreason.Thedefenseattorneyattemptedtostatesuchareason.Thetrialjudgedisallowedthechallenge.Onappealthecourtfoundthatthiswasreversibleerrorbecausetheinitialburdenwasnotmet.Thestate,infact,nevermadeaclaimthattheperemptorychallengewasbeingusedinaraciallydiscriminatoryfashionnorcouldithavedonesoingoodfaith. "[T]hereisnobasiswhateverfor "  concludingthatthechallengeinvolvedtheevilproscribedbytheBatsonNeilrule;thatisthatitwasbasedona $" 'constitutionallyimpermissibleprejudice....'Inthiscase,theHispanicdefendantchallengedaHispanicprospectivejuror.Onthefaceofitandthereisnothingintherecordtosuggestotherwisetherewouldseemnobasisforevenimplyingaracialreasonfor[thedefendant]notwanting[thechallengedperson]toserveonhisjury." Thecourtpointedoutthatmost,ifnotall,  +p&) caseswheretheburdenismet,thechallengedprospective ,`'* jurorisamemberofagroupwhosegeneralcharacteristicswouldseemtobeinconsistentwiththepositionofthepartymakingthechallenge. Betancourtv.State ,650So.2d  1021(Fla.3dDCA1995).Seealso Portuv.State ,651So.  2d791(Fla.3dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  3  )3  0 h Inthiscasethetrialcourterredinrefusingtoallowthe P  defendanttostrikeahispanicprospectivejurorbecausetherewasnobasisforevenimplyingthatthechallengewasraciallymotivated. Garciav.State ,655So.2d194(Fla.  p  3dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  4  )3  0 h Apartyobjectingtoaperemptorychallengemust @  demonstrateontherecordthatthechallengedjurorwasamemberof adistinctracialgroup. Coulterv.State ,657   So.2d2(Fla.3dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  5  )3  0 h AfterNeilinquiriesontwojurors,theprosecutorindicated  thatheintendedtochallengeanotherprospectivejuror.Thisexchangetookplace:"[DEFENSECOUNSEL]:I'dliketoquestionthatchoice,too,assumingsheisblack.[PROSECUTOR]:Idon'tbelievesheis.THECOURT:ItsaysHispanic.[PROSECUTOR]:IthinksheisactuallyIndian.***THECOURT:Hi.Whatisyournationality?[JUROR]:EastIndian.THECOURT:Okay.That'sallweneedtoknow.Thankyou.Sheisdefinitelynotarecognizedminority.She'sEastIndian.[DEFENSECOUNSEL]:EverybodyinTrinidadisblack.[PROSECUTOR]:Noteverybodybecausesheis,obviously,not.[DEFENSECOUNSEL]:ShemaybeIndian.THECOURT:Allright.She'sIndianbutI'mgoingtolethimstrikeherifthat'swhathewantstodo."OnappealtheCourtfoundnoabuseofdiscretion.InJohanstheCourt "  requiredaNeilinquirywhenanobjectionisraisedthata #! peremptorychallengeisbeingusedinadiscriminatorymanner. "However,atimelyobjectionanda % # demonstrationontherecordthatthechallengedpersonisamemberofadistinctracialgrouphaveconsistentlybeenheldtobenecessary."Thequestionofajuror's"membershipinacognizableclassisamatteroffact." In @)$' thiscasethedefensefailedtomakeatimelyobjectioninwhichitwasshownontherecordthatthechallengedjurorwas "amemberofacognizableclass."Windomv.State , ,`'* 656So.2d432(Fla.1995). h(#h(#    `       `  2  b  .3  0   Properprocedure . (#(#    `    2(  1  )3  0 h Itisnotsufficientforapartymerelytodemandraceneutral p reasonsforachallenge. Thepartymustingoodfaith `  objectonthegroundsthatthechallenge"'isbeingusedinaraciallydiscriminatorymanner.'" Betancourtv. @  State ,650So.2d1021(Fla.3dDCA1995).0 h(#h(#    `    2(  2  )3  0 h InJohanstheSupremeCourteliminatedthethreshold `  burdensetforthinNeil.InJohanstheCourtsaid"'a P  peremptorystrikewillbedeemedvalidunlessanobjectionismadethatthechallengeisbeingusedinaraciallydiscriminatorymanner. However,uponsuchobjections,   thetrialjudgemustconductaNeilinquiry...."    Melbournev.State ,655So.2d126(Fla.5thDCA1995).h(#h(#    `    2(  3  )3  0 h InthiscasethecourtdidaNeilinquiryeventhoughitwas  somewhat"freeform." "[T]heprosecutoranticipatedthe  questionbythejudgeand,withoutthejudgeactuallyaskingthequestion,proceededintothestate'sexplanationthatitsperemptorystrikewasnotraciallymotivated." Melbournev.State ,655So.2d126(Fla.5th @ DCA1995). h(#h(#    `       `  2  c  .3  0   Sufficiencyofreasonsforchallenge t.`(#(#     `    2(  1  )3  0 h Thefactthatajurorindicatedthat hewasaleaderandhad @ beentheforemanonanotherjury isaraceneutralreason. 0 Thisopinionshouldbeplacedinbenchbooksbecause it   containsausefullistofapprovedreasonsforchallenges.  !  Betancourtv.State ,650So.2d1021(Fla.3dDCA1995)." h(#h(#    `    2(  2  )3  0 h Thecourtrefusedtoallowthedefensetochallengea $" woman.Thefactthattheprospectivejuror workedasa % # paralegalatalawfirm wasagenderneutralreasonforthe p&!$ challenge. Santiagov.State ,652So.2d485(Fla.5th `'"% DCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  3  )3  0 h Inthiscasetheprosecutormerelyassertedthatshehadno 0*%( racialmotivation.Nevertheless,thecourtaffirmedonappeal. "[B]ecausethetrialcourtcanconsiderallthatit ,`'* hasseenandheard,inadditiontotheexplanationthatcomesdirectlyfromthemouthofthelawyerwhohasannouncedtheperemptorychallenge,reversalisnotrequired. Therecordshowedthenonracialmotive.This  caseinvolvedaDUIManslaughter.Thejuryinquestiontoldthecourtthathiswifehaddiedasaresultofalcoholism."Itispossible,ofcoursethat[thejuror]mighthavebeenunaffectedbyhispreviousmisfortune. Itismore @  likely,however,thathewouldeitherhavebeensympatheticto[thedefendant]becauseofherweaknessorhostiletoherbecauseofherconduct.Intheeventofeithersympathyorhostility,araceneutralreasonforthisstrikewasapparentontherecord."Melbournev. @  State ,655So.2d126(Fla.5thDCA1995).0 h(#h(#    `    2(  4  )3  0 h Thestatechallengedablackjuror.Theprosecutorgavetwo  reasonsforthechallenge:(1)whenthejurorwasaskedwhatshethoughtofthecriminaljusticesystemshe respondedby  merelystating,"Ifeelthesystemworks;" (2) the  prosecutorwantedtogetanotherjurorfartherbackonthepanel. Onappealthecourtfoundthe firstreasontobe p insufficient because:(1)theprosecutordidnotaskthe ` prospectivejurortogointoanydetailaboutherresponse;(2)otherjurors'responsestothequestionhadbeenequallybrief;(3)thatwastheonlyquestionaskeddirectlyofthechallengedjuror.Onappeal,thecourtfound thesecond  p reasontobeinvalidbecauseitwasincumbentontheprosecutortogivenonracialreasonsforchallengingtheblackjurorsratherthanthewhitejurorsinanefforttogettothepreferredjuror. Stroudv.State ,656So.2d 0 195(Fla.2dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `       `  2  d  .3  0   Remedy . " (#(#    `       ` 2  3  .3  0  Voirdire . $" (# (#     ` 2  4  .3  0  Juryselectionandmultiplejuries . p&!$ (# (#      ` 2  5  .3  0  Challengesforcause n. P(#& (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  "Whenprospectivejurorsexpressdoubtintheirabilityto 0*%( respectthedefendant'srighttoremainsilenteithertheprosecutororthejudge'mustmakesuretheprospectivejuror ,`'* canbeanimpartialmemberofthejury.'" Watsonv.State ,651  So.2d1159(Fla.1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Duringvoirdireaprospectivejurorindicatedthat:(1)itwould  concernherthatthedefensedidnotproveanythingbybringingwitnessesorevidencebecause thedefendantshouldhavethe `  opportunitytohavewitnessescomeinandtestifyforhim; (2)it P  wouldstillconcernherevenifthedefendanthadtheopportunity,butchosenottopresentevidence,becauseshewouldthinkthat he 0  wasnotbeingfairlyrepresented; (3)shecouldnotsaythatshe  p  wouldthinkinhermindthatthedefendantwasguiltyifhedidnotpresentevidencebecauseinhermindshethinksheisinnocentuntilprovenguilty;(4)shedidnotthinkshecouldacceptthefactthathedidnotpresentanyevidenceevenifshewastoldthattherewasarulethathedidnothavetodoso.Asecondprospectivejurorsaid:(1)inresponsetoaquestionaboutwhetherhewouldthinkthatthedefendantwasguiltyifhedidn'tpresentanything,"Youhavetopresentsomething;"(2) evenifhewastoldbythejudgethatthe  defensedidnothavetopresentanything,itwouldstillbotherhim;(3)hedidnotknowwhetherhecouldfollowthelawonthispoint. Challengesforcauseweredenied.OnappealtheCourt p affirmedbasedontheseconclusions:(1)astothefirstprospectivejuror,afairreadingofhercommentswasthatifthedefendant'slawyerdidnotcallanywitnesses, hewouldnotbegettingfair @ representation;(2)thefirstprospectivejurordidnotindicatethatshewouldfindthedefendantguiltyifhefailedtopresentanyevidence; (3)totheextentthatsomeofthefirstprospective ` juror'sanswerscouldbeconsidered ambiguous,thetrialjudge P wasclearlywithinhisdiscretiontodenythemotiontoexcuseforcause; (4)astothesecondprospectivejuror, thedefense 0 attorney'sobscurequestionsandtheshortvenireonthesubject,madeitdifficulttodeterminewhatcausedtheprospectivejurortosaythatifthedefendantfailedtoputonanyevidence,hedidnotknowwhetherhecouldfollowthelaw; (5)astothesecond #! prospectivejuror,hisresponseconcerninginabilitytofollowthelawwasnotthereasonforthechallenge,butratheritwasbasedonthefactthatthesecondprospectivejurorhadbenthevictimofaburglarythenightbeforethetrial;(6)astothesecondprospectivejuror, thefailuretospecificallyraisetheresponseconcerning P(#& inabilitytofollowthelawasgroundsforremoval,constitutedawaiver; (7)since,thedefendant,receivedoneadditional 0*%( peremptorychallenge,hewasnotentitledtoreversalunlessbothprospectivejurorswerebothimproperlyretained. Watsonv.State , ,`'* 651So.2d1159(Fla.1994). Specialnote: Thisdecisionis  interestingbecauseitcameonarehearinginthecase.Intheoriginalopinion, whichwaswithdrawn theCourtreversed,finding  thateachofthesechallengesshouldhavebeengrantedbecausetheresponsesofthejurors "show,atworst,aninabilitytoaccept[the p defendant's]righttoremainsilent,andatbestanambivalence." "ThisCourthaslongheldthatajuryshouldbe P  'composedofpersonswhosemindsarefreeofanypreconceivedopinionsofguiltorinnocenceofanaccused,personswhocaninfactgivetoanaccusedthefullbenefitofthepresumptionofinnocence....' Singerv.State,109So.2d7,23(Fla.1959).This `  goalisachievedwhenajurorcanrenderaverdictbasedsolelyonthecourt'sinstructionsandtheevidencepresentedattrial.... A @  jurorwhoisincapableofhonoringthismostbasicofdefendant'srightsshouldbeexcused'onmotionofaparty,orbythecourtonitsownmotion.'Singer,109So.2dat24."   Watsonv.State,19Fla.L.WeeklyS144(Fla.March24,1994).   (#(#    `     `  2  c  .3  0  Oneprospectivejurorhadbeenanemployeeofawitnessforeight  years.Thatwitnesswastheownerofthewarehousethedefendantwasaccusedofbreakinginto.Thepropspectivejurorhadpriorknowledgeofthecrime.Whenaskedwhetherhisconnectionwiththewarehouseownerwouldgivehimanydifficultinsittingasajurorandbeingfairandimpartial,hesaid, "Itshouldn't.Idon't 0 muchbelieveitwill." Itwaserrortodenyachallengeforcause.  p  Thejuror"didnotunequivocallystate,thetrialcourtdidnot ` explicitlyfind,andtherecorddoesnototherwiseestablishthat[thejuror]wasableto'renderaverdictontheevidenceandthelawgivenatthetrialfreeoftheinfluenceofhisopinionsandprejudices.'" Terryv.State ,651So.2d756(Fla.1stDCA   1995). (#(#    `  2  d  .3  0  Thefactthatprospectivejurorsknewthedefendantorhisfamily #! wasnotsufficientcauseforthetrialjudgetoremovetheprospectivejuroronhisorownmotion.Inthiscasesome,butnotall,oftheprospectivejurorswhoknewthedefendantwereautomaticallydismissed.Onappealthecourtdisapprovedthisprocedure. "We `'"% canfindnothingintherecordthatwouldraiseareasonabledoubtthatanyofthesefourvenirepersonsdeservedautomaticdisqualification,forcause,withoutfurtherinquirytoaddresseachone'sabilitytoreachanimpartialverdict." Judahv.State ,  +p&) 654So.2d994(Fla.1stDCA1995).,`'*(#(# Ї   `  2  e  .3  0  Thetrialcourtdidnoterrinfailingtoexcuseonejurorforcause.  Hewasaskedaconfusingquestionandhisanswerwassomewhatunclear,butitdidnotreflectthathewouldnotfollowthelaw. "Thefinalpartofthequestionaskedindicatedthatitwasa  crimetodrivewhileimpaired.hethenaskedif[thejuror]agreed.Thejuroragreedthatsuchwouldbeacrime.hedidnotdirectlyrespondto[theattorney's]firststatementthatdrivingafterdrinking,solongastherewasnoimpairment,wouldbelegal.{Thejuror]neverindicatedthathecouldnotorwouldnotfollowthelawasinstructedbythejudge." Thetrialjudgedid  p  noterrindenyingthechallenge.   Melbournev.State ,655So.2d `  126(Fla.5thDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  f  .3  0  Thedefendantwaschargedwithsexualassaultonaminorwhenthe 0  defendantknewhewasHIVpositive.Aprospectivejurorstatedinaquestionnairethat hewasunsurewhetherhecouldgive  defendantafairtrialbecauseofasexualmolestationexperienceofamemberofhisfamily. Achallengeforcausewasdenied.The  juror statedthathe"wouldfollowthecourt'sinstructions,but  hisotherresponsesonhisabilitytogiveafairtrialwereequivocal." Thecourtreversedtheconviction. "'Thetestforjuror p competencyis"whetherthejurorcanlayasideanybiasorprejudiceandrenderhis[orher]verdictsolelyupontheevidencepresentedandtheinstructionsonthelawgiventohim[orher]bythecourt."Thejurorshouldbeexcusedifthereisanyreasonabledoubtaboutthejuror'sabilitytorenderanimpartialverdict.'" [FromTurnerv.State,645So.2d444(Fla. ` 1994)] "'Thecompetencyofajurychallengedforcausepresents P amixedquestionoflawandfacttobedeterminedbythetrialcourt.Manifesterrormustbeshowntooverturnthetrialcourt'sfinding.'" Pereav.State ,657So.2d8(Fla.3dDCA   1995). (#(#    `  2  g  .3  0  "Thetestfordeterminingjurorcompetencyiswhetherthejurorcan #! layasideanybiasorprejudiceandrenderaverdictsolelyupontheevidencepresentedandtheinstructionsonthelawgivenbythecourt.Luskv.State,446So.2d1038,1041(Fla.),cert.denied, p&!$ 469U.S.873,105S.Ct.229,83L.Ed.2d158(1984).Inapplyingthistest, if'anyreasonabledoubtexistsastowhetherajuror P(#& possessesthestateofmindnecessarytorenderanimpartialrecommendationastopunishment,thejurormustbeexcusedforcause.' Hillv.State,477So.2d553,556(Fla.1985)." Bryant  +p&) v.State ,656So.2d426(Fla.1995).,`'*(#(# Ї   `  2  h  .3  0  Duringvoirdireinacapitalcaseseveraljurorsindicatedthatthey  stronglysupportedthedeathpenaltyandwerepredisposedtoimposeitifthedefendantwasconvicted.Uponquestioningbytheprosecutorthosejurorsstated "eitherthattheywouldfollowthe  court'sinstructionsorthattheywouldweightheaggravatingandmitigatingfactorstodeterminewhetherdeathwastheappropriatesentence." Forthatreasontherewasnoabuseof P  discretionindenyingchallengesforcause. Bryantv.State ,656 @  So.2d426(Fla.1995). (#(#    `  2  i  .3  0  "[T]herecordreflectsthatprospectivejurorPekkoladidnotpossess `  therequisiteimpartialstateofmind.Pekkolaindicatedthathewasastrongsupporterofthedeathpenalty,andbelievedthatifsomeoneisguiltyoffirstdegreemurdertheappropriatepenaltyisthedeathpenaltyandthatalifesentenceistoolenient. Although   Pekkolastatedthathecouldfollowthecourt'sinstructions,hisotherresponsesweresufficientlyequivocaltocasedoubtonthis.Thus,thecourterredindenyingBryant'schallengeforcauseofthisprospectivejuror." Bryantv.State ,656So.2d426(Fla.  1995). (#(#    `  2   j  .3  0  Thiscaseinvolvedacrimearisingfromanactofdomesticviolence. ` Thedefendantclaimedthatheactedinselfdefense.Thus,itwasthevictim'swordagainstthedefendant'sword.Duringvoirdireoneofthejurorsstatedthat:(1)hetendstofeelthatwomen"areperfectlyhonest;"(2)heismuchmoresympatheticandunderstandingofwomenandtendstobelievethem;(3)hewouldtendtogivethebenefitofthedoubttothewoman.Hewentintodetailaboutthereasonsforthispredisposition.Thetrialjudgerefusedtoexcusethisjurorforcause.Onappealthecourtreversed. "Whereajurordemonstratesastrongbiasfororagainstthe   credibilityofonesideoranother,whichheorsheisunsurecanbeputaside,achallengeforcauseshouldbegranted.Theunderlyingcommonprincipleisthat'ajurorisnotimpartialwhenonesidemustovercomeapreconceivedopinioninordertoprevail.'" Ifthereisa reasonabledoubtaboutajuror's % # impartiality thejurorshouldbedismissed.Inthiscasethejuror p&!$ indicatedastrongbiasinfavorofthewife.Althougheventuallyhedidstatethat"hethoughthewould'judgethefactsofthiscase'andthathedidnot'think'thathissympathieswouldaffecthisabilitytobefairandimpartial, heneverwithdrewfromhisstatementthat 0*%( hewouldgivethebenefitofthedoubttothewoman." Thisjuror  +p&) shouldhavebeenexcusedandthedefendantwasforcedtoexercise ,`'* aperemptorychallengeandtoacceptanotherjuror(i.e.aformerpoliceofficer)hewouldhaveotherwisechallenged. Davisv.State ,  656So.2d560(Fla.4thDCA1995). (#(#    ` 2   6  .3  0  Timeforandmatterofchallenges ~. (# (#     ` 2  7  .3  0  Juryinstructions&contact G.`  (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0   Standardinstructions .@ (#(#     `    2(  1  )3  0 h Thetrialjudgerefusedtoinstructthejurythat"'theState  p  mustprovebeyondareasonabledoubtthattheDefendantdidnotactinselfdefense.'"Insteadthejudgeinstructedthejury:"IfinyourconsiderationoftheissueofselfdefenseyouhaveareasonabledoubtonthequestionofwhetherortheDefendantwasjustifiedintheuseofforcelikelytocausedeathorgreatbodilyharm,youshouldfindtheDefendant,notguilty,However,iffromtheevidenceyouareconvincedthattheDefendantwasnotjustifiedintheuseofforcelikelytocausedeathorgreatbodilyharm,youshouldfindhimguiltyifalloftheelementshavebeenproven." Thiswasastandardinstruction.Therewasno p reasonablepossibilitythatthejurywouldbemisledastotheprosecutor'sburdenofproof. Bowenv.State ,655 P So.2d1208(Fla.4thDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  2  )3  0 h "[T]hestandardreasonabledoubtinstruction,readinits  p totality,'adequately'defines'reasonabledoubt'anddoesnotdilutethequantumofproofrequiredtomeetthereasonabledoubtstandard." Chiconev.State ,658So.2d @ 1007(Fla.5thDCA1994). h(#h(#    `  2  b  .3  0   Instructionsonelementsanddefenses ". !(#(#    `     `    2(  1  )3  0 h Inthiscasethedefendantdeniedbothexclusivepossession #! andknowledge.HewasentitledtoaninstructioninaccordancewithStatev.Dominguez,509So.2d917(Fla. % # 1987)(i.e.aDominguezinstruction).Thatisaninstruction p&!$ consistingofthisorcomparablelanguage: "TheStatemust `'"% provebeyondandtotheexclusionofeveryreasonabledoubtthatatthetimeofthetransactionthatthedefendantknewthesubstancewascocaine." Ifthejury 0*%( concludesthatthedefendanthadexclusivepossessionofthedrugs,itcaninferthatthedefendantknowinglypossessed ,`'* thecocaine.SuchevidencejustifiesaninstructiontothateffectbasedonGartrellv.State,626So.2d1364(Fla.  1993)(i.e.aGartrellinstruction), butwhereexclusive  possessioniscontroverted,thegivingofsuchaninstructiondoesnotexcusethefailuretogiveaDominguezinstruction. Johnsonv.State ,650So.2d89 `  (Fla.4thDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  2  )3  0 h Aninstructiononthedefenseofentrapmentshouldbe 0  deniedwhenthereisevidencetosupportthatdefense only  p  wherethedefendanthasdeniedunderoaththeactsconstitutingthecrimecharged. Santosv.State ,657So. P  2d1286(Fla.3dDCA1995). h(#h(#     `  2  c  .3  0   Lesserincludedinstructions *. (#(#     `    2(  1  )3  0 h Thedefendantwaschargedwithburglaryofanunoccupied  structure.Thejurywasinstructedonattemptedburglaryasacategory2permissivelesserincludedoffenseoverthedefendant'sobjection.Thejuryconvictedthedefendantofattemptedburglary.Onappealthecourtfoundthat itwas p errortoinstructonattemptedburglaryoverobjectionofthedefensebecauseitcarriedthesamepenaltyasthechargedoffenseofburglary. Thus,itwasnotalesser @ includedoffense.Thisopinionincludesexcellentdiscussionsofthesystemoflesserincludedoffensesandjurypardons.  p  Nursev.State ,658So.2d1074(Fla.3dDCA1995).`h(#h(#    `    2(  2  )3  0 h Adefendantmaybeconvictedofattemptedmanslaughterif @ thereisproofthatthedefendanthadthenecessaryintenttocommitanunlawfulact.Thereisnot,however,acrimeofattemptedmanslaughterbyculpablenegligenceanditconstitutesfundamentalerrortoinstructonsuchacrime. Reidv.State ,656So.2d191(Fla.1stDCA1995).#!h(#h(#    `    2(  3  )3  0 h Aggravatedbatteryisnotalesseroffensesubsumedbythe % # crimeofsexualbattery.Theyeachrequireanelementthattheotherdoesnot. Bradhamv.State ,657So.2d40(Fla. `'"% 1stDCA1995). h(#h(#    `       `  2  d  .3  0   Waiver 2.0*%((#(#  ̀    `  2  e  .3  0   Unusualinstructionsormodifications 3. ,`'*(#(# Ї   `    2(  1  )3  0 h ThedecisioninStatev.Weller,590So.2d923(Fla.1991)  doesnotrequirethatthejurybeinstructedastotheminimummandatorypenaltiesfortraffickingandconspiracytotrafficinvaryingamountsofcocaineorforthelesserincludedoffenses. Limosev.State ,656So.2d947(Fla. p 5thDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2(  2  )3  0 h Thetrialjudgecommittedfundamentalerrorbyinstructing @  that"theStatedoesnot,Irepeat,stress,emphasize,theStatedoesnothavetoconvinceyouthejurytoanabsolutecertaintyofthedefendant'sguilt.YoudonothavetobeonehundredpercentcertainoftheDefendant'sguiltinordertofindtheDefendantguilty." "[T]heindispensable @  reasonabledoubtstandard,acomponentofdueprocessoflawincriminalproceedingswasabridgedbythetrialjudge'sstatementthatcertitudewasnotrequired.Infact,theinstructionwastantamounttotellingthejurythatitcouldbaseaguiltyverdictonaprobabilityofguiltaslongasitwasremarkablystrongprobability.Thiskindofminimizationofthereasonabledoubtstandardviolatesthedueprocessclauseofthefederalandstateconstitutions." Jonesv.State ,656So.2d489 ` (Fla.4thDCA1995). h(#h(#    `  2  f  .3  0   Specialinstructions :.0(#(#     `    2(  1  )3  0 h Thetrialjudgecommittednoerrorinrefusingtogivean ` instructionondyingdeclarations. "Oncethejudgedecides P infavorofadmissibility,thestatementpassesintotherealmofthetrieroffacttodetermineweight,character,andcredibility,anditwouldbeerrorforthejudgetocommentonit." Coneyv.State, 653So.2d1009(Fla. ! 1995). h(#h(#    `       `  2  g  .3  0   Curativeandlimitinginstructions =.$"(#(#     `       ` 2  8  .3  0  Jurymisconductorproblems >. p&!$ (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Thejuryaskedthebailiffforatapeplayerandhehadgavethem P(#& one.Thetapeplayercontainedatapeofthedefendant'sstatement,partofwhichhadbeenfoundinadmissible.Thejurylistenedtotheentiretape.Onappealthecourtfoundthatthiswasreversibleerrorperse.ItviolatedRule3.410which "providesthatanyrequestby ,`'* adeliberatingjurycanbeactedononlyafternoticetotheprosecutingattorneyandtocounselforthedefendant.InIvory  v.State  ,351So.2d26,28(Fla.1977),thesupremecourtheld  thataviolationofrule3.410constitutespersereversibleerror."   Inthiscasethebailiffactedonhisownwithoutanycompliancewiththisrule.Furthermore, Rule3.400wasalsoviolatedbecause `  unauthorizedmaterialsweregiventothejury. Thiefaultv. P  State ,655So.2d1276(Fla.4thDCA1995).@ (#(#     ` 2  9  .3  0  Jurydeliberations 2D. p  (# (#     ` 2   10  .3  0  Juryverdict D. P  (# (#    2   B  .3  0 `  Presenceofdefendantandthejudge E. 0 ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 Duringjurydeliberations,thejuryaskedtohavethetestimonyofawitness  readback.Thecourthadthecourtreporterreadthetestimonyback,butthejudgewasdoingahearinginanadjoiningcourtroom.Thedefendantwasnotaskedaboutthisprocedure. Evenwheretheprosecutorandthe  defenseattorneyconsent,butthedefendantisnotpersonallyconsulted,"theabsenceofthetrialjudgeduringthesecommunicationstothejuryconstitutedfundamentalerror." Wallacev.State ,650So.2d95(Fla. ` 5thDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2  2  .3  0 Thedefendantclaimedthatthecourterredinconductingavoirdirebench 0 conferenceintheabsenceofhispresenceatthebench. "Thedefendant  p hasarighttobephysicallypresentattheimmediatesitewherepretrialjurorchallengesareexcercised....Wherethisisimpractical,suchaswhereabenchconferenceisrequired,thedefendantcanwaivethisrightandexerciseconstructivepresencethroughcounsel.Insucha 0 case,thecourtmustcertifythroughproperinquirythatthewaiverisknowing,intelligentandvoluntary.Alternatively,thedefendantcanratifystrikesmadeoutsidehispresencebyacquiescinginthestrikesaftertheyaremade....Again,thecourtmustcertifythedefendant'sapprovalofthestrikesthroughproperinquiry." Inthiscasethedefendantwas &!# notpresentduringabenchconferencewheresomechallengesweremadebasedonthepropectivejurorswillingnesstoimposethedeathpenalty.Therecorddidnotshowthathewaivedhispresenceorratifiedthestrikes.Thiswaserror,butitwasharmlessinthiscasebecausetherewasnoprejudicetothedefendant.Theremovals,whichwereforcause,involvedalegal +&( questiononwhichthedefendantwouldhavehadnobasisforinput. Coney  v.State ,653So.2d1009(Fla.1995). (# (#      ` 2  3  .3  0 Thedefendantwasnotpresentatabenchconference.InConeyv.State,  658So.2d622(Fla.1995),theCourtheldthatthetrialcourtmustobtain p  anexpresswaiverfromthedefendanthimselfoftherighttobepresent `  atsuchbenchconferences. Thatdecisiondidnotapplytothiscase P  becausethetrialtookplacebeforethatdecisionanditwasnotretroactive. @   Ogdenv.State ,658So.2d621(Fla.3dDCA1995).0  (# (#    ` 2  4  .3  0 Thetrialjudgewaspresentforquestioningoftheprospectivejurorsduring `  thevoirdire.Itwasconcludedpriortotheluncheonrecess.Threeprospectivejurorswereexcusedforcause.Thetrialjudgerecessedandtheremainingjurorsleftthecourtroom.Beforeleavingthecourtroomthejudgegavetheattorneysandthepartiestheoptionofremainingbehindtotrytoagreetoapanel.Theydidthatandweresuccessful.Thedefendantwaspresentandparticipatedinthatprocess.Subsequently,thedefendantclaimedtheprocedurewasimproperpursuanttoStatev.Singletary,549  So.2d996(Fla.1989).Thecourtdisagreed. "'[T]heexpediencyofjuror  selectionoutsidethepresenceofajudgemustyieldtojudicialsupervisionofallquestioningandtheexerciseofperemptorychallenges.' p (emphasisadded).Statev.Singletary,549So.2dat999.Thecourt's ` attendantreasonsforitsholdingweretoensuretheselectionofcompetentjurorswhowerefreeofbiasorprejudicefororagainsttheparties;precludeapartyfromexceedingtheboundsofproperexaminationofajurorormisstatingthelaw;andprecludeapartyfromexercisingperemptorychallengesinadiscriminatory." These ` principleswerenotviolatedundertheuniquecircumstancesofthiscase. Ortizv.State ,655So.2d1288(Fla.3dDCA1995).@ (# (#    ` 2  5  .3  0 "[A]defendantwhoabsentshimselfaftercommencmentofthetrial   depriveshimselfoftheopportunityoflearningofthesentencingdate,therebywaivingtherightnotonlytobepresentattrial,butalsotherighttobepresentatsentencing." Smithv.State ,655So.2d1271(Fla. #! 1stDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2  6  .3  0 Inafelonycasethetrialjudgestartedthetrialintheabsenceofthe p&!$ defendant.Hewastriedinabsentiaandwasconvictedofonecharge.On `'"% appealthecourtreversedbasedonRule3.180. "Totheextentthe P(#& defendantcan,duringthecourseoftrial,waiverightsundertheruleinfavorofthe'exercise[of]constructivepresencethroughcounsel...,thecourtmustcertifythroughproperinquirythatthewaiverisknowing,intelligentandvoluntary,'id.,exceptasprovidedinRule ,`'* 3.180(b)." Therecorddidnotestablish 'thatappellant'snonappearance  wasvoluntary." Thereisauthoritythatifthedefendantleavesduringa  trial,thereisapresumptionthathisorherdeparturewasvoluntary.Thatdoesnotapplyatthebeginningofthetrial. "While'[p]ersonsprosecuted  formisdemeanorsmay,attheirownrequest,byleaveofcourt,beexcusedfromattendance[attrial],'[Rule3.180]requiresthatthedefendantbepresentforthebeginningofafelonytrial." Jarrettv. P  State ,654So.2d973(Fla.1stDCA1995).@  (# (#    ` 2  7  .3  0 "Theexamination,challenging,impanellingandswearingofthejury  p  isanessentialstageofthetrialatwhichadefendanthasaconstitutionalrighttobepresent...."Thisrightmaybewaived.Martinezv.State ,655So.2d166(Fla.3dDCA1995).@  (# (#    ` 2  8  .3  0 Thejuryaskedtoseethetranscriptofapoliceofficer'stestimony   concerningthearrestofthedefendant.Thejudge,stateattorney,anddefenseattorneymetandtalkedabouttherequest.Theyagreedthattheofficer'stestimonywouldbereadbacktothejuryinitsentirety."Whendefensecounselnotedthat[thedefendant]wasnotpresent,thejudgerequestedthathebebroughtintothecourtroom.Thejudgealsoconductedacolloquyinwhichtheattorneysagreedthatthejudgeneednotbepresentduringthereadback.Therecorddoesnotindicatewhen[thedefendant]wasbroughtintothecourtroomorwhetherhewaspresentduringthecolloquy."Thejudgewasnotpresentduringthereadback.Onappealthecourtfoundthatthiswasfundamentalerror. "Waiverofthetrialjudge'spresence 0 cannotbeimpliedbecauseofadefendant'sfailuretomakeatimelyobjection....Althoughdefensecounselandthestateattorneyagreedtothejudge'sabsenceinthiscase,thedefendantBryantdidnotbecausehewasnotconsultedaboutthisprocedurebyhisattorneyorthetrialcourt.Thus,[thedefendant]didnotknowingly,intelligently,andvoluntarilywaivethetrialjudge'spresenceduringthereadback."Bryantv.State ,656So.2d426(Fla.1995).! (# (#    ` 2  9  .3  0 "Thetrialjudgemustbepresentduringthequestioningofprospective #! jurorsinacriminalcaseand thisrequirementcannotbewaivedby $" anyoneincludingthedefendant. Statev.Singleton,549So.2d996(Fla. % # 1989).Thejudge'spresencemaynotbewaivedwhenajurywishestocommunicatewiththecourtduringthecourseofitsdeliberations.Brown `'"% v.State,538So.2d833(Fla.1989)." Bryantv.State ,656So.2d426 P(#& (Fla.1995).  (# (#   2   C  .3  0 `  Presentationofevidence Gi.  +p&)` (#` (#  ,`'*    ` 2  1  .3  0 Jurorswereallowedtoaskquestionsofthewitnessesfollowingthis  procedure: "Thejurorswouldwritethequestiondown,giveittothe  judge,whowouldconsultwiththestateanddefenseattorneys,andifthequestionwasproper,thejudgewouldpresentittothewitness.""[T]hispracticehasbeencondonedaspermissibletrialprocedure.See p Shoultzv.State , 106So.2d424(Fla.1958);Ferrarav.State,101So.2d `  797(Fla.1958)." Watsonv.State ,651So.2d1159(Fla.1995).P  (# (#    ` 2  2  .3  0    "'[W]hereevidencetendsinanyway,evenindirectly,toestablisha 0  reasonabledoubtofdefendant'sguilt,itiserrortodenyitsadmission.'"    Parev.State ,656So.2d602(Fla.1stDCA1995).`  (# (#   2  D  .3  0 `  Competencyofwitnesses n. @ ` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 Indeterminingwhetherachildisacompetentwitnessthecourtshould   consider: (1)"whetherthechildiscapableofobservingandrecollecting  facts,(2)whetherthechildiscapableofnarratingthosefactstothecourtortoajury,and(3)whetherthechildhasamoralsenseoftheobligationtotellthetruth." Thecourtfoundthatthetrialjudgefailedto  makesufficientfindingstosupporttheconclusionthatthechildwascompetent. "Thechildfrequentlyfailedtorespondtoquestionsposed p duringthevoirdire.Herknowledgeofnumbers,datesandtimeperiodswaspoor.Whenaskedifsheknewwhatitmeanstotellalie,sheshookherheadfromsidetoside.Sheansweredthathermothertoldherthedifferencebetweentellingthetruthandalie,andthathermothertoldherwhattosayincourt." Kertellv.State ,649So.2d892  p (Fla.2dDCA1995).  (# (#    `    ` 2  2  .3  0 Thetrialjudgerefusedtoallowathreeyearoldchildtotestifyforthe @ defensethathesaw"twopeoples"comeinbecausetherewasevidencefromtheboysfather,awitnessandthechild'sdepositionthathedidnotknowthedifferencebetweenoneandtwoand"peoples"wasawordheusedtorefertoeveryone.OnappealtheCourtfoundnoabuseofdiscretion."Althoughingeneral'everypersoniscompetenttobeawitness,'section90.601,FloridaStatutes(1989), atrialjudgeis $" permittedtoexcludeawitnesswhenthatwitnessis'[i]ncapableofexpressinghimselfconcerningthematterinsuchamannerastobeunderstood.'90.603(1),Fla.Stat.(1989). InClintonv.State,53Fla. `'"% 98,43So.312,315(1907),thisCourtstated,'Whereitappearsthat...[awitness]hassufficientintelligencetoreceivejustimpressionsofthefactsrespectingwhichheistotestifyandsufficientcapacitytorelatethem 0*%( correctly...heshouldbeadmittedtotestify.'(Emphasisadded). Wefind  +p&) thatthetrialjudgedidnotabusehisdiscretioninfindingthatthechild ,`'* wasincompetenttotestifybecausehelackedthecapacitytocorrectlyrelatetheeventssurroundinghismother'smurder." Lowev.State ,650  So.2d969(Fla.1994).  (# (#    ` 2  3  .3  0 Thedefenseobjectedtothetestimonyofanineyearoldonthegroundsthat `  ithadnotbedeterminedwhetherthechildknewthedifferencebetweenthetruthandalie.Thejudgestatedthatanineyearoldispresumedtohavesuchknowledge.Onappealthecourtreversed. "Itisthetrialcourt'sduty 0  todeterminewhetherachildwitness'hassufficientmentalcapacityandsenseofmoralobligationfobecompetentasawitness.'Lloydv. `  State,524So.2d396,400(Fla.1988).Whenachild'scompetencyisat P  issue,thecourtmustdeterminewhetherthechildiscapableofobserving,recollecting,andnarratingfactsinadditiontowhetherthechildhasamoralsenseofthedutytotellthetruth." Theprosecutor   askedthechildwhetherthechildknewthedifferencebetweenthetruthandalie.Suchaquestiondoesnot "necessarilydemonstratethatthechild  hadamoralobligationtotellthetruth." Thetrialjudgeshouldmake   findings astothechild'scompetency. Z.P.v.State ,651So.2d213(Fla.  2dDCA1995).  (# (#    `   2  E  .3  0 `  ConfrontationandCrossexamination 1. `` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0 "Firmlyrootedexceptionstothehearsayruledonotviolatethe @ confrontationclause.SeeBourjailyv.UnitedStates,483U.S.171,181 0 84,107S.Ct.2775,278283,97L.Ed.2d144(1987)." Brownv.State ,  p 648So.2d268(Fla.4thDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2  2  .3  0 Thevictimtestifiedthatthedefendantfiredagun.Thetrialjudgerefused @ toallowthedefensetoquestionthevictimconcerninghisknowledgeoffirearmsonthegroundsthatitwasirrelevant.Onappealthecourtagreed.Suchquestioningcouldnot "'modify,supplement,contradict,rebutor ! makeclearthefacts.'" Hallv.State ,651So.2d217(Fla.3dDCA "  1995).  (# (#    ` 2  3  .3  0 "Whenawitnessusesawritingorotheritemtorefreshhismemorywhile % # testifying,anadversepartyisentitledtohavesuchwritingorotheritemproducedatthehearing,toinspectit,tocrossexaminethewitnessthereon,andtointroduceit,or,inthecaseofawriting,tointroducethoseportionswhichrelatetothetestimonyofthewitness,inevidence."90.613Fla.Stat.(1993). Thisprovisionappliestoadefendantwhotakesthestand. 0*%( Parev.State ,656So.2d602(Fla.1stDCA1995). +p&) (# (#    `  ,`'*      ` 2  4  .3  0 Seecasesunderhearsaysectiondealingwithchildabusecases.  (# (#    `   2  F  .3  0 `  RedirectandRebuttal . ` (#` (#   2  G  .3  0 `  Impropercomments Èp` (#` (#    ` 2  1  .3  0  Bythejudge u. P  (# (# ̀   ` 2  2  .3  0  Bytheprosecutorordefensecounsel +. 0  (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Thedefendantraisedthedefenseofvoluntaryintoxication.The `  defendanttestified,butcallednootherwitnesses.Theallegedoffensetookplacewherethedefendantandhismotherlived.Duringtheclosing, theprosecutormadecommentsonthefailure 0  oftheprosecutoranddefensetocallthemotherasawitness.    Thedefenseattorneyobjected,butthecourtoverruledtheobjectionbasedonthestate'sargumentthatitwasanticipatingthedefendant'sargument.Onappealthecourtfoundthatthiswaserror. "Generally,commentsbyaprosecutorinclosingthatthe  defendanthasfailedtocallawitnessarereversibleerror,astheymayleadthejurytobelievethatthedefendanthastheburdenofprovinghisinnocence....Thesupremecourthascarvedoutanarrowexceptionwithinwhichthestateispermittedtodrawanadverseinferencetoadefendantbasedonthedefendant'sfailuretocallawitness.Theexceptionapplieswhenthedefendantvoluntarilyassumessomeburdenofproofbyassertingadefensethatrequireshimtorelyonfactsthatcouldbeelicitedonlyfromawitnesswhoisnotequallyavailabletothestate....Whileaspecialrelationshipexisted...appellant'sdefensedidnotrelyonfactswhichcouldbeprovedonlyby[thedefendant's]mother.Theofficersatthescenewereabletotestifyregardingtheirimpressionsofhisintoxication.Therefore,evenifthemotherhadrelevantevidenceontheissueofthedefense,theappellantdidnotneedtorelysolely #! onhismother'stestimonytopresenthisdefense."  $ "  Batesv.State ,649So.2d908(Fla.4thDCA1995).%0!#(#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Indeterminingwhetheraprosecutor'sremarksduringclosing '#% requireanewtrial,thecourtshouldconsidertwothings. First, ($& whethertheywereimproper.Second,"whethertheyprejudiciallyaffectedthesubstantiverightsof[thedefendant]."  *%(  Statev.Compo ,651So.2d127(Fla.2dDCA1995).+&)(#(# Ї   `  2  c  .3  0  Ithadbeenestablishedthatadefensewitnesshadmadeaprior  inconsistentstatement.Inclosingtheprosecutortoldthejurythatitwasobviousthatsomebody"gotto"her.Onappealthestatearguedthatthiscouldbeinferredfromherinconsistentstatements.Thecourtfoundthatthiswasimproper. "Thefactthatawitness p isimpeachedmayimplythatthewitnessiflying,butitdoesnotimplythatsomeoneelsehasmadethewitnesschangeherstory.Theimplicationbytheprosecutorinthiscase...suggeststhatthedefensewasengagedintamperingwithawitnessandsuborningperjury,bothcriminaloffenses.Suchacommentishighlyirregular,impermissible,andprejudicial." Henryv. `  State ,651So.2d1267(Fla.4thDCA1995).P (#(#    `  2  d  .3  0  Itwasplainerrorfortheprosecutortoreadtothejuryduring 0  closingargument unpublishedportionsofthedepositionofa   witnesswhohadtestifiedatthetrial. Thedepositionhadbeen  usedtoimpeachthewitness,buttheportionthatwasreadhadnotbepublished. AJAv.State ,658So.2d1168(Fla.5thDCA1995).   (#(#    `  2  e  .3  0  Thedefendantwasaccusedofsellingdrugs.Duringclosingthe p prosecutorsaidthedefensecounselwillbringupdifferentthingsaboutstatementsthatweremade,"[b]utisthereanythingshowingthathedidn'tmakethatsale?Hewasthere." "Thiscommentwas @ impropernotonly[because]itcouldhavemisledthejuryontheburdenofproof...butalsobecauseitcouldhavebeeninterpretedbythejuryasacommentonthedefendant'sfailuretotestify."Sheltonv.State ,654So.2d1295(Fla.4thDCA P 1995). (#(#    ` 2  3  .3  0  Byawitness (.   (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Thedefendantwasaccusedofsellingdrugs.Duringcross "  examinationoftheofficerwhopurchasedthedrugs,thedefenseattorneybroughtoutthatthedefendantdidnothavethemoneyinhispossessionwhenhewasarrested.Onredirecttheofficerwasallowedtotestifyoverobjectionthat(1)inhisexperiencetheydonotalwaysrecoverthemoney;(2)inhisexperienceitwouldnotbeconsideredabnormalthatthemoneywasnotreceived;and(3)inhisexperiencetheydonotalwaysrecoverdrugsonundercoverarrests.Onappealthecourtfoundthatsuchtestimonywasinadmissibleandprejudicial. "'[E]verydefendanthastherighttobetriedbased  +p&) ontheevidenceagainsthim,notonthecharacteristicsor ,`'* conductofcertainclassesofcriminalsingeneral.Floridacourtshavefrequentlycriticizedtheuseoftestimonyfrompoliceofficersregardingtheirexperiencewithothercriminalsassubstantiveproofofaparticulardefendant'sguiltorinnocence***[I]twasalsoerrortoallowapoliceofficertotestifyasanexpertastoarelationshipbetweenpossessing$1,290incashanddealinginnarcotics.'"[fromLowderv.State,589So.2d P  933,935(Fla.3dDCA1991).]  Sheltonv.State ,654So.2d1295 @  (Fla.4thDCA1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  Aresponsebyanofficertoaquestioncallingforhisdescriptionof `  theactionsofthedefendantwhenhefirstsawthepolicecar,that basedonhisexperienceseeinghowpeoplereactaftertheyhave @  committedcrimeshecould... [theresponsewasinterrupted],but 0  neverthelessthecourtrecognizedthatsuchquestionsandanswersmayprejudicethedefendant'srighttoafairtrial.Inthiscasethetrialjudgegaveacurativeinstructionadvisingthejurytodisregardwhattheofficersaid.Thatwassufficientandamistrialwasnotrequired. Nubiolav.State ,655So.2d1255(Fla.3dDCA1995).(#(#    ` 2  4  .3  0  Invitederrororresponse . p (# (#    `  2  a  .3  0  Thedefendantraisedthedefenseofentrapmentduringopening P statementanditwasansignificantissuethroughoutthetrial.Thedefendantabandonedthisdefenseattheendofthetrial.Thetrialjudgedecidedtogiveaninstructiontothejuryexplainingentrapmentandtellingthemthatthedefensehadbeenwaived.Thejudgetoldtheprosecutorthatthestatecouldmentionbrieflywhatthejudgewouldsay.Duringclosingthestatediscussedentrapmentontwodifferentoccasionsmakingspecificreferencetothejuryinstructionthatthecourtwouldbegiving.Onthatbasisthecourtgrantedanewtrial.Onappealthecourtreversed. "Thestate's ! commentsfellintothecategoryof'invitedresponse.'Fundamentalnotionsoffairnessrequiredthatthestatebeallowedtocommentontheentrapmentissueraisedbythedefendant." Statev.Compo ,651So.2d127(Fla.2dDCA % # 1995). (#(#    `  2  b  .3  0  "Itiswellestablishedthatthestatecannotcommentona P(#& defendant'sfailuretoproduceevidencetorefuteanelementofthecrimebecausedoingsocoulderroneouslyleadthejurytobelievethatthedefendantcarriedtheburdenofintroducingevidence...." Itisalsouniversalthatcounselisaccordedawide ,`'* latitudeinmakingargumentstothejuryparticularlyinretaliationtopriorcommentsmadebyopposingcounsel.... Inreconciling  thesetwodictates,courtshaveheldthatwheredefensecounselcommentsuponthestate'sfailuretocallawitnesswhoisdemonstrablycompetentandavailable,areplybytheprosecutingattorneythatthedefensehasthesameabilitytoputonthewitnessdoesnotprejudicethedefendant'srighttoafairtrial." Inthiscasethedefenseattorney's explicitcomment onthe @  state'sfailuretocallwitnessesinvitedfairreplybytheprosecutortotheeffectthatthedefensehadthesamesubpoenapowerasthestate.Unfortunately,thestatedidnotendwithsuchcomment.Theprosecutorwentontotellthejury: "TheStatewouldsubmitto P  youthat[theinvolvedwitnesses]...couldtestifytonothingdifferentthanwasalreadytestifiedonthatstand.Everythingthatwassaidorcouldhavebeensaidbythemwassaidinthiscourtroom.Therefore,it'stheState'spositionthatthetestimonywasunnecessary." Thisexceededthescopeoffair  reply. "[T]hestatecannotgosofarastellingthejurythatthe  additionalwitnesseswouldcorroboratethestate'scase."Hazelwoodv.State ,658So.2d1241(Fla.4thDCA1995).(#(#    `    2  H  .3  0 `  Circumstantialevidence .`` (#` (#     ` 2  1  .3  0 Thedefendantwasanattorneywhowassentmoneybyoneindividual(i.e. @ buyer)tosendtoanotherindividual(i.e.seller)asadownpaymentonproperty.Thebuyerreceivedacallfromthesellerwhichcausedthebuyertobeconcernedaboutthedownpayment.Theattorneywaschargedwiththeftofthedownpayment.Attrialthedefendanttestifiedthathehadsentthedownpaymenttothesellerintheformofacashiercheck.Therewasnotestimonythatthesellerdidnotreceivethedownpayment.Therewasonlytestimonybythebuyerthathehadtogivetheselleranadditionalsumofmoneytoclosethesale.Thesellerdidnottestify.Onappealthecourtreversedtheconviction.Thecourtconcludedthatthetestimonyofthebuyerthathehadtopaytheselleradditionalmoneycouldbeinterpretedasindicatingthatthesellerneverreceivedallofthedownpayment,butthetestimony failedtoexcludeotherreasonablepossibilities. Forinstance % # itwasreasonablethatthesellerjustaskedformoremoney."Althoughthestatedoesnothavetorebutconclusivelyeverypossiblevariationofeventswhichcouldbeinferredfromtheevidence,thestatemustintroducecompetentevidencewhichisinconsistentwithdefendant'stheoryofevents." Inthiscasetherewasnoevidencetorebutthe 0*%( defendant'stestimonythathesentthecashiercheckand "therewasnoway  +p&) todeterminefromtheevidencewhetherthemoneywasmissingdueto ,`'* [thedefendant's]conductorduetootherreasonablepossibilities."    Helmv.State ,651So.2d142(Fla.2dDCA1995). (# (#      2  I  .3  0 `  Closingarguments . ` (#` (#    ` 2   1  .3  0 Seesectionaboveon impropercomments. `  (# (#   2   J  .3  0 `  Reductionofcharges . @ ` (#` (#    ` 2   1  .3  0 Thedefendantwaschargedwithaggravatedassault.Thedefendantmoved  p  foracquittalonthegroundsthatthetestimonywasthatthedefendanthadwavedagunintheair,butdidnotpointitatanyone.Thetrialjudgereducedthechargetoimproperexhibitionofafirearm.Thedefendantarguedthatthiswasapermissivelesserincludedoffenseandthechargecouldnotbereducedtosuchanoffense.OnappealthecourtaffirmedbasedonRule3.510(b). "Thisruleprovidesthat,wheretheevidence  maynotsupportthegreaterchargebutsupportsalesserincludedoffense,whethernecessarilyorpermissiblyincluded,thetrialcourtmayactonitsowninitiativeandreducethegreaterchargetothatchargewhichtheevidencevalidlysupports." Thetrialcourtacted  properlyonits owninitiative . Harrisv.State ,650So.2d210(Fla.3d p DCA1995).  (# (#   2   K  .3  0 `  Sufficiencyoftheevidence . @` (#` (#    ` 2   1  .3  0 Thedefendantwaschargedwithcrimesagainst"James"Neeley.Attrial  p thevictimwasnotcalledtotestify,butthearrestingofficersaidthecrimeshadbeencommittedagainst"Joseph"Neeley.Thedefendantwasconvicted.Noobjectionwasmadetothedifferenceinnames.Onappealthecourtfoundthat theconvictionconstitutedfundamentalerror. The 0 courtfoundnoevidencethat"Joseph"and"James"werethesameperson.Thedefendantwasconvictedofadifferentcrimethattheonecharged.Thiswasafatalvarianceandleftthedefendantatjeopardyforasecondconvictionforcommittingthesamecrime. "Ifweaffirmedthese #! convictionsandthevictim'snamewas,infact,Joseph,then[thedefendant]couldbeconvictedtwiceforthesameoffenses." Thecourt % # instructedthetrialcourttodischargethedefendantastothechargeinvolvingJamesNeeley. Jacobv.State ,651So.2d147(Fla.2dDCA `'"% 1995).  (# (#    2   L  .3  0 `  MotionsforJudgmentofAcquittal *. 0*%(` (#` (#   ,`'*  2   IX  .3  0   OFFENSES .(#(#   2   A  .3  0 `  Obstructingandopposing .` (#` (#       ` 2   1  .3  0  Legalduty [. p (# (#    `  2   a  .3  0  Therewassomedisputeastowhethertheinvolveddeputy's P  appointmentmightbeirregularbecausetheoathwasimproperlyadministered.Thiswasacasecertifiedfromcountycourt.Onappealthecourtfoundthatitwasunnecessarytoresolvetheissueastothevalidityoftheoathbecauseattheveryleastthedeputywasadefactoofficeratthetimeofthearrest. "Itisclearlyestablished P  thattheactsofofficersinthesecategoriesarevalidastothirdpersonsandthepublicuntiltheirtitletoofficeisjudiciallyadjudgedtobedefective." Farrellv.State ,650So.2d88(Fla.   4thDCA1995). (#(#    `  2   b  .3  0  Itisnoterrorforthecourt "toinstructajurythat'anarrestand  detentionconstitutesthelawfulexecutionofalegalduty,'"butitiserror"togivetheinstructioninacasespecificmanner,asitwasgivenhere,becausetheinstructionineffecttakesfromthejurytheissueofthevalidityofthearrest." Thatmeansitis ` impropertospecificallystatethatthenamedofficerwasengagedinalegaldutywhenheorshearrestedthenameddefendant. Kylev. @ State ,650So.2d127(Fla.4thDCA1995).0(#(#    `     `  2   c  .3  0  Seecasesonjuryinstructionsbelow.`(#(#      ` 2   2  .3  0  Defendant'sconduct.  @ (# (#     `  2   a  .3  0  Thedefendantwas"hogtied"sothattherewasnowayhecould   havecarriedoutanythreatagainstofficers,buthewasthreateningthemandgivingthemahardtime.Thedefendantwasconvictedofresistingarrestwithviolence.Onappealthecourtreversed.InScullockv.State,377So.2d682(Fla.1979),thecourtconcluded $" thatthestatutewasnotunconstitutionalbyprovidingthatthereisaviolationifthedefendantofferstodoviolencebecause that p&!$ requiresthatthedefendanthavethecapacitytoachievethethreatenedresult. Inthiscasethedefendantdidnothavethat P(#& capacity. Kirklandv.State ,647So.2d142(Fla.1stDCA1995).@)$'(#(#    `  2   b  .3  0  Wherethecourtfoundthatthedefendantwasnotlawfullyarrested  +p&) fordisorderlyconduct,hecouldnotbefoundguiltyofresistingthat ,`'* arrestwithoutviolencebecause hehadarighttoresistbytheuse  oflanguageandprotest(i.e.nonviolent). L.A.T.v.State ,650  So.2d214(Fla.3dDCA1995). (#(#    `  2   c  .3  0  Atrooperwascalledtothesceneofaminoraccident.Ashe p approached,hesawseveraljuvenilesaroundthecars.Thedefendantandtwootherjuvenilesranuponseeingthepolicecar.Thetroopercaughtthedefendantandarrestedhimforobstructingbecausethedefendanthadimpededhisinvestigation.Headmittedthathesaidnothingtothejuvenilesbeforetheyfledorwhiletheywererunning.Thedefendantwasfoundguiltyofresisting.Onappealthecourtreversed. "Tosupportaconvictionundersection P  843.02,thestatemustshow:(1)theofficerwasengagedinthelawfulexecutionofalegalduty;and(2)theactionbythedefendantconstitutedobstructionorresistanceofthatlawfulduty.Perryv.State,593So.2d1165,1166(Fla.1stDCA1992).  '[T]hecrimeofresistinganofficerwithoutviolencedidnottakeplaceifeither[theofficer]lackedanarticulablewellfounded  suspicionofcriminalactivitytojustifytheattempttodetain[thedefendant]orif[thedefendant]hadnoreasontobelievehe  wasgoingtobedetained.'Harrisv.State,647So.2d206,208 p (Fla.1stDCA1994)(emphasisinoriginal)." Inthiscasethestate ` lackedparticularandobjectivefactsestablishingareasonablesuspicionofcriminalactivity.Under316.066(3)(a)and316.061thetrooperwasobligatedtofileanaccidentreportforallaccidentsresultingindamagetoavehicle,butt hereisnorequirementthat  p witnessesstayatthesceneorreporttoinvestigatingofficers.  ` Therewasnocrime.Theonlyreasontheofficerchasedandarrestedthedefendantwasbecauseheranawayandthetrooperneededtocompletehisreport. "Flight,standingalone,doesnot 0 constituteobstructinganofficernordoesitgiverisetoawellfoundedsuspicionofcriminalactivity....Moreover,adefendant'smerepresenceatthesceneofacrimeandflight "  therefromisinsufficientevidence. Inthiscasethedefendant #! merelyfledfromthesceneofaminortrafficaccident,whichpresentsanevenmorecompellingreasonforfindingthattherewasnoreasonablesuspicion.Eveniftheofficerhadsuchasuspicion,the statefailedtoshowthatthedefendanthadanyreasonto `'"% believethathewasbeingdetained.Theofficerdidnotorderthedefendanttostopandthedefendanthadnoreasontobelievethathehaddonesomethingillegalforwhichhewouldbearrested. Thedefendantfledtoavoidconfrontationwiththeofficer  +p&) becausehewasafraidhewouldgetintroubleforskippingschool. ,`'*  Knowingthatthetrooperwantedtoquestionhimisinsufficient  tosustainaconvictionforresistingarrestwithoutviolence.    S.G.K.v.State ,657So.2d1246(Fla.1stDCA1995).(#(#    `       ` 2   3  .3  0  Juryinstructions E.p (# (#    2   B  .3  0 `  Contempt . P ` (#` (#    ` 2   1  .3  0 Thedefendantkickedthecourtroomdoorandthebailifftoldhimnottodo 0  that.Herespondedbysayingtothebailiff:"gofkyourself."Thejudgewaspresentandheardthecommentandconcludedthatthestatementwasdirectedonlyatthebailiff.Thetrialjudgefoundthedefendantguiltyofdirectcriminalcontempt.Theappellatecourtaffirmed. "Inourview,even @  thoughtheincidentoccurredtechnicallyoutsidethecourtroom,thescatologicallanguagedirectedatanofficerofthecourtinthedueexecutionofhisdutywasclearly'calculatedtolessen[thecourt's]authorityoritsdignity,'andwasthereforecontemptuous." Thecourt  noted: "Thiscasedoesnotinvolvetheperceivedproceduraldeficiency,  andwenotsharetheselftorturedreticencetoenforcethetrialcourt'scontemptauthoritywhichtogetherdrovethedecisioninSchenckv.  State,645So.2d71(Fla.4thDCA1994).Indeed,thiscourthasvery p recentlyPCA'dadeterminationthatdefendantwho,almostexactlylikeSchenck,said,'fkyou'asshewasleavingthecourtroom,wasincontempt.SeeBestv.State,648So.2d734(Fla.3dDCA1994)." The @ courtgaveseveralexamplesofconductfoundtobecontemptuousinotherjurisdictions:(1)defendantleavingcourtroommakingobscenegesturesandthreateningpoliceofficerwitness;(2)witnessgrittingteethandscowlingatprosecutorinthreateningmannerincourtroomandsaying,"I'llseeyouwhenyoucomedown;"(3)venirepersonusingvulgarlanguagetocourtreporterincourtroomwhilethejudgewasout;(4)individualstrikingtheprosecutorinthecorridorconstitutedindirectcriminalcontempt. R.C.v.   State ,648So.2d1258(Fla.3dDCA1995).! (# (#    ` 2   2  .3  0 Thetrialjudgeissuedanordertoshowcausetoanattorneywhyheshould #! notbeheldindirectcriminalcontemptfordisobeyingthetrialcourt'sorderprohibitingnegativeimpeachmententeredinanothercriminalcasetheattorneywastryingbeforethejudge.Thejudgefoundtheattorneyincontempt.Onappealthecourtreversed. "Withregardtoindirect `'"% criminalcontemptorders,wehaveheldthattheremustbeanorderwhichclearlyanddefinitelymakesapersonawareofthecourt'scommandanddirection....Moreover,theremustbeproofbeyondareasonabledoubtthattheindividualintendedtodisobeythecourt." In  +p&) thiscasethejudgesustainedaprosecutionobjectiontonegative ,`'* impeachment.Theattorneythenproposedonemorequestionandthejudgedeniedtherequest. "Thesetworulingsfailtoclearlyanddefinitelymake  [theattorney]awareofthecourt'scommandanddirection." Levinev.  State ,650So.2d666(Fla.4thDCA1995). (# (#    `      ` 2   3  .3  0 Thetrialjudgeproceededagainstanattorneybyissuinganordertoshow `  causewhysheshouldnotbeheldinindirectcriminalcontemptunderrule3.840forconductshowingdisrepectandcriticismofthecourt.Thejudge,whowasthechiefjudge,voluntarilydisqualifiedhimselfandassignedanotherjudgetohearthematter.TheattorneymovedtodisqualifythesecondjudgeonthegroundsthatthejudgetohearthematterhadtobeappointedbythechiefjusticeoftheFloridaSupremeCourt.Thesecondjudgedeniedthemotionfordisqualificationonthegroundsthattheappointmentbythechiefjusticeisnotrequiredwherethefirstjudge voluntarily disqualifieshimselforherself.TheattorneyfiledaPetitionfor   WritofProhibition.Thecourtgrantedthepetition. "Rule3.840(e)states:  'Ifthecontemptchargedinvolvesdisrespecttoorcriticismofajudge,thejudgeshalldisqualifyhimselforherselffrompresidingatthehearing.Anotherjudgeshallbedesignatedbythethechiefjusticeofthesupremecourt.'"Thevoluntarinessofthedisqualificationisnotrelevant.  Castrov.Luce ,650So.2d1067(Fla.2dDCA1995).p (# (#    ` 2   4  .3  0 Onappealthecourtruledthatthetrialjudgedidnoterrorinrefusingto P allowcounseltospeakforthedefendantinadirectcriminalcontemptproceeding. "Whiledueprocessrequirementsmaymandatearightto 0 counsel,thatrightisnotabsolute.'Thenarrowexceptiontothesedueprocessrequirementsincludesonlychargesofmisconductinopencourt,inthepresenceofthejudge,whichdisturbsthecourt'sbusiness,wherealloftheessentialelementsofthemisconductareundertheeyeofthecourt,areactuallyobservedbythecourt,andwhereimmediatepunishmentisessentialtoprevent"demoralizationofthecourt'sauthority***beforethepublic.'" Thecourtreferencedthedecisionin ! Saundersv.State,319So.2d118(Fla.1stDCA1975),whereinthecourt "  heldthattherewasnorighttocounselindirectcontemptproceedings. Roundtreev.State ,651So.2d1286(Fla.3dDCA1995).$" (# (#    ` 2   5  .3  0 Thedefendantwaschargedwithwillfulcontemptofcourtforviolatinga p&!$ domesticviolationinjunctionbyshakinghisgirlfriend'sapartmentdoorandrattlingherdoorknob.Thedefendanttriedtointroduceatranscriptofaproceedinginfrontofanotherjudgeinanothercase,wherethedefendantwasorderedintothecustodyofthegirlfriend,withherconsent.Thetrialjudgeruledthatthetranscriptwasnotrelevant.Onappealthecourtreversed. "Relevantevidenceis'evidencetendingtoproveordisprove ,`'* amaterialfact.'90.401Fla.Stat.(1993).Heretheallegationofindirectcriminalcontemptrequiresthewillfulviolationofacourtorder....Intentnecessarilyisanessentialelementofcontempt...."   Clearlythetranscriptwasrelevanttothedefendant'sintenttoviolatetheinjunction. Wellv.State ,654So.2d146(Fla.3dDCA1995).p (# (#    ` 2   6  .3  0 Itis fundamentalerror tofindadefendantguiltyofindirectcriminal P  contemptwherethemotionforanordertoshowcause wasneithersworn @  tonorsupportedbyanaffidavit. Judkinsv.Ross ,658So.2d658(Fla. 0  1stDCA1995).Seealso Lindmanv.Ellis ,658So.2d632(Fla.2dDCA  p  1995).  (# (#    ` 2   7  .3  0 "[C]ourtshaveinherentandstatutorycontemptpowertopunishfor @  violationofavalidcourtorder....Theauthoritytopunishforcontemptlieswiththecourtcontemned." Wellsv.State ,654So.2d145   (Fla.3dDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2   8  .3  0 ThetrialjudgeerredandfailedtocomplywithRule3.840(f),inanindirect  criminalcontemptcase,bysimplystatinginitsorderthatthedefendanthadwillfullyviolatedatemporaryinjunction,whichprohibitedthepartiesfromdischargingfirearmsineachother'spresence.Therulerequires "a'recital p ofthefactsconstitutingthecontemptofwhichthedefendanthasbeenfoundandadjudicatedguilty.'"  Judkinsv.Ross ,658So.2d658(Fla. P 1stDCA1995).Seealso Lindmanv.Ellis ,658So.2d632(Fla.2dDCA @ 1995).  (# (#    ` 2   9  .3  0 The differencebetweencivilcontemptandcriminalcontemptisthatthe ` fineimposedinthefirstcaseisasanctiontocoercecomplianceortocompensateapartyforactualdamages,whereasinthelattercase,thefineisimposedasapunishment. Whereafineisimposedandthereisno 0 remedialactionavailable,anyrequirementforfutureaction,efforttocoerce,orindicationthatthefinewasrelatedtoanydamagessufferedbyaparty,thecontemptiscriminal. Lindmanv.Ellis ,658So.2d632(Fla. "  2dDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2    10  .3  0 Thesentenceforanindirectcriminalcontemptmustbeannouncedinopen % # courtandthefinemaynotexceedtheamountsspecifiedin775.02. Lindmanv.Ellis ,658So.2d632(Fla.2dDCA1995).`'"% (# (#    ` 2    11  .3  0 Thedefendantwasconvictedofindirectcriminalcontemptforviolatinga @)$' domesticviolenceinjunction.Thejudgedeniedthedefendant'srequestforajurytrialandconductedabenchtrial.Thedefendantwasconvicted.Hewassentencedtooneyearonprobationandserved60daysinjail.The ,`'* defendantmaintainsthatthetrialjudgeerredindenyingajurytrial.Thecourtfoundthattherewasnoerror. "Thedenialofarequestforajury  trialinacontemptproceedinglimitsthemaximumtermofimprisonmenttosixmonthsonafindingofguilt." Sincethedefendant  onlyserved60daysinjail,soajurytrialwasnotrequired.   Wellsv.State , p 654So.2d146(Fla.3dDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2    12  .3  0 Thedefendantwassentencedtooneyearofprobationand60daysinjail @  onanindirectcriminalcontempt.Hewasdeniedajurytrial. "[E]ven 0  though[thedefendant's]sentenceinvolvedaoneyearprobationaryterm,histotalmaximumtermofimprisonmentwouldstillbesixmonthsevenonaprobationviolation." Wellsv.State ,654So.2d146 P  (Fla.3dDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2    13  .3  0 Thechiefjudgeenteredanadministrativeorderstatingthatthecountycourt   willhearallcontemptsarisingfromaviolationofadomesticviolenceinjunction.Acircuitjudgefoundthedefendantinindirectcriminalcontemptforviolatingadomesticeviolenceinjunction.Thedefendantarguedthatbyvirtueoftheadministrativeorderthecircuitcourtlackedjurisdictiontofindhimincontempt.OnappealtheCourtdisagreed. "An  administrativeordercannotalterthejurisdiction"ofacourt."Additionally,courtshaveinherentandstatutorycontemptpowertopunishforviolationofavalidcourtorder....Theauthoritytopunishforcontemptlieswiththecourtcontemned." Wellsv.State ,654So.2d @ 145(Fla.3dDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2    14  .3  0 "Itwouldbearareoccasionwhenatrialjudgecouldsummarilypunish ` contemptcommittedbyperjury." "'[T]hemerefactthatthecourt P believesonewitnessoveranotherisinsufficienttoestablishjudicialknowledgethatawitness'testimonyisfalseforthepurposeofsummarilyadjudicatingthewitnessindirectcriminalcontempt....Ordinarily,underourconstitutionallymandatedsystemofdueprocess,criminalsanctionscannotbeimposedunlessthefullpanoplyofdueprocessrightareapplied.Thatiswhy,intheordinarysituationwhereperjuryissuspected,astateprosecutionforperjuryisthepreferredalternative.'" Newryv.State ,654So.2d1292(Fla.4thDCA1995).% # (# (#    `   2   C  .3  0 `  LoiteringandProwling .`'"%` (#` (#     ` 2   1  .3  0 Adeputyhad probablecausetoarrestthedefendantforloiteringand @)$' prowling underthesecircumstances:(1)thedeputysawthedefendantin 0*%( ahighcrimenarcoticsareaat1:05a.m.;(2)thedeputyknewthedefendantdidnotliveinthearea;(3)theresidentsoftheduplexwherethishappened ,`'* hadcontractswiththeHousingAuthoritywhichspecificallyforbadguestsinanuntimelymanner;(4)notrespassingsignswerealsopostedintheareaanddeputieshadbeenaskedbytheHousingAuthoritytoinvestigatepotentialviolators;(5)thedefendantwasgivenanopportunitytodispeltheofficer'salarmasrequiredby856.021(2),buthegaveinconsistentexplanationsforbeingintheareawhichthedeputyknewtobefalse.Thus,theofficerhadprobablecauseforthearrestandthesubsequentsearchofthedefendant'spersonincidentaltothatarrestwaslawful. Statev. @  Lookretis ,657So.2d1237(Fla.2dDCA1995).0  (# (#    ` 2   2  .3  0 "Inordertosustainaconvictionforloiteringandprowlingundersection `  856.021theremustbeproofthat: (1)thedefendantloiteredorprowled P  inaplace,atatime,orinamannernotusualforlawabidingindividuals;and(2)suchloiteringandprowlingwereundercircumstancesthatwarrantedajustifiableandreasonablealarmorimmediateconcernforthesafetyofpersonsorpropertyinthevicinity....Priortoanyarrest,thedefendantmustbeaffordedanopportunitytodispelanyalarmorimmediateconcernbyidentifyinghimselfandexplaininghispresenceandconduct....Alarmispresumedunderthestatuteif,whenalawofficerappears,thedefendantflees,concealshimselforanyobject,orrefusestoidentifyhimself." Inthis p caseMr.Wrightwasawakenedat2:00a.m.byhiswifewhosaidthatthereweretwomalesintheirsideyard.Mr.Wrightsawtheboyswalkingonasidewalkthatranalongthefrontofthehouse.Hesubsequentlycaughtthedefendantbecausehewasconcernedaboutbicyclesthatwerekeptintheyard.ThedefendanttoldMr.Wrightthathewaslookingatthebicyclesbecausehethoughtoneofthembelongedtoafriendwhosebikehadbeenstolen.AnofficerarrivedattheWrights'homeinresponsetoacallfromthewife.Thedefendanttoldtheofficerthatwhenhelearnedthatthebikewasnothisfriend'shewasonhiswayhome.Thedefendantwasconvicted.Onappealthecourtreversed.NeitherMr.orMrsWrightsaidthattheysawthedefendantintheiryardandhedeniedthathedidso.Mrs.Wrighttestifiedthatnothinghadbeentakenfromtheyard. "Furthermore,the "  factthatappellantwaswalkingonthesidewalkinfrontoftheWrights'houseat2:00a.m.isinitselflegallyinsufficientevidenceofloiteringandprowling....TheappellantexplainedhispresencetotheWrightsandtoOfficerLowe,althoughtheappellantranfromMr.Wright,hedidnotfleefromtheofficer,failtoidentifyhimself,orconcealanyobject." Theevidencewasinsufficient. W.A.E.v.State ,654 P(#& So.2d193(Fla.2dDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2   3  .3  0 "Inordertosustainaconvictionforloiteringandprowlingundersection  +p&) 856.021theremustbeproofthat: (1)thedefendantloiteredorprowled ,`'* inaplace,atatime,orinamannernotusualforlawabidingindividuals;and(2)suchloiteringandprowlingwereundercircumstancesthatwarrantedajustifiableandreasonablealarmorimmediateconcernforthesafetyofpersonsorpropertyinthevicinity....Priortoanyarrest,thedefendantmustbeaffordedanopportunitytodispelanyalarmorimmediateconcernbyidentifyinghimselfandexplaininghispresenceandconduct....Alarmispresumedunderthestatuteif,whenalawofficerappears,thedefendantflees,concealshimselforanyobject,orrefusestoidentifyhimself." Inthis 0  caseMr.Wrightwasawakenedat2:00a.m.byhiswifewhosaidthatthereweretwomalesintheirsideyard.Mr.Wrightsawtheboyswalkingonasidewalkthatranalongthefrontofthehouse.Hesubsequentlycaughtthedefendantbecausehewasconcernedaboutbicyclesthatwerekeptintheyard.ThedefendanttoldMr.Wrightthathewaslookingatthebicyclesbecausehethoughtoneofthembelongedtoafriendwhosebikehadbeenstolen.AnofficerarrivedattheWrights'homeinresponsetoacallfromthewife.Thedefendanttoldtheofficerthatwhenhelearnedthatthebikewasnothisfriend'shewasonhiswayhome.Thedefendantwasconvicted.Onappealthecourtreversed.NeitherMr.orMrsWrightsaidthattheysawthedefendantintheiryardandhedeniedthathedidso.Mrs.Wrighttestifiedthatnothinghadbeentakenfromtheyard. "Furthermore,the p factthatappellantwaswalkingonthesidewalkinfrontoftheWrights'houseat2:00a.m.isinitselflTheconstitutionalrighttoprivacydoesnotrenderunconstitutionalthoseportionsof800.04and794.041providingthatconsentisnotadefensetoaprosecutionforsexualactivitywithaminorundertheageof16. Casadov.State ,648  p So.2d714(Fla.1995).  (# (#     2   D  .3  0 ` Disorderlyconduct. @` (#` (#    ` 2   1  .3  0 Thedefendantwasoneofagroupofjuvenileslocatedinamall.Officers   hadbeensenttotheareaonareportthatthejuvenileshadrefusedtoleavearestaurantlocatedinthemall.Aftertheofficersinterviewedthemthejuvenilesenteredanearbysupermarket.Afterfurtherinvestigation,theofficersarrestedoneofthedefendant'sfriendsinsidethesupermarket.ThedefendantandanotheryouthbegantoscreamaboutpolicebrutalityandhowthiswasliketheRodneyKingcase.Agroupoftwentytotwentyfivepeoplegatheredaround.Thejuvenilescontinuedtoscream.Theyusedalotoffoullanguage,butmaintainedtheiroriginaltheme.Anofficerrepeatedlytoldthedefendanttocalmdownandthatifhefailedtocalmdownhewouldbearrested. "Theykeptscreamingandholleringand 0*%( wouldn'tgiveusanopportunitytoexplainwhatthesituationwas." The  +p&) defendantwasarrestedfordisorderlyandwasfoundguilty.Hisconviction ,`'* wasreversedonthegroundsthathewas "punishedsimplyforasserting  hisrighttofreespeechinwhatthepoliceconsideredandwhatmaywellhavebeenanoffensivemanner.Buttheconstitutiondoesnotpermitthatresult...'[t]hefreedomofindividualstoverballyopposeorchallengepoliceactionwithouttheirriskingarrestisoneoftheprinciplecharacteristicsbywhichwedistinguishafreenationfromapolicestate.'" Thecourtfoundthatthelanguagedidnotconsistof fighting P  words,whichwouldbeanexception,becausethedefendantdidnoturgethecrowdtodoanythingnordidthecrowdtakeanyaction.Thedefendantdidnotdisturbanyoneorcauseanyonetointerferewiththearrestorotherwisebreachthepeace. Theopinioncontainsanlistof `  othercasesdealingwithsimilarsituations. L.A.T.v.State ,650So.2d P  214(Fla.3dDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2   2  .3  0 Anofficerwasworkinganoffdutyjobatanapartmentcomplexwherethe   defendant(ajuvenile)livedwithherfamily.Theofficerhadnotseenthedefendantonthepremisesbefore.Heaskedhertoidentifyherselfandwhyshewasthere. "Whentheofficerasked...hernameandifshelivedon  theproperty,sherespondedwithabusiveandprofanelanguage." He  toldhertoleavethepremises.Shedid,butshequicklyreturned.Theofficerstoppedheranddemandedthatshegivehernamebeforereenteringtheproperty.Thedefendantrespondedwithmoreprofanity.Whenthedefendanttriedtoreentertheplace,hegrabbedthedefendant'sarmandshesnatchedaway.Therewasastruggleduringwhichthedefendantyelledprofanelanguage.Theofficersaidthedefendantgotlouderandlouder,untileveryoneinthenearbylaundrycameout,andpassersbystoppedtowatch.Thetrialcourtfoundthedefendantguiltyofbreachofthepeace.Onappealthecourtreversedbecausethechild'slanguagewasprotectedbytheFirstAmendment. "Thereisnothingintherecordwhichindicatesthat @ thechild'sloudlanguageinflictedinjuryortendedtoinciteaviolentresponseamongstanyofthespectators.Although[thedefendant's]languagewasfrustratingandannoyingtotheofficer,therewasnoevidencethatherscreamingwasofsuchnatureastoinciteanyoneintheareatoanimmediatebreachofthepeace." B.R.v.State ,657So. #! 2d1184(Fla.1stDCA1995).  (# (#    ` 2   3  .3  0 Seealsocasebelowunder"Alcoholrelatedoffensesnotinvolvingdriving."p&!$ (# (#   2   E  .3  0 `  Alcoholrelatedoffensesnotinvolvingdriving 8@.  P(#& Ѐ ` (#` (#    ` 2   1  .3  0 856.015,Fla.Stat.(1993),isnotunconstitutionallyvague.Itisthe 0*%(  "openhouseparty"statute. Thestatemustprovethefollowingelements:  +p&) (1)anadultincontrolofthepremisesknowinglypermittedasocial ,`'* gathering;(2)theconsumptionorpossessionofalcoholicbeveragesorcontrolledsubstancebyminorstookplaceduringthegathering;(3)theadulthadactualknowledgeofthatactivity;(4)theadultallowedthepartytocontinueandfailedtomakeanyreasonableefforttopreventtheconsumptionorpossession. "Inessence,theStatehastheheavyburden p ofprovingbeyondareasonabledoubtthattheadultinchargestoodbyanddidnothinginthefaceoftheadult'sactualknowledgeofthe P  minor'sconsumptionorpossessionofalcoholorcontrolledsubstances."Statev.Manfredonia ,649So.2d1388(Fla.1995).0  (# (#    `   2   F  .3  0 `  Escape E.` ` (#` (#    2   G  .3  0 `  DUI&BUI. MF  0 ` (#` (#    ` 2   1  .3  0  Elements G.  (# (#    ` 2   2  .3  0  Admissibilityofchemicaltestsresults G. (# (#    `  2   a  .3  0   Natureoftest H. (#(#     `  2   b  .3  0   Basisforprobablecause [I. `(#(#    `    2 (  1  )3  0 h Seebelow.@h(#h(#     `  2   c  .3  0   Validityofthestop J.  p(#(#    `    2 (  1  )3  0 h Thesecaseswouldalsoapplytootherformsofevidence.Ph(#h(#    `    2 (  2  )3  0 h Seecasesundersearch&seizure.0h(#h(#    `  2   d  .3  0   Sufficiencyofregulations (M. !(#(#     `  2   e  .3  0   Compliancewithregulations M. #!(#(#    `    2 (  1  )3  0 h 316.1934(5),providingforuseofaffidavittoestablish % # predicate doesnotviolatetheconfrontationclauseofthe p&!$ federalandFloridaconstitutions,nordoesitimproperlyshifttheburdenofprooftothedefense. Gehrmannv. P(#& State ,650So.2d1021(Fla.4thDCA1995).@)$'h(#h(#    `       `  2   f  .3  0   Forcibleextractionunderimpliedconsentlaw P.,`'*(#(#     `    2 (  1  )3  0 h Theofficerhadprobablecausetoorderabloodtest  under316.1933(1) basedonthesefacts:(1)the  defendant'svehiclewasaboutsixfeetacrossthecenterlineatthetimeofimpact;(2)therewasanopencontainerofliquorinthevehicle;(3)therewasanicechestandbeercanslyingaroundthevehicle;(4)theotherdriverhadsufferedseriousbodilyinjury.Despiteconflictingevidenceastowhetherthedefendant'sbreathsmelledofalcohol,thestatedfactsweresufficienttoestablishprobablecausetobelievethatthedefendantwasundertheinfluenceofalcoholicbeveragesatthetimeoftheaccidentandcausedthedeathorseriousbodilyinjuryofahumanbeing. Thisis @  particularlyimportantsincethisinvolvedreversalofatrialjudge'sfindingthattherewasnoprobablecause.     Statev.Durden ,655So.2d215(Fla.1stDCA1995).h(#h(#    `       `  2   g  .3  0   AlternativetoImpliedConsentLaw hV. (#(#    `    2 (  1  )3  0 h UndertheU.S.Constitutionabloodsamplecanbe  withdrawnifanofficerhasprobablecausetoarrestthedefendantforDUIandthesampleisextractedinareasonablefashion.Thestateshavearighttoextentgreaterprotectionstotheircitizens.TheStateofFloridahaschosentodoso.TheImpliedConsentLawextendsgreaterprotection. Ifapoliceofficerhasprobablecausetoarrest  p thedefendant,whoisconscious,forDUI,afteranaccidentinwhichthereisnoseriousbodilyinjuryanditisnototherwiseimpracticalorimpossibletosecureabreathtest,theofficermaynotrequirethatthedefendantprovideabloodsample. Inthiscasetheofficer   toldthedefendantthathislicensewouldbesuspendedifhedidnotprovidethatsample.Thatwasnotauthorizedbythestatuteandmadeanyconsentinvoluntary.Thisisaverylongopinionthatshouldbecarefullyread. Statev.Slaney , $" 653So.2d422(Fla.3dDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2 (  2  )3  0 h TheStatesoughttheproductionofdefendant'smedical `'"% recordsbysubpoena.Thestategavethenoticerequiredby27.04. "Inarecentcaseonallfours,theFifthDistrict @)$' concludedthatthestatecansubpoenathosemedicalrecordssolongasthepatientisgivennoticebeforethesubpoenaisissuedand,ifthepatientobjects,thestate ,`'* carriesitsbrudenofshowingtherelevanceoftherecordstoitscriminalinvestigation.Hunterv.State,639So.2d  72(Fla.5thDCA1994).WeagreewithHunter..."  Usseryv.State ,654So.2d561(Fla.4thDCA1995).h(#h(#    `       `  2   h  .3  0   Preservationofevidence __.` (#(#     `    2 (  1  )3  0 h ThedefendantwasarrestedforDUIandwasaskedtotake @  abreathtest.Hewantedabloodtestinstead.Theofficeradvisedthatabloodtestwasnotprovidedforbythestate,hehadtoeithertakethebreathtestorrefuse,andhecouldarrangeforabloodtestafterprocessingandbooking.Aphonewasavailable.Thedefendanttookthebreathtestanddidnotrepeathisrequestforabloodtest.Amotiontosuppressthebreathtestresults,basedontheallegeddenialofhisrequestforabloodtest,wasdenied.Thetrialjudgefoundthatthedefendantwasnotdeniedtheopportunitytoobtainanindependentbloodtestandthatofficersdonothaveanaffirmativedutytoensurethatanindependentbloodtestisprovided.Thecircuitcourtreversed.Itruledthatthereisaconflictbetween316.1932(1)(f)3,whichprovidesfortheindependenttest,and311.193(9),whichrequiresthatapersonarrestedforDUIremainincustodyuntilthepersonisnolongerundertheinfluence,hasabloodalcoholleveloflessthan0.05%oreighthourshaselapsedfromthetimeofthearrest.Thecircuitcourtconcludedthat,sincetheaccusedhadtoremainincustodyforaperiodoftimethatwoulddestroythemeaninfulnessofanybloodtest,officershadanaffirmativedutytotakehimtoatestingfacilitytosecurethebloodtest.TheDistrictCourtreversedthedecisionofthecircuitcourt.TheCourtstatedthatthecountyjudge'sfindingthattheofficerhadnotdeniedthedefendantanopportunitytosecureabloodtestwaspresumptivelycorrectandthecircuitcourthadmisinterpreted316.1932(1)(f)3.Byvirtueofacceptingtheprivilegetodrive,thedefendanthadagreedtosubmittothebreathtestandwasrequiredtodoso.Therewasnoclaimthatthebreathtesthadbeeninaccurate.Sincedrivingisaprivilegeandnotaright,thestatehasthepowertoimposesuchrestrictionsontheexerciseoftheprivilege.Thefailuretosecureanindependentbloodtestdoesnotaffectthatdutyortheaccuracyofthebreathtest. Theissueiswhetherlaw  +p&) enforcementhasanaffirmativedutytoassista ,`'* defendantinobtaininganindependentbloodtestorwhetherthedutyislimitedtonotinterferingwiththedefendant'sattemptstoobtainthebloodtest. Whilethe  statutedoespermitsuchatest, itisinadditiontothetest  requiredbythestate. Pursuantto316.1932(1)(f)3,ifthe p defendantfailstoarrangethetestorisunabletohaveitperformed,thatdoesnotaffecttheadmissibilityofthetestrequiredbythestate.TheCourtagreedwiththeconclusioninStatev.Saylor,625So.2d907(Fla.2dDCA1993),that 0  316.1932(1)(f)3doesnotconferanewdiscoveryrightonthedefendant.Toholdotherwisewouldresultinofficersbeingoutofserviceforthetimenecessarytotransportarresteesandtosecuresamples.Itmightalsorequirepaymentforthetestingprocedurebythestateforindigentindividuals.TheDistrictCourtconcludedthatthiscouldnothavebeentheintentofthelegislatureandthereis no  affirmativedutytoassistadefendantinobtaininganindependentbloodtest.Thedutyislimitedtonotinterferingwiththedefendant'sattemptstoobtainthebloodtest. TheDistrictCourtfounditsearlierdecisionin  Statev.Durkee,584So.2d1080(Fla.5thDCA),cause p dismissed,592So.2d682(Fla.1991),distinguishable ` becausethereofficersrefusedtherequestsoftwoarrestedpersonsforanopportunitytohavetheirbloodtestedbyanindependentexamineranddeniedthattheyhadsucharight. 0  Thus,therewasactivewrongdoingbyofficersin  p refusingtoallowanindependenttestthatjustifiedsuppression;whereasinUnruh'scaseofficersneverrefusedtheopportunitytocallandarrangeforanindependenttest. Theysimplystatedtheywouldnot 0 providetransportationormakearrangementsforthetest.Thisdidnotconstituteinterferencewiththedefendant'srighttoarrangeforanindependentbloodtest.ThisissuewascertifiedtotheSupremeCourt.Itshouldbenotedthatastothematteroftheconflictbetweenthestatutoryrighttoanindependentbloodtestandthestatutoryrequirementthatthedefendantbeheldincustody,theCourtsimplystatedthattherewasnoconflictwithoutfurtherexplanation.ThereisaninterestingdissentbyChiefJudgeHarrisinwhichitisnotedthatifthedefendantwasabletogothroughtheprocessoffindingaqualifiedpersoninthephonebook,dialingthenumber,andmakingthenecessaryarrangementsthat"shouldbealmostconclusiveevidenceofhisorher ,`'* innocenceofthecharge."AnexcellentreviewofthedecisionsinvariousjurisdictionsonthissubjectisinanarticlewrittenbyJohnP.Lundington,annotations,DWI-PrivateSobrietyTest,45A.L.R.4th11(1986). State  v.Unruh ,658So.2d1011(Fla.5thDCA1994).ph(#h(#    `    2 (  2  )3  0 h Thecourtconcludedthatwherethedefendantexpressesa P  desiretosecureanindependentbloodtestandtheofficerdiscouragesthisactionthedueprocessstandardsetforthin 0  Arizonav.Youngblood,488U.S.51,109S.Ct.333,102  p  L.Ed.2d281(1988),applies. Thatmeansthatthe `  defendantmustshowthattheofficeractedinbadfaith.Inthiscasethedefendantfailedtomeetthatburden.  @  Whenthedefendantmentionedsecuringanindependentbloodtesttheofficertoldhimthatthecostwouldbebetween$250.00and300.00.Infactthecostwasmuchlower.Thedefendanttestifiedthatthatthismisadvisementcausedhimnottoseekthebloodtest.Theofficertestifiedthathehadsimplymadeamistakebasedonhisrecollectionofpastexperience. Statev.Bock ,659So.2d1196(Fla.3d  DCA1995).  ph(#h(#    `       ` 2   3  .3  0  Righttocounsel y. P (# (#    `  2   a  .3  0  TheapplicationoftherulinginTraylorthatcounselmustbe 0 provided "assoonasfeasible" hasrecentlybeenconsidered.The  p courtrefused,however,toresolvetheissuebecauseitconcludedthatthiscasedidnotinvolveacrucialstageoftheproceedings. "Weholdthatadministeringabreathalyzerandhavinga @ defendantperformthefieldsobrietytestonvideotapearereallynothingmorethanthecollectionandpreservationofphysicalevidence,asisdoneineverytypeofcase,anddonotconstituteacrucialconfrontationrequiringthepresenceofdefensecounsel."  Statev.Burns ,661So.2d842(Fla.5thDCA1995).#!(#(#    `     ` 2   4  .3  0  Statements 8~.% # (# (#    `  2   a  .3  0   Selfincrimination ~. `'"%(#(#    `    2 (  1  )3  0 h Thedefendantwasstoppedinitiallyforatrafficinfraction. @)$' Hewasaskedtoshowalicenseandregistrationandtoperformfieldsobrietytests.Theentiretransactiontookaboutelevenminutes.Thedefendantwasnotadvisedofhis ,`'* Mirandarights.Onlyoneofficerwaspresentandthistook  placeinapublicarea. "Here,therearenofactorswhich  wouldtakethiscaseoutsidetheholdinginBerkemer.  Thetrialcourt'sfindingthatBurnsreasonablybelievedhisfreedomofactionwas'curtailedtoadegreeassociatedwithactualarrest'waserroneousasamatteroflaw.Whilehisfreedomofactionwascurtailed,asitisinanydetention,Burnsdidnotbringforthanyevidencethathewassubjectedtoanyrestraintscomparabletothosefoundinaformalarrest." Thefact  p  thathetoldtheofficerhewasclosetohomeandwantedtogodidnotaffectthisresult.ThecourtalsofindthattheconceptofcustodyforMirandapurposesundertheFlorida @  ConstitutionisthesameasundertheFederalConstitution. 0   Statev.Burns ,661So.2d842(Fla.5thDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2 (  2  )3  0 h Whereofficersaskedwhatwouldnormallybeconsidered  questionsseekingroutinebookinginformation,ifitwasclearthattheywereaskingthemtosecureincriminatingevidenceandnotforanybookingpurpose,theresponsesshouldbeexcludedifthedefendantwasincustodyand p Mirandarightswerenotread. Inthiscasetheofficers ` wererepeatingquestionsthathadalreadybeenaskedandtakingnonotes,butthecourt foundthatthiswasnotfor @ anyincriminatingpurpose,butrathertonotehowthedefendantsaidhisresponses. Statev.Burns ,661So.2d  p 842(Fla.5thDCA1995). h(#h(#    `    2 (  3  )3  0 h ThedefendantswerebeinginterrogatedforMiranda @ purposeswheretheywereunderarrestandwereaskedtorecite,outoftheordinarysequence,thealphabetandnumbers. Thisseekscontent("incorrectrecitation") ! ratherthanmanner("slurring")ofspeechandrequiresadvisementofrights. UndertheAllreddecisionrecitation #! ofportionsofthealphabetorcountingwouldbeadmissibleifitwasdonecorrectlybecauseitwouldhavenoincriminatingimpactandwouldconstitutephysicalevidence. Statev.Burns ,661So.2d842(Fla.5thDCA `'"% 1995). h(#h(#    `    2 (  4  )3  0 h Seefactsbelowunder "accidentreportprivilege."    Statev. 0*%( Shepard ,658So.2d611(Fla.2dDCA1995). +p&)h(#h(#  ,`'*    `  2   b  .3  0   AccidentReportPrivilege A .(#(#    `    2 (  1  )3  0 h Anofficerrespondedtothesceneofanaccident.Heaska  crowdifanyonehadseenwhathadhappened.Thedefendantstatedshehadhitthevictim.Theofficercouldsmellastrongodorofalcoholcomingfromthedefendant.Heaskedherforalicenseandforthelocationofhercar.Shepointedtoacarlocatedabout100metersfromtheaccidentscene.Whenthetrafficdivisionarrivedtheofficerturnedtheinvestigationovertothem.Thatpersonwasadeputy.Theofficertoldthedeputythatthedefendantwasthedriverofthevehicle.Inresponsetoquestioningbythedeputy,thedefendantmadestatementsdescribingwhathadhappened.Afterdoingapreliminaryinvestigationatthescene,thedeputyagainapproachedthedefendantandadvisedherofherMirandarightsandherrightsunderthe  impliedconsentlaw.Thedefendantindicatedthatsheunderstoodtherightsandagreedtospeaktothedeputy.ThedeputytoldherthathewasnowconductingacriminalinvestigationforapossibleDUIcharge.Inresponsetoquestioningthedefendantrepeatedherstatementthatshewasdrivingthevehicleandsawapersoninthemiddleoftheroad,butcouldnotavoidhittinghim.Thedefendantagreedtosubmittoaseriesoffieldsobrietytests.Thedeputyadministeredthealphabetandheeltotoecountingtest. Onappealthecourtaffirmedsuppressionofthe  p statementsmadeduringtheaccidentinvestigationconductedbytheofficerbeforethedeputyarrivedandthestatementsmadetotheDeputybeforeMirandawas @ read. Thecourtfoundthatthestatementsmadetothe 0 deputyafterhereadMirandawereadmissiblebasedonState   v.Norstrum,613So.2d437(Fla.1993). AfterMirandais ! readstatementsareadmissiblewhethertheyaremadeduringtheaccidentinvestigationorcriminalinvestigationstage."Theoperativeeventforpurposesofdeterminingwhetherthestatementsareadmissibleisinformingthedefendantofhis/herconstitutionalrights."  p&!$  Thestatementsmadeinconnectionwiththefield `'"% sobrietytestswereadmissiblebecausetheyweregivenafterMirandawarningwereread. BasedonAllredthe @)$' courtruledthatthedriver'sresponsetothealphabetandcountingportionsofthetestwastestimonial. Statev.  +p&) Shepard ,658So.2d611(Fla.2dDCA1995).,`'*h(#h(# Ї    `  2   c  .3  0   CorpusDelicti . (#(#    ` 2   5  .3  0  Multipleconvictions. s  (# (#    `  2   a  .3  0  Thedefendanthadhislicenseadministrativelysuspendedfora p refusal.HesoughtawritofprohibitiontostoptheDUIprosecutiononthegroundsthatitwouldresultinadditionalpunishmentinviolationoftheDoubleJeopardyClause.Thecourtdeniedthewrit. "Weconcludethattheadministrativeremedyofsuspendinga 0  driver'slicensebecauseofdrunkdrivingorotherrelatedbehaviorwasandcontinuestobeprimarilyforthepurposeofenhancingsafedrivingonthepublichighways.Itseffectisremedialinageneraloruniversalsense,becauseitremovesdangerousdriversfromthehighways.And,itcanalsobeviewedasremedialfortheindividualdriverinvolved,sinceinanintoxicatedstate,adriverposesaseriousdangertohimorherself,aswellastoothers.Assuch,itisnomorepunitivethandenyingapersonwhoislegallyblindadriver'slicense.Bothwilllivelongerandhealthierlivesiftheydonotdrive."    Davidsonv.Mackinnon ,656So.2d223(Fla.5thDCA1995).(#(#    `     h    p    `  2   b  .3  0  "Thedoublejeopardyclause[doesnotbar]trialofanoffender ` onacriminaltrafficoffensewheretheoffenderhaspreviouslyenteredapleaofguiltytoatrafficinfractiononwhichthestatewillrelytoproveconductinthecriminaltrafficoffense." The 0 CourtheldthatpaymentofafineonacivilinfractiondidnotbartrialonaDUIoffensearisingfromthesameincident.TheCourtconcluded:(1)thatCorbinhasbeenoverruled;(2)theinfractionis P notcriminalinnature;(3)thestateneednotrelyontheconductwhichwasthebasisfortheinfractiontoprovetheDUI;and(4)thefineforacivilinfractionisnotpunishmentbutratherisdesignedonlytoreduceaccidentsbysafedrivingandthefineisnotexcessiveordisproportionatetotheconduct,therefore,Halperdoesnot "  apply. Statev.Knowles ,625So.2d88(Fla.5thDCA1993).See #! also Statev.Coupal ,626So.2d1013(Fla.2dDCA1993); State $" v.Dean ,637So.2d355(Fla.1stDCA1994); Statev.Murray , % # 644So.2d533(Fla.4thDCA1994); Statev.Mathews, 654 p&!$ So.2d291(Fla.3dDCA1995). (#(#    `  2   c  .3  0  ThedefendanthadaconvictioninColoradofor"drivingwhile @)$' abilityimpaired."Thisoffenseconsistedofdrivingwhen"affected'totheslightestdegreesothatheislessablethanheordinarilywouldhavebeen...toexerciseduecareintheoperationofa ,`'* vehicle.'"Thereisapresumptionthatapersonwhohasabloodalcohollevelof.05to.10commitsthisoffense.InColoradothereisagreateroffensewherethepersonhasabloodalcohollevelover.10%.IntheFloridacasethedefendanthada.20bloodalcohollevel.OnappealthecourtruledthattheColoradooffensewastobeconsideredasafirstforpurposeofsentencinginFlorida. "Given `  thevarietyofeverchangingstatutesinthefiftystatesgoverningtheproblemofdrivingundertheeffectsofalcohol,itisclearthatthelegislatureintendsthisstatutetoincludeawiderangeofforeignoffensesasprioroffenses." McAdamv.State ,648So.  p  2d1244(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    `  2   d  .3  0  ThedefendantwasconvictedofDUImanslaughter,DUIwith @  seriousbodilyinjury,andDUIcausingdamagetoanother.HearguedthatbasedonBoutwellv.State,631So.2d1094(Fla.   1994),hecouldnotbeconvictedofmultipleoffensesarisingoutofasingledrivingepisode.WithoutanydiscussionofthepointsraisedinBoutwellthecourtrejectedthispositionbasedsolelyonthefact  thatBoutwellinvolvedtheoffenseofdrivingwhilealicensewas  suspended. "ThiscourthaspreviouslyheldthatundertheDUI  statute,separateconvictionsarepermissiblewheremultiplevictimsareinjured.Wrightv.State,592So.2d1123,1126(Fla. ` 3dDCA1991),quashedinpartonothergrounds,600So.2d457 P (1992),approvedinpartonothergrounds,Boutwellv.State,631 @ So.2dat1095." Wickv.State ,651So.2d765(Fla.3dDCA 0 1995).Seealso Melbournev.State ,655So.2d126(Fla.5th  p DCA1995)[courtreachedthesameconclusion,butpointedoutthatifBoutwellappliedtoDUIcharges,itwouldeffectivelyoverturn P Houserv.State,474So.2d1193(Fla.1985)].@(#(#    `  2   e  .3  0  ThedefendantwasgivecitationsforDUIandFelonyDUIbasedon   threepriorconvictions.TheDUIwasdismissedincountycourtforfailuretoprovideaspeedytrial.ThecourtfoundthattrialontheFelonyDUIwasbarred. "Section316.193definesonlyonetype #! ofDUIoffense...,punishedwithincreasingseverityinsuccessiveviolations....TheelementsofproofofbothfelonyandmisdemeanorDUIoffensesareidentical.AlthoughprovingtheexistenceofthreepriorDUIconvictionsisanessentialelementoffelonyDUIoffense,...thesoledistinguishingfactorbetweenthemisdemeanorandthefelonyistheseverityofpunishmentprescribedbysection316.193(2)...Hence,theoffensesfallunderthesection775.021(4)(b)1.doublejeopardybarfor'Offenseswhichrequireidenticalelementsofproof.'" ,`'* Thecourtnotedthateventhoughajuryhadnotbeensworn"'sincethedischargeunderthe[speedytrial]ruleisforfailureofstateactiontotimelyprosecute,suchdischargebytheclearlanguageoftherulewouldrateasanestoppelagainstprosecutionofdefendantforthesameoffensesfromwhichhehasbeenpreviouslydischarged.'" Statev.Woodruff ,654So.2d `  585(Fla.3dDCA1995). (#(#    `  2   f  .3  0  ThedefendantwaschargedwithtwocountsofDUIwithserious 0  bodilyinjurybasedoninjuriestotwooccupantsofanothervehicleresultingfromoneaccident.Thetrialjudgefoundthattherecouldbeonlyoneconvictionanddismissedoneofthechargesbasedon P  BoutwellandMichie.Onappealthecourtreversed. "Boutwelland @  MichiedonotprohibitmorethanoneconvictionforDUIwith 0  seriousbodilyinjurybaseduponasingledrivingepisode." The   courtreachedthisconclusionbasedonthefollowingconsiderations:(1)inBoutwell,theCourtheldthattherecouldbeonlyone  convictionperaccidentfordrivingwithasuspendedlicensewithseriousinjuryregardlessofthenumberofvictims;(2)theBoutwell  courtapprovedWrightv.State,592So.2d1123(Fla.3dDCA  1991),quashedonothergrounds,600So.2d457(Fla.1992),tothe p extentthatthecaseeffectedtheholdinginBoutwell;(3)the ` BoutwellcourtfailedtomentionthatWrightletmultipleconvictions P forDUIwithseriousbodilyinjuryarisingoutofonedrivingepisodeatissueinthatcase;(4)inhisdissentinBoutwellJustice 0 GrimesacknowledgedthatinWrightandPulaskiv.State,540So.  p 2d193(Fla.2dDCA),reviewdenied,547So.2d1210(Fla.1989), ` thecourtsupheldmultipleconvictionsforDUIwithseriousbodilyinjuryarisingoutofoneaccident;(5)inMichiethedefendantwas @ chargedwithtwocountsofDUIwithseriousbodilyinjuryandtwocountsofdrivingwithasuspendedlicensewithseriousbodilyinjury,buthewasconvictedofthelesser-includedoffensesofsimpleDUIanddrivingwithasuspendedlicenseandonappealthiscourtheld"'thattrafficoffensessuchasdrivingundertheinfluenceordrivingwithasuspendedlicenseare'continuingoffenses'permittingasingleconvictionperepisode.'"Michie,632So.2dat % # 1108;(6)inMichiethiscourtsaidofBoutwellthat"'regardlessof p&!$ thenumberofinjuredpersons,therecanonlybeoneconvictionarisingfromasingleaccident,'"butthiswas"unnecessaryandwasnotapartofourholdingtherein,asMichieexclusivelyaddressed @)$' multipleconvictionsforsimpleDUIarisingfromasingledrivingepisode;"(7)"therearenumerouscases...whichholdthatmultipleconvictionsforDUIwithseriousbodilyinjuryareindeed ,`'* permissibleforinjuriestomorethanonevictimarisingoutofasingledrivingepisode;"(8)BoutwelldidnotapplytoDUIcases  involvingseriousbodilyinjury. Statev.Lamoureux ,660So.2d  1063(Fla.2dDCA1995). (#(#    `  2   g  .3  0  TheFourthDistrictdisagreeswiththeSecondDistrict.Adefendant `  hadanacccidentandasaresulthewasconvictedofoneDUIManslaughter,twoDUIsWithBodilyInjury,1DUIWithSeriousBodilyInjury,twoDUIsWithPropertyDamage,andoneDrivingWhileLicensewasSuspended.Onappealthecourtconsideredthe  p  Boutwelldecisionandreachedtheseconclusions:(1)DUI,like `  DUS,isacontinuingoffense(i.e.itiscompletewhentheoffenderdrivesandcontinuesuntiltheperiodofdrivingisbroken);(2) like @  DUSthecommissionofDUIWithSeriousBodilyandDUIPropertyDamagearisingoutofonedrivingepisodeshouldbeconsideredsingleoffensesregardlessofthenumberofpeopleinjuredandthenumberofcarsdamages; (3)thereis no  inconsistencywithHouserbecausetheSupremeCourthasmade  itclearthatDUIManslaughterisactuallyaseparatecrime,whiletheotheroffensesaremerelyenhancements; (4)Boutwell  undercutsPulaski;(5)thedefendantcanbeconvicted undereach p sectionofthestatute,(i.e.onceforDUIWithSeriousBodilyInjuryandonceforDUIWithPropertyDamage)butonlyonceperdrivingepisode,unlessthechargesaremanslaughter.  @ Salazarv.State,20Fla.L.WeeklyD2431(Fla.4thDCANov.1, 0 1995). (#(#    `  2   h  .3  0  Seesectionunderpretrialmattersondoublejeopardy.P(#(# Ѐ   `   @    ` 2   6  .3  0  FieldSobrietyProcedures =. 0 (# (#    `  2   a  .3  0  Itisreasonableforanofficertorequestthatthedefendantperform ! noninvasiveandpainlessfieldsobrietytestswheretheofficer has "  reasonablesuspicion. ThereisnoviolationoftheFourth #! Amendment. Statev.Taylor ,648So.2d701(Fla.1995).$"(#(#    `  2   b  .3  0  "[T]otheextentthatBurnsrefusedtocomplywitharequestto p&!$ takephysical,non-testimonialtests,weholdthattherefusalisadmissible."Statev.Burns ,20Fla.L.WeeklyD807(Fla.5th P(#& DCAMarch31,1995). (#(#    `  2   c  .3  0  Seefactsaboveunder "accidentreportprivilege."  Statev.  +p&) Shepard ,658So.2d611(Fla.2dDCA1995).,`'*(#(# Ї   ` 2   7  .3  0  Otherevidence .  (# (#    `  2   a  .3  0  Twodaysbeforeasentencinghearingthetrialcourtrefusedto  acceptawrittenreportfromthedefendant'stoxicologyexpert   indicatingthatanulcermedicationbeingtakenbythedefendantenhancedalcoholabsorption;sothatthedefendant'sblododalcoholreadingwasmuchhigherthanitwouldhavebeenwithoutthemedication.Thetrialjudgewantedtohearthetestimonyoftheexpert.Onappealthecourtfoundnotabuseofdiscretion. Wickv. 0  State ,651So.2d765(Fla.3dDCA1995). x   @  @ !  @ !  p (#(#    ` 2   8  .3  0  Refusals S .`  (# (#    `  2   a  .3  0  Noviolationofaconstitutionalorstatutoryrighttakesplacewhere @  anofficerasksapersontotakefieldsobrietytestsbasedonreasonablesuspicionandhisorher refusaltodosoisallowedinto   evidence. Statev.Taylor ,648So.2d701(Fla.1995).(#(#    `  2   b  .3  0  Thecourtruledthattherefusaltosubmittofieldsobrietytests  wasrelevanteventhoughthedefendanthadnotbeentoldthatthetestswerecompulsoryorabouttheadverseconsequencesofhisrefusal. Thedefendantinthiscasesuggestedthattherefusal p wasnotprobativeasaninferenceofguiltbecausehemayhavebeenmotivatedbyinnocentconsiderationssuchasthedesiretoterminatethecontactwiththeofficer.Onappealthecourtrejectedthispositionbecause:(1)theofficerobservedcircumstancesindicatingthatthedefendantwasintoxicated;(2)theofficeraskedthedefendanttwicetotakethefieldsobr